Court File No.: CV-20-00643158-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ROBERTS COMPANY CANADA LIMITED

Applicant

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANT
(Amended and Restated Initial Order)

July 6, 2020

BENNETT JONES LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
3400 One First Canadian Place
P.O. Box 130
Toronto, ON M5X 1A4

Raj Sahni (LSO#: 42942U)
Tel: (416) 777-4804
Email: sahnir@bennettjones.com

Danish Afroz (LSO#: 65786B)
Tel: (416) 777-6124
Email: afrozd@bennettjones.com

Lawyers for the Applicant

INDEX

Court File No.: CV-20-00643158-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ROBERTS COMPANY CANADA LIMITED

INDEX

TAB 1

CITATION: Lydian International Limited (Re), 2019 ONSC 7473
COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-00633392-00CL
DATE: 2019-12-24

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGMENT OF LYDIAN INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, LYDIAN CANADA VENTURES CORPORATION AND LYDIAN U.K. CORPORATION LIMITED

Applicants

BEFORE: Chief Justice Geoffrey B. Morawetz

COUNSEL: *Elizabeth Pillon, Sanja Sopic,* and *Nicholas Avis*, for the Applicants

Pamela Huff, for Resource Capital Fund VI L.P.

Alan Merskey, for OSISKO Bermuda Limited

D.J. Miller, for Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. proposed Monitor

David Bish, for ORION Capital Management

Bruce Darlington, for ING Bank N.V./ABS Svensk Exportkrerdit (publ)

HEARD and DETERMINED: December 23, 2019

REASONS RELEASED: December 24, 2019

ENDORSEMENT

Introduction

[1] Lydian International Limited ("Lydian International"), Lydian Canada Ventures Corporation ("Lydian Canada") and Lydian UK Corporation Limited ("Lydian UK", and collectively, the "Applicants") apply for creditor protection and other relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA"). The Applicants seek an initial order, substantially in the form attached to the application record. No party attending on the motion opposed the requested relief.

[2] The Applicants are part of a gold exploration and development business in south central Armenia (the "Amulsar Project"). The Amulsar Project is directly owned and operated by Lydian Armenia CJSC ("Lydian Armenia"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Applicants.

[3] As set out in the affidavit of Edward A. Sellers sworn December 22, 2019 (the "Sellers Affidavit"), the Applicants have been experiencing and continue to experience liquidity issues due to blockades of the Amulsar Project and other external factors. The Sellers Affidavit details such activities and Mr. Sellers deposes that these activities have prevented Lydian Armenia and its employees, contractors and suppliers from accessing, constructing and ultimately operating the Amulsar Project.

[4] Mr. Sellers states that the lack of progress at the Amulsar Project has prevented the Lydian Group (as that term is defined below) from generating any positive cash flow and has also triggered defaults on certain of the Lydian Group's obligations to its lenders which, if enforced, the Lydian Group would be unable to satisfy.

[5] The Lydian Group has operated under forbearance agreements in respect of these defaults since October 2018, but the most recent forbearance agreement expired on December 20, 2019.

[6] The Applicants contend that they now require immediate protection under the CCAA for the breathing room they require to pursue remedial steps on a time sensitive basis.

[7] The Applicants intend to continue discussions with their lenders and other stakeholders, including the Government of Armenia ("GOA"). The Applicants also intend to continue evaluating potential financing and/or sale options, all with a view to achieving a viable path forward.

The Applicants

[8] Lydian International is a corporation continued under the laws of the Bailiwick of Jersey, Channel Islands, from the Province of Alberta pursuant to the *Companies (Jersey) Law 1991*. Lydian International was originally incorporated under the *Business Corporations Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9 (Alberta) on February 14, 2006 as "Dawson Creek Capital Corp.", and subsequently became Lydian International on December 12, 2007.

[9] Lydian International's registered office is located in Jersey. On June 12, 2019, Lydian International shareholders approved its continuance under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44, but this continuance has yet to be implemented.

[10] Lydian International has two types of securities listed on the Toronto Stock exchange: (1) ordinary shares and (2) warrants that expired in 2017.

[11] Lydian Canada is a direct, wholly owned subsidiary of Lydian International. Lydian Canada is incorporated under the *Business Corporations Act*, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57 (British Columbia) and has a registered head office in Toronto. Its registered and records office is located in British Columbia.

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

[12] Lydian UK is a corporation incorporated in the United Kingdom and is a direct, wholly-owned subsidiary of Lydian Canada with a head office located in the United Kingdom. Lydian UK has no material assets in the UK.

[13] Lydian International and Lydian UK have assets in Canada in the form of deposits with the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto.

[14] The Applicants are part of a corporate group (the "Lydian Group") with a number of other subsidiaries ultimately owned by Lydian International. Other than the Applicants, certain of the Lydian Group's subsidiaries are Lydian U.S. Corporation ("Lydian US"), Lydian International Holdings Limited ("Lydian Holdings"), Lydian Resources Armenia Limited ("Lydian Resources") and Lydian Armenia, a corporation incorporated under the laws of the Republic of Armenia. Together, Lydian U.S., Lydian Holdings, Lydian Resources and Lydian Armenia are the "Non-Applicant" parties.

[15] The Applicants submit that due to the complete integration of the business and operations of the Lydian Group, an extension of the stay of proceedings over the Non-Applicant parties is appropriate.

[16] The Applicants contend that the Lydian Group is highly integrated and its business and affairs are directed primarily out of Canada. Substantially all of its strategic business affairs, including key decision-making, are conducted in Toronto and Vancouver.

[17] Further, all the Applicants and Non-Applicant Parties are borrowers or guarantors of the Lydian Group's secured indebtedness. The Lydian Group's loan agreements are governed primarily by the laws of Ontario.

[18] Finally, the Lydian Group's forbearance and restructuring efforts have been directed out of Toronto.

[19] The Lydian Group is focused on constructing the Amulsar Project, its wholly-owned development stage gold mine in Armenia. The Amulsar Project was funded by a combination of equity and debt capital and stream financing. The debt and stream financing arrangements are secured over substantially all the assets of Lydian Armenia and Lydian International in the shares of various groups of the Lydian Group.

[20] The Applicants contend that time is of the essence given the Applicants' minimal cash position and negative cash flow.

Issues

[21] The issues for consideration are whether:

(a) the Applicants meet the criteria for protection under the CCAA;

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

(b) the CCAA stay should be extended to the Non-Applicant Parties;

(c) the proposed monitor, Alvarez & Marsal Canada Inc. ("A&M") should be appointed as monitor;

(d) Ontario is the appropriate venue for this proceeding;

(e) this court should issue a letter of request of the Royal Court of Jersey;

(f) this Court should exercise its discretion to grant the Administration Charge and the D & O Charge (as defined below); and

(g) it is appropriate to grant a stay extension immediately following the issuance of the Initial Order.

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

Law and Analysis

[22] Pursuant to section 11.02(1) of the CCAA, a court may make an order staying all proceedings in respect of a debtor company for a period of not more than 10 days, provided that the court is satisfied that circumstances exist to make the order appropriate.

[23] Section 11.02(1) of the CCAA was recently amended and the maximum stay period permitted in an initial application was reduced from 30 days to 10 days. Section 11.001 which came into force at the same time as the amendment to s. 11.02(1), limits initial orders to "ordinary course" relief.

[24] Section 11.001 provides:

> 11.001 An order made under section 11 at the same time as an order made under subsection 11.02(1) or during the period referred to in an order made under that subsection with respect to an initial application shall be limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that period.

[25] The News Release issued by Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada specifically states that these amendments "limit the decisions that can be taken at the outset of a CCAA proceeding to measures necessary to avoid the immediate liquidation of an insolvent company, thereby improving participation of all players."

[26] In my view, the intent of s. 11.001 is clear. Absent exceptional circumstances, the relief to be granted in the initial hearing "shall be limited to relief that is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company in the ordinary course of business during that

period". The period being no more than 10 days, and whenever possible, the *status quo* should be maintained during that period.

[27] Following the granting of the initial order, a number of developments can occur, including:

(a) notification to all stakeholders of the CCAA application;

(b) stabilization of the operation of debtor companies;

(c) ongoing negotiations with key stakeholders who were consulted prior to the CCAA filing;

(d) commencement of negotiations with stakeholders who were not consulted prior to the CCAA filing;

(e) negotiations of DIP facilities and DIP Charges;

(f) negotiations of Administration Charges;

(g) negotiation of Key Employee Incentives Programs;

(h) negotiation of Key Employee Retention Programs;

(i) consultation with regulators;

(j) consultation with tax authorities;

(k) consideration as to whether representativecounsel is required; and

(l) consultation and negotiation with key suppliers.

[28] This list is not intended to be exhaustive. It is merely illustrative of the many issues that can arise in a CCAA proceeding.

[29] Prior to the recent amendments, it was not uncommon for an initial order to include provisions that would affect some or all of the aforementioned issues and parties. The previous s. 11.02 provided that the initial stay period could be for a period of up to 30 days. After the initial stay, a "comeback" hearing was scheduled and, in theory, parties could request that certain provisions addressed in the initial order could be reconsidered.

[30] The practice of granting wide-sweeping relief at the initial hearing must be altered in light of the recent amendments. The intent of the amendments is to limit the relief granted on the first day. The ensuing 10-day period allows for a stabilization of operations and a negotiating window, followed by a comeback hearing where the request for expanded relief can be considered, on proper notice to all affected parties.

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

[31] In my view, this is consistent with the objectives of the amendments which include the requirement for "participants in an insolvency proceeding to act in good faith" and "improving participation of all players". It may also result in more meaningful comeback hearings.

[32] It is against this backdrop that the requested relief at the initial hearing should be scrutinized so as to ensure that it is restricted to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operations of the debtor company during the initial stay period.

[33] For the reasons that follow, I conclude that it is appropriate to grant a s. 11.02 order in respect of the Applicants.

[34] I am satisfied that Lydian Canada meets the CCAA definition of "company" and is eligible for CCAA protection.

[35] I have also considered whether the foreign incorporated companies are "companies" pursuant to the CCAA. Such entities must satisfy the disjunctive test of being an "incorporated company" either "having assets or doing business in Canada".

[36] In *Cinram International Inc., (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 3767, 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46, I stated that the threshold for having assets in Canada is low and that holding funds in a Canadian bank account brings a foreign corporation within the definition of "company" under the CCAA.

[37] In this case, both Lydian International and Lydian UK meet the definition of "company" because both corporations have assets in and do business in Canada.

[38] In my view the Applicants are each "debtor companies" under the CCAA. The Applicants are insolvent and have liabilities in excess of $5 million. I am satisfied that the Applicants are eligible for CCAA protection.

[39] The Applicants seek to extend the stay to Lydian Armenia, Lydian Holdings, Lydian Resources Armenia Limited and Lydian US. I am satisfied that, in the circumstances, it is appropriate to grant an order that extends the stay to the Non-Applicant Parties. The stay is intended to stabilize operations in the Lydian Group. This finding is consistent with CCAA jurisprudence: see e.g., *Sino-Forest Corporation (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 2063, at paras. 5, 18, and 31; *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)* (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.); and *Target Canada Co. (Re)*, 2015 ONSC 303, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 323, at paras. 49-50.

[40] I am also satisfied that is appropriate to appoint A & M as monitor pursuant to the provisions of s. 11.7 of the CCAA.

[41] With respect to whether Ontario is the appropriate venue for this proceeding, Lydian Canada's registered head office is located in Toronto and its registered and records offices are located in Vancouver. In my view, Ontario has jurisdiction over Lydian Canada. The registered head offices for Lydian International and Lydian UK are in Jersey and the UK respectively, however, both entities have assets in Ontario, those being funds on deposit with the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. Further, it seems to me that both Lydian International and Lydian UK

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

have a strong nexus to Ontario and accordingly I am satisfied that Ontario is the appropriate jurisdiction to hear this application.

[42] I am also satisfied that, in these circumstances, it is appropriate for this court to issue to the Royal Court of Jersey a letter of request as referenced in the application record.

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

Administration Charge

[43] The Applicants seek a charge on their assets in the maximum amount of US $350,000 to secure the fees and disbursements incurred in connection with services rendered by counsel to the Applicants, A & M and A & M's counsel, in respect of the CCAA proceedings (the "Administration Charge").

[44] Section 11.52 of the CCAA provides the ability for the court to grant the Administration Charge.

[45] The recently enacted s. 11.001 of the CCAA limits the requested relief on this motion, including the Administration Charge, to what is reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the Applicants during the Initial Stay Period. The Sellers Affidavit outlines the complex issues facing the Applicants.

[46] In *Canwest Publishing Inc.*, (Re), 2010 ONSC 222, 63 C.B.R.(5th) 115, Pepall J. (as she then was) identified six non-exhaustive factors that the court may consider in addition to s. 11.52 of the CCAA when determining whether to grant an administration charge. These factors include:

(a) the size and complexity of business being restructured;

(b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

(c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;

(d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

(e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and

(f) the position of the monitor.

[47] It seems to me that the proposed restructuring will require extensive input from the professional advisors and there is an immediate need for such advice. The requested relief is supported by A & M.

[48] I am satisfied that the Administration Charge in the limited amount of US $350,000 is appropriate in the circumstances and is reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the business at this time.

D & O Charge

[49] The Applicants also seek a charge over the property in favour of their former and current directors in the limited amount of $200,000 (the "D & O Charge").

[50] The Applicants maintain Directors' and Officers' liability insurance (the "D & O Insurance") which provides a total of $10 million in coverage.

[51] The D & O Insurance is set to expire on December 31, 2019.

[52] Section 11.51 of the CCAA provides the court with the express statutory jurisdiction to grant the D & O charge in an amount the court considers appropriate, provided notice is given to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected.

[53] In *Jaguar Mining Inc., (Re),* 2014 ONSC 494, 12 C.B.R. (6th) 290, I set out a number of factors to be considered in determining whether to grant a directors' and officers' charge:

> (a) whether notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;
>
> (b) whether the amount is appropriate;
>
> (c) whether the Applicant could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director at a reasonable cost; and
>
> (d) whether the charge applies in respect of any obligation incurred by a director or officer as a result of the directors' or officers' gross negligence or willful misconduct.

[54] Having reviewed the Sellers Affidavit, it seems to me that the granting of the D & O charge is necessary in the circumstances. In arriving at this conclusion, I have also taken into account that the D & O Insurance will lapse shortly; having directors involved in the process is desirable; that the secured creditors likely to be affected do not object; and that A & M has advised that it is supportive of the D & O Charge. Further, the requested amount is one that I consider to be reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the Applicants.

Extension of the Stay of Proceedings

[55] The Applicants have requested that, if the initial order is granted, I should immediately entertain and grant an order extending the Stay Period until and including January 17, 2020 which will provide the Applicants and all stakeholders with enough time to adequately prepare for a comeback hearing.

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

[56] The Applicants submit that I am authorized to grant a stay extension immediately after granting the initial order because section 11.02(2) of the CCAA does not provide a minimum waiting time before an applicant can seek a stay extension. The Applicants reference recent decisions where courts have scheduled hearings within two or three days after the granting of an initial order. Reference is made to *Clover Leaf Holdings Company (Re)*, 2019 ONSC 6966 and *Re Wayland group Corp. et al.* (2 December 2019), Toronto CV–19–00632079-00CL. In *Clover Leaf*, the stay extension for 36 days and additional relief including authorization for DIP financing was granted three days after the initial order and in *Wayland*, the stay extension was granted two days after the initial order.

[57] I acknowledge that, in this case, it may be challenging for the Applicants to return to court at or near the end of the 10-day initial stay period due to the year-end holidays. I also acknowledge that the offices of many of the parties involved in these proceedings may not be open during the holidays.

[58] However, the statutory maximum 10-day stay as referenced in s. 11.02(1) expires on January 2, 2020 and the courts are open on that day.

[59] As noted above, absent exceptional circumstances, I do not believe that it is desirable to entertain motions for supplementary relief in the period immediately following the granting of an initial order.

[60] It could very well be that circumstances existed in both *Clover Leaf* and *Wayland* that justified the stay extension and the ancillary relief being granted shortly after the initial order.

[61] However, in this case, I have not been persuaded on the evidence that it is necessary for the stay extension to be addressed prior to January 2, 2020 and I decline to do so.

Disposition

[62] The initial order is granted with a Stay Period in effect until January 2, 2020. In view of the holiday schedules of many parties, the following procedures are put in place. The Applicants can file a motion returnable on January 2, 2020, requesting that the stay be extended to January 23, 2020. Any party that wishes to oppose the extension of the stay to January 23, 2020 is required to notify the Applicant, A & M and the Commercial List Office of their intention to do so no later than 2:00 p.m. on December 30, 2019. In the event that the requested stay extension is unopposed, there will be no need for counsel to attend on the return of the motion. I will consider the motion based on the materials filed.

[63] If any objections are received by 2:00 p.m. on December 30, 2019, the hearing on January 2, 2020 will address the opposed extension request. Any further relief will be considered at the Comeback Motion on January 23, 2020.

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

Chief Justice Geoffrey B. Morawetz

Date: December 24, 2019

2019 ONSC 7473 (CanLII)

TAB 2

Court File No. CV-20-00636875-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE	)	FRIDAY, THE 6th
	)	
JUSTICE CONWAY	)	DAY OF MARCH, 2020

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 2607380 ONTARIO INC. (the "**Applicant**")

AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER
(Amending Initial Order dated February 25, 2020)

THIS MOTION, made by the Applicant pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**") for an order amending and restating the Initial Order (the "**Initial Order**") issued on February 25, 2020 (the "**Initial Filing Date**") and extending the stay of proceedings provided for therein was heard this day at 330 University Ave, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of Shawn Saulnier sworn February 24, 2020 (the "**Saulnier Initial Affidavit**"), the affidavit of Shawn Saulnier sworn March 4, 2020 (the "**Saulnier Comeback Affidavit**") and the Exhibits thereto, the pre-filing report of Richter Advisory Group Inc., in its capacity as proposed monitor (the "**Monitor**") to the Applicant, dated February 24, 2020, the First Report of the Monitor dated March 5, 2020 and on being advised that the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the charges created herein were given notice, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicant and counsel for the Monitor, the DIP Lender and those other parties listed on the counsel slip, with counsel for ● in attendance and ~~not opposing~~, and on being advised that those parties listed in the affidavits of service filed were given notice of this motion;

INITIAL ORDER AND INITIAL FILING DATE

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Initial Order, reflecting the Initial Filing Date, shall be amended and restated as provided for herein.

SERVICE

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

APPLICATION

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicant is a company to which the CCAA applies.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "**Plan**").

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall remain in possession and control of its current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "**Property**"). Subject to the provisions of this Order and further Order of this Court, the Applicant shall continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of its business (the "**Business**") and Property. The Applicant is authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the employees, consultants, agents, experts, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively "**Assistants**") currently retained or employed by it, with liberty to retain such further Assistants as it deems reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business or for the carrying out of the terms of this Order.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall be entitled to continue to use the central cash management system currently in place as described in the Saulnier Initial Affidavit

or replace it with another substantially similar central cash management system (the "**Cash Management System**") and that any present or future bank providing the Cash Management System shall not be under any obligation whatsoever to inquire into the propriety, validity or legality of any transfer, payment, collection or other action taken under the Cash Management System, or as to the use or application by the Applicant of funds transferred, paid, collected or otherwise dealt with in the Cash Management System, shall be entitled to provide the Cash Management System without any liability in respect thereof to any Person (as hereinafter defined) other than the Applicant, pursuant to the terms of the documentation applicable to the Cash Management System, and shall be, in its capacity as provider of the Cash Management System, an unaffected creditor under the Plan with regard to any claims or expenses it may suffer or incur in connection with the provision of the Cash Management System.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall advise and obtain the Monitor's consent in respect of

(a) any proposed disbursements after the Initial Filing Date to be made where (i) the amount of the disbursement is in excess of $1,000 for a singular disbursement or (ii) the aggregate daily disbursements will exceed $5,000; and

(b) any contracts, including leases, with (i) an aggregate value or liability in excess of $1,000; and/or (ii) a term in excess of one month, to be entered into by the Applicant or Nuvo Network Inc.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall be entitled but not required to pay the following expenses whether incurred prior to, on or after the Initial Filing Date:

(a) all outstanding and future wages, salaries, employee benefits, vacation pay and expenses payable on or after the Initial Filing Date, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements; and

(b) the fees and disbursements of any Assistants retained or employed by the Applicant in respect of these proceedings, at their standard rates and charges.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein, the Applicant shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Applicant in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course after the Initial Filing Date, and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, which expenses shall include, without limitation:

(a) all expenses and capital expenditures reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance (including directors and officers' insurance), maintenance and security services; and

(b) payment for goods or services actually supplied to the Applicant following the Initial Filing Date.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:

(a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including, without limitation, amounts in respect of (i) employment insurance, (ii) Canada Pension Plan, (iii) Quebec Pension Plan, and (iv) income taxes;

(b) all goods and services or other applicable sales taxes (collectively, "**Sales Taxes**") required to be remitted by the Applicant in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Applicant, but only where such Sales Taxes are accrued or collected after the Initial Filing Date, or where such Sales Taxes were accrued or collected prior to the date of this Order but not required to be remitted until on or after the Initial Filing Date, and

(c) any amount payable to the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any political subdivision thereof or any other taxation authority in respect of municipal realty, municipal business or other taxes, property tax arrears relating to the Real Property (as defined below), assessments or levies of any nature or kind which are entitled at law to be paid in priority to claims of secured creditors and

which are attributable to or in respect of the carrying on of the Business by the Applicant.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as specifically permitted herein, the Applicant is hereby directed, until further Order of this Court: (a) to make no payments of principal, interest thereon or otherwise on account of amounts owing by the Applicant to any of its creditors as of the Initial Filing Date; (b) to grant no security interests, trust, liens, charges or encumbrances upon or in respect of any of its Property; and (c) to not grant credit or incur liabilities except in the ordinary course of the Business.

RESTRUCTURING

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall, subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA, have the right to:

(a) terminate the employment of such of their employees or temporarily lay off such of their employees as the Applicant deems appropriate; and

(b) continue negotiations with stakeholders in an effort to pursue restructuring options for the Applicant including without limitation all avenues of refinancing of their Business or Property, in whole or part, subject to prior approval of this Court being obtained before any material refinancing;

all of the foregoing to permit the Applicant to proceed with an orderly restructuring of its business (the "**Restructuring**"). For greater certainty, any steps taken in connection with a sales and investor solicitation process involving all or part of the Applicants' shares, the Property and/or the Business ("**SISP**") shall be in the sole control of the Monitor pursuant to its powers set out in this Order and any further Order of this Court.

NO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT, NUVO NETWORK INC. OR THE SAULNIERS

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until and including October 24, 2020, or such later date as this Court may subsequently order (the "**Stay Period**"), no proceeding or enforcement process in or out of any court or tribunal (each, a "**Proceeding**") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the Applicant or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property,

except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or with leave of this Court, and any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Applicant or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further Order of this Court.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or with leave of this Court, no Proceeding shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the non-applicant Nuvo Network Inc. or affecting any of its current and future assets, businesses, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "**Nuvo Property**"), and any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Nuvo Network Inc. or affecting the Nuvo Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further order of this Court.

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or with leave of this Court, no Proceeding shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of Shawn Saulnier or Bridget Saulnier (the "**Saulniers**") or any of their current and future assets, businesses, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (collectively, the "**Saulnier Property**"), arising upon or as a result of any default under the terms of any document entered into in connection with any of the Saulniers' guarantees of any of the commitments or loans of the Applicant (collectively, the "**Saulnier Default Events**"). Without limitation, the operation of any provision of a contract or agreement between the Saulniers and any other Person (as hereinafter defined) that purports to effect or cause a termination or cessation of any rights of the Saulniers, or to accelerate, terminate, discontinue, alter, interfere with, repudiate, cancel, suspend, amend or modify such contract or agreement, in each case as a result of one or more Saulnier Default Events, is hereby stayed and restrained during the Stay Period.

NO EXERCISE OF RIGHTS OR REMEDIES

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all rights and remedies of any individual, firm, corporation, governmental body or agency, or any other entities (all of the foregoing, collectively being "**Persons**" and each being a "**Person**") against or in respect of the

Applicant or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, are hereby stayed and suspended except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or leave of this Court, provided that nothing in this Order shall (i) empower the Applicant to carry on any business which the Applicant is not lawfully entitled to carry on, (ii) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by Section 11.1 of the CCAA, (iii) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest, or (iv) prevent the registration of a claim for lien.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all rights and remedies of any Person against or in respect of Nuvo Network Inc. (or affecting the Nuvo Property) or the Saulniers (or affecting the Saulnier Property) as a result of a Saulnier Default Event are hereby stayed and suspended except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or leave of this Court, provided that nothing in this Order shall (i) empower Nuvo Network Inc. or the Saulniers to carry on any business which Nuvo Network Inc. or the Saulniers are not lawfully entitled to carry on, (ii) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by Section 11.1 of the CCAA, (iii) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest, or (iv) prevent the registration of a claim for lien.

NO INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or leave of this Court, no Person shall discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, lease, sublease, licence or permit in favour of or held by (i) the Applicant, (ii) Nuvo Network Inc. or (iii) any other party as a result of a Saulnier Default Event.

CONTINUATION OF SERVICES

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all Persons having oral or written agreements with the Applicant or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods and/or services, including without limitation all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation services, utility or other services to the Business or the Applicant, are hereby restrained until further

Order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply of such goods or services as may be required by the Applicant, and that the Applicant shall be entitled to the continued use of its current premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses and domain names, provided in each case that the normal prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the Initial Filing Date are paid by the Applicant in accordance with normal payment practices of the Applicant or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and each of the Applicant and the Monitor, or as may be ordered by this Court.

NON-DEROGATION OF RIGHTS

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding anything else in this Order or the Initial Order, no Person shall be prohibited from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of lease or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided on or after the Initial Filing Date, nor shall any Person be under any obligation on or after the Initial Filing Date to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to the Applicant. Nothing in this Order or the Initial Order shall derogate from the rights conferred and obligations imposed by the CCAA.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, and except as permitted by subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA, no Proceeding may be commenced or continued against any of the former, current or future directors or officers of the Applicant with respect to any claim against the directors or officers that arose before the Initial Filing Date and that relates to any obligations of the Applicant whereby the directors or officers are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors or officers for the payment or performance of such obligations, until a compromise or arrangement in respect of the Applicant, if one is filed, is sanctioned by this Court or is refused by the creditors of the Applicant or this Court.

DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INDEMNIFICATION AND CHARGE

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall indemnify its directors and officers against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as directors or officers of the Applicant after the Initial Filing Date, except to the extent that, with respect to any officer or director, the

obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the directors and officers of the Applicant shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**Directors' Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $50,000 as security for the indemnity provided in paragraph 22 of this Order. The Directors' Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 42 and 44 herein.

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any language in any applicable insurance policy to the contrary, (a) no insurer shall be entitled to be subrogated to or claim the benefit of the Directors' Charge, and (b) the Applicant's directors and officers shall only be entitled to the benefit of the Directors' Charge to the extent that they do not have coverage under any directors' and officers' insurance policy, or to the extent that such coverage is insufficient to pay amounts indemnified in accordance with paragraph 22 of this Order.

APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that that Richter Advisory Group Inc. is, as of the Initial Filing Date, appointed pursuant to the CCAA as the Monitor, an officer of this Court, to monitor the business and financial affairs of the Applicant, including monitoring the renovation of the buildings, to permit the Applicant to apply for occupancy permits and lease up status, on the lands municipally known as 1295 North Service Road, Burlington, Ontario (the "**Renovation Project**"), with the powers and obligations set out in the CCAA or set forth herein and that the Applicant and its shareholders, officers, directors, and Assistants shall advise the Monitor of all material steps taken by the Applicant pursuant to this Order, and shall co-operate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and discharge of its obligations and provide the Monitor with the assistance that is necessary to enable the Monitor to adequately carry out the Monitor's functions.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is hereby directed and empowered to:

(a) monitor the Applicant's receipts and disbursements, including to the extent deemed appropriate by the Monitor as it relates to Nuvo Network Inc. to the extent it utilizes

the Cash Management System with the Applicant, in order to review and consider the cash requirements and reasonableness of the cash flow forecast prepared by the Applicant, and the continued use of the Cash Management System;

(b) approve or deny any proposed disbursements by the Applicant pursuant to paragraph 7 above;

(c) have full and complete access to the books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and other financial documents of the Applicant and Nuvo Network Inc. to the extent that is necessary to adequately assess the Applicant's business and financial affairs and prospects for a restructuring or transaction of any kind, to report on cash flow forecasts prepared by the Applicant, or to perform its duties arising under this or any further Order of this Court and Nuvo Network Inc. shall cause its respective employees, contractors, agents, advisors, directors and/or officers, as may be necessary, available to the Monitor for such purposes;

(d) report to this Court at such times and intervals as the Monitor may deem appropriate with respect to matters relating to the Property, the Business, the Renovation Project, and such other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein;

(e) assist the Applicant, to the extent required by the Applicant, in its dissemination of to the DIP Lender and its counsel on a weekly basis of financial and other information as agreed between the Applicant and the DIP Lender which may be used in these proceedings including reporting on a basis to be agreed with the DIP Lender;

(f) assist the Applicant in its preparation of the Applicant's cash flow statements;

(g) prepare, based upon information provided by the Applicant, the Applicants' cash flow statement and reporting required by the DIP Lender, which information shall be reviewed by the Monitor and delivered to the DIP Lender and its counsel on a periodic basis, but not less than weekly, or as otherwise agreed to by the DIP Lender;

(h) advise the Applicant in its development of the Plan and any amendments to the Plan;

(i) assist the Applicant, to the extent required by the Applicant, with the holding and administering of creditors' or shareholders' meetings for voting on the Plan;

(j) Monitor and oversee the Renovation Project, including the powers to enter into any discussions or agreements with contractors, incur any obligations in the ordinary course of business, all on behalf of the Applicant, and consult with the DIP Lender in connection therewith;

(k) engage consultants, appraisers, agents, sales agents, contractors and other trade workers, experts, auditors, accountants, managers, counsel and such other persons from time to time and on whatever basis, including on a temporary basis, to assist with the exercise of the Monitor's powers and duties, including without limitation those conferred by this Order;

(l) purchase or lease, on behalf of the Applicant, such machinery, equipment, inventories, supplies, premises or other assets to continue the business of the Applicant or any part or parts thereof;

(m) settle, extend or compromise any indebtedness owing to the Applicant;

(n) assist the Applicant and Nuvo Network Inc. in complying with the terms of the DIP Agreement (as defined below) including, without limitation, preparing materials in anticipation of a SISP order, to be approved by the Court;

(o) report to, meet with and discuss with such affected Persons as the Monitor deems appropriate on all matters relating to the Property and the Renovation Project, and to share information, subject to such terms as to confidentiality as the Monitor deems advisable;

(p) register a copy of this Order and any other Orders in respect of the Property against title to any of the Property;

(q) apply for any permits, licences, approvals or permissions as may be required by any governmental authority and any renewals thereof for and on behalf of and, if thought desirable by the Monitor, in the name of the Applicant;

(r) assist the Applicant and its counsel to rectify errors in existing corporate documents and contracts;

(s) be at liberty to engage such persons as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under this Order; and

(t) perform such other duties as are required by this Order or by this Court from time to time.

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall make best reasonable efforts to the extent possible to cause Nuvo Network Inc. (including its respective employees, contractors, agents, advisors, directors and/or officers) to co-operate fully with the Monitor in relation to its information requests and its powers and duties set forth herein, and for so long as the stay of proceedings in favour of Nuvo Network Inc. shall remain in place.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and shall take no part whatsoever in the management or supervision of the management of the Business and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder, be deemed to have taken or maintained possession or control of the Business or Property, or any part thereof.

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to occupy or to take control, care, charge, possession or management (separately and/or collectively, "**Possession**") of any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, might be a pollutant or a contaminant, or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to any federal, provincial or other law respecting the protection, conservation, enhancement, remediation or rehabilitation of the environment or relating to the disposal of waste or other contamination including, without limitation, the Canadian *Environmental Protection Act*, the Ontario *Environmental Protection Act*, the Ontario *Water Resources Act*, or the Ontario *Occupational Health and Safety Act* and regulations thereunder (the "**Environmental Legislation**"), provided however that nothing herein shall exempt the

Monitor from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by applicable Environmental Legislation. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order or anything done in pursuance of the Monitor's duties and powers under this Order, be deemed to be in Possession of any of the Property within the meaning of any Environmental Legislation, unless it is actually in possession.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall provide any creditor of the Applicant and the DIP Lender with information provided by the Applicant in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by such creditor addressed to the Monitor. The Monitor shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to the information disseminated by it pursuant to this paragraph. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Applicant is confidential, the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by this Court or on such terms as the Monitor and the Applicant may agree.

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the rights and protections afforded the Monitor under the CCAA or as an officer of this Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part. Nothing in this Order or the Initial Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA or any applicable legislation.

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicant shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case at their standard rates and charges, by the Applicant as part of the costs of these proceedings, incurred both before and after the making of this Order in respect of these proceedings in connection with the Applicant. The Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to pay the accounts of the Monitor, counsel for the Monitor and counsel for the Applicant on a weekly basis and, in addition, the Applicant is hereby authorized to pay to the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, and counsel to the Applicant, retainers in the amounts of $50,000 each, to be held by them as security for payment of their respective fees and disbursements outstanding from time to time.

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor and its legal counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time, and for this purpose the accounts of the Monitor and its legal counsel are hereby referred to a judge of the Commercial List of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicant shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**Administration Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $300,000 as security for their professional fees and disbursements incurred at their standard rates and charges of the Monitor and such counsel, both before and after the making of the Initial Order in respect of these proceedings. The Administration Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 42 and 44 hereof.

DIP FINANCING

35. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant is hereby authorized and empowered to obtain and borrow under a credit facility from Meridian Credit Union Limited (the "**DIP Lender**") in order to finance the Applicant's working capital requirements and other general corporate purposes and capital expenditures, provided that borrowings under such credit facility shall not exceed $7.18 million, unless permitted by further Order of this Court.

36. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that such credit facility shall be on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the DIP Credit Facility Agreement between the Applicant and the DIP Lender dated as of March 4, 2020 (the "**DIP Agreement**"), filed.

37. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant is hereby authorized and empowered to execute and deliver such credit agreements, mortgages, charges, hypothecs and security documents, guarantees and other definitive documents (collectively, the "**Definitive Documents**"), as are contemplated by the DIP Agreement or as may be reasonably required by the DIP Lender pursuant to the terms thereof, and the Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to pay and perform all of its indebtedness, interest, fees, liabilities and obligations to the DIP Lender under and pursuant to the DIP Agreement and the Definitive Documents as and when the same become due and are to be performed, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order.

38. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the DIP Lender shall be entitled to the benefit of and is hereby granted a charge (the "**DIP Lender's Charge**") on the Property including, without limiting the foregoing, the real property identified in Schedule "A" hereto (the "**Real Property**") which DIP Lender's Charge shall not secure an obligation that exists before this Order is made. The DIP Lender's Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 42 and 44 hereof.

39. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that upon the registration in the Land Titles Division of the Real Property of the DIP Lender's Charge in the form prescribed by the *Land Titles Act* and/or the *Land Registration Reform Act*, the Land Registrar is hereby directed to register the DIP Lender's Charge on title of the Real Property.

40. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order:

(a) the DIP Lender may take such steps from time to time as it may deem necessary or appropriate to file, register, record or perfect the DIP Lender's Charge or any of the Definitive Documents;

(b) upon the occurrence of an event of default under the Definitive Documents or the DIP Lender's Charge, the DIP Lender, upon five business days notice to the Applicant and the Monitor, may exercise any and all of its rights and remedies against the Applicant or the Property under or pursuant to the DIP Agreement, Definitive Documents and the DIP Lender's Charge, including without limitation, to cease making advances to the Applicant and set off and/or consolidate any amounts owing by the DIP Lender to the Applicant against the obligations of the Applicant to the DIP Lender under the DIP Agreement, the Definitive Documents or the DIP Lender's Charge, to make demand, accelerate payment and give other notices, or to apply to this Court for the appointment of a receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver, or for a bankruptcy order against the Applicant and for the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicant; and

(c) the foregoing rights and remedies of the DIP Lender shall be enforceable against any trustee in bankruptcy, interim receiver, receiver or receiver and manager of the Applicant or the Property.

41. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the DIP Lender shall be treated as unaffected in any plan of arrangement or compromise filed by the Applicant under the CCAA, or any proposal filed by the Applicant under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of Canada (the "**BIA**"), with respect to any advances made under the Definitive Documents.

VALIDITY AND PRIORITY OF CHARGES CREATED BY THIS ORDER

42. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the priorities of the Administration Charge, the DIP Lender's Charge and the Directors' Charge, as among them, shall be as follows:

First – Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of $300,000);

Second – DIP Lender's Charge ; and

Third- Directors' Charge (to the maximum amount of $50,000).

43. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the filing, registration or perfection of the Administration Charge, the DIP Lender's Charge and the Directors' Charge (collectively, the "**Charges**") shall not be required, and that the Charges shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected subsequent to the Charges coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.

44. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Administration Charge, the DIP Lender's Charge and the Directors' Charge (all as constituted and defined herein) shall constitute a charge on the Property and such Charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (collectively, "**Encumbrances**") in favour of any Person.

45. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Applicant shall not grant any Encumbrances over any Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, any of the Administration Charge, the DIP Lender's Charge and the Directors' Charge unless the Applicant also obtains the prior written consent of the Monitor and the beneficiaries of the Administration Charge, the DIP Lender's Charge and the Directors' Charge.

46. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Administration Charge, the DIP Lender's Charge and the Directors' Charge shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the chargees entitled to the benefit of the Charges (collectively, the "**Chargees**") thereunder shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by (a) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (b) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to BIA, or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications; (c) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA; (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other agreement (collectively, an "**Agreement**") which binds the Applicant, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:

(a) the creation of the Charges shall not create or be deemed to constitute a breach by the Applicant of any Agreement to which it is a party;

(b) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the Charges; and

(c) the payments made by the Applicant pursuant to this Order and the granting of the Charges, do not and will not constitute preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers at undervalue, oppressive conduct, or other challengeable or voidable transactions under any applicable law.

47. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Charge created by this Order over leases of real property in Canada shall only be a Charge in the Applicant's interest in such real property leases.

CRITICAL SUPPLIERS

48. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant is hereby authorized to pay the aggregate maximum amount of $2,375,000 to Maple Reinders Constructors Ltd. ("**Maple Reinders**) and Barrie Glass & Mirror Ltd. ("**Barrie Glass**"), to pay critical supplier amounts outstanding as at the date of the Initial Order or deposits therefor, including amounts required to vacate the

construction lien registered on the Renovation Project by Maple Reinders for $1,867,943.00 as Instrument No. HR1667791 and the construction lien registered on the Renovation Project by Barrie Glass for $89,543.93 as Instrument No. HR1672639, and to dismiss any all related claims in respect of such construction liens.

49. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that each of Maple Reinders and Barrie Glass is a critical supplier of the Applicant as contemplated by Section 11.4 of the CCAA (each, a "**Critical Supplier**").

50. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each Critical Supplier shall continue to supply the Applicant with goods and/or services in accordance with the terms and conditions of their existing agreement or arrangements. No Critical Supplier may require the payment of a further deposit or the posting of any additional security in connection with the supply of goods and/or services to the Applicant after the date of this Order.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

51. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall (i) without delay from the Initial Filing Date, publish in the Globe & Mail (national edition) a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA in respect of the Initial Order, (ii) within five days after the Initial Filing Date, (A) make the Initial Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (B) send, or cause to be sent, in the prescribed manner, a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the Applicant of more than $1,000, and (C) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with Section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder.

52. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the E-Service Protocol of the Commercial List (the "**Protocol**") is approved and adopted by reference herein and, in this proceeding, the service of documents made in accordance with the Protocol (which can be found on the Commercial List website at http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practice-directions/toronto/eservice-commercial) shall be valid and effective service. Subject to Rule 17.05 this Order shall constitute an order for substituted service pursuant to Rule 16.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Subject to Rule 3.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and paragraph 21 of the Protocol, service of

documents in accordance with the Protocol will be effective on transmission. This Court further orders that a Case Website shall be established in accordance with the Protocol with the following URL <https://www.richter.ca/insolvencycase/2607380-ontario-inc/>.

53. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if the service or distribution of documents in accordance with the Protocol is not practicable, the Applicant and the Monitor are at liberty to serve or distribute this Order, any other materials and orders in these proceedings, any notices or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or facsimile transmission to the Applicant's creditors or other interested parties at their respective addresses as last shown on the records of the Applicant and that any such service or distribution by courier, personal delivery or facsimile transmission shall be deemed to be received on the next business day following the date of forwarding thereof, or if sent by ordinary mail, on the third business day after mailing.

54. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant and the Monitor and their respective counsel are at liberty to serve or distribute this Order, and other materials and orders as may be reasonably required in these proceedings, including any notices, or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by electronic message to the Applicant's creditors or other interested parties and their advisors. For greater certainty, any such distribution or service shall be deemed to be in satisfaction of a legal or judicial obligation, and notice requirements within the meaning of clause 3(c) of the *Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations*, Reg. 81000-2-175 (SOR/DORS).

SEALING

55. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the April 2019 Valuation, as described in the Saulnier Initial Affidavit, is hereby sealed and shall not form part of the public record until further order of the Court.

GENERAL

56. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant or the Monitor may from time to time apply to this Court to amend, vary or supplement this Order or for advice and directions in the discharge of their respective powers and duties hereunder.

57. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as an interim receiver, a receiver, a receiver and manager, or a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicant, the Business or the Property.

58. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicant, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicant and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Applicant and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

59. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicant and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order, and that the Monitor is authorized and empowered to act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.

60. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any interested party (including the Applicant and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than seven (7) days notice to any other party or parties likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order.

61. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time on the date of this Order.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT A TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

MAR 06 2020

PER / PAR:

SHEDULE "A"
Real Property

1. 1295 North Service Road, Burlington, Ontario (PIN 07127-0265 (LT)) Legal Description: PT LT 10 , RCP PL 99 , PART 3 & 7 , 20R6963 , S/T IN 619045; BURLINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF 2607380 ONTARIO INC.

Court File No.: CV-20-00636875-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)
Proceeding commenced at Toronto

AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER

Stikeman Elliott LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
5300 Commerce Court West
199 Bay Street
Toronto, Canada M5L 1B9

Elizabeth Pillon LSO#: 35638M
Tel: (416) 869-5623
Email: epillon@stikeman.com

Sanja Sopic LSO#: 66487P
Tel: (416) 869-6825
Email: ssopic@stikeman.com

Nicholas Avis LSO#: 76781Q
Tel: (416) 869-5504
Email: navis@stikeman.com
Fax: (416) 947-0866

Lawyers for the Applicant

TAB 3

Court File No. CV-20-00638930-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE	)	THURSDAY, THE 9TH
	)	
MR. JUSTICE HAINEY	)	DAY OF APRIL, 2020

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANNTRUST HOLDINGS INC., CANNTRUST INC., CTI HOLDINGS (OSOYOOS) INC., AND ELMCLIFFE INVESTMENTS INC.

Applicants

AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER

THIS APPLICATION, made by the Applicants pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**") for an order amending and restating the Initial Order (the "**Initial Order**") issued on March 31, 2020 (the "**Initial Filing Date**") and extending the stay of proceedings provided for therein was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of Greg Guyatt sworn March 31, 2020 and the Exhibits thereto (the "**Guyatt Affidavit**"), the affidavit of Greg Guyatt sworn April 6, 2020 and the Exhibits thereto (the "**Second Guyatt Affidavit**"), the consent of Ernst & Young Inc. ("**EYI**") to act as the Monitor (in such capacity, the "**Monitor**"), the Pre-Filing Report of EYI in its capacity as the proposed Monitor dated March 31, 2020, and the First Report of the Monitor dated April 8, 2020, and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, the Monitor and those other parties that were present as listed on the counsel slip, no other party appearing although duly served as appears from the Affidavit of Service of Trevor Courtis sworn April 7, 2020.

AMENDING AND RESTATING INITIAL ORDER

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Initial Order, reflecting the Initial Filing Date, shall be amended and restated as provided for herein.

SERVICE

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service and filing of the Notice of Application, the Application Record and the Supplementary Application Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Application is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

APPLICATION

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicants are companies to which the CCAA applies.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court one or more plans of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "**Plan**").

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall remain in possession and control of their current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "**Property**"). Subject to further Order of this Court, the Applicants shall continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of their businesses (the "**Business**") and Property. The Applicants are authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the employees, contractors, consultants, agents, experts, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively "**Assistants**") currently retained or employed by them, with liberty to retain such further Assistants as it deems reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business, to preserve the value of the Property or for the carrying out of the terms of this Order.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall be entitled to continue to utilize the central cash management system currently in place or, with the consent of the Monitor, replace it with another substantially similar central cash management system (the "**Cash Management System**") and that any present or future bank providing the Cash Management System shall not be under any obligation whatsoever to inquire into the propriety, validity or legality of any transfer, payment, collection or other action taken under the Cash Management System, or as to the use or application by the Applicants of funds transferred, paid, collected or otherwise dealt with in the Cash Management System, shall be entitled to provide the Cash Management System without any liability in respect thereof to any Person (as hereinafter defined) other than the Applicants, pursuant to the terms of the documentation applicable to the Cash Management System, and shall be, in its capacity as provider of the Cash Management System, an unaffected creditor under the Plan with regard to any claims or expenses it may suffer or incur in connection with the provision of the Cash Management System.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants' existing depository and disbursement banks (collectively, the "**Banks**") is authorized to debit the applicable Applicant's accounts in the ordinary course of business without the need for further order of this Court for: (i) all cheques drawn on the applicable Applicant's accounts which are cashed at such Bank's counters or exchanged for cashier's cheques by the payees thereof prior to the date of this Order; (ii) all cheques or other items deposited in one of the Applicant's accounts with such Bank prior to the date of this Order which have been dishonoured or returned unpaid for any reason, together with any fees and costs in connection therewith, to the same extent an Applicant was responsible for such items prior to the date of this Order; and (iii) all undisputed pre-filing amounts outstanding as of the date hereof, if any, owed to any Bank as service charges for the maintenance of the Cash Management System.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any of the Banks may rely on the representations of the applicable Applicant with respect to whether any cheques or other payment order drawn or issued by the applicable Applicant prior to the date of this Order should be honoured pursuant to this or any other order of this Court, and such Bank shall not have any liability to any party for relying on such representations by the applicable Applicant as provided for herein.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that (i) those certain existing deposit agreements between the Applicants and the Banks shall continue to govern the post-filing cash management relationship between the Applicants and the Banks, and that all of the provisions of such agreements, including, without limitation, the termination and fee provisions, shall remain in full force and effect, (ii) either any of the Applicants, with the consent of the Monitor, or the Banks may, without further Order of this Court, implement changes to the Cash Management System and procedures in the ordinary course of business pursuant to the terms of those certain existing deposit agreements, including, without limitation, the opening and closing of bank accounts, and (iii) all control agreements in existence prior to the date of this Order shall apply.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall be entitled but not required to pay the following expenses whether incurred prior to, on or after the Initial Filing Date:

(a) all outstanding and future wages, salaries, contract amounts, amounts payable pursuant to the CannTrust Capital Appreciation Plan (whether accrued prior to, on or after the Initial Filing Date), employee and pension benefits, vacation pay and expenses (including, without limitation, in respect of expenses charged by employees to corporate credit cards) payable on or after the Initial Filing Date to employees or contractors, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements;

(b) the fees and disbursements of any Assistants retained or employed by the Applicants, or retained by employees or officers of the Applicants that the Applicants have agreed to reimburse, in respect of these proceedings, at their standard rates and charges; and

(c) with the consent of the Monitor, amounts owing for goods or services actually supplied to the Applicants prior to the Initial Filing Date by third party suppliers if in the opinion of the Applicants the supplier is critical to the Business, ongoing operations of the Applicants, or preservation of the Property and the payment is required to ensure ongoing supply.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein, the Applicants shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the

Applicants in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course after the Initial Filing Date, and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, which expenses shall include, without limitation:

(a) all expenses and capital expenditures reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance (including directors and officers insurance), maintenance and security services;

(b) expenses required to ensure compliance with any governmental or regulatory rules, orders or directions; and

(c) payment for goods or services actually supplied to the Applicants following the Initial Filing Date.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:

(a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including, without limitation, amounts in respect of (i) employment insurance, (ii) Canada Pension Plan (iii) Quebec Pension Plan, and (iv) income taxes;

(b) all goods and services or other applicable sales taxes and all federal excise taxes and duties (collectively, "**Sales & Excise Taxes**") required to be remitted by the Applicants in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Applicants, but only where such Sales & Excise Taxes are accrued or collected after the Initial Filing Date, or where such Sales & Excise Taxes were accrued or collected prior to the Initial Filing Date but not required to be remitted until on or after the Initial Filing Date; and

(c) any amount payable to the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any political subdivision thereof or any other taxation authority in respect of municipal realty, municipal business or other taxes, assessments or levies of any nature or kind which are entitled at law to be paid in priority to claims of secured

creditors and which are attributable to or in respect of the carrying on of the Business by the Applicants.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until a real property lease is disclaimed in accordance with the CCAA, the Applicants shall pay all amounts constituting rent or payable as rent under real property leases (including, for greater certainty, common area maintenance charges, utilities and realty taxes and any other amounts payable to the landlord under the lease) or as otherwise may be negotiated between the Applicants and the landlord from time to time ("**Rent**"), for the period commencing from and including the Initial Filing Date twice-monthly in equal payments on the first and fifteenth day of each month, in advance (but not in arrears), or, at the election of the applicable Applicant, at such intervals as such Rent is usually paid pursuant to the applicable lease. On the date of the first of such payments, any Rent relating to the period commencing from and including the Initial Filing Date shall also be paid.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as specifically permitted herein, the Applicants are hereby directed, until further Order of this Court: (a) to make no payments of principal, interest thereon or otherwise on account of amounts owing by the Applicants to any of their creditors as of the Initial Filing Date; (b) to grant no security interests, trust, liens, charges or encumbrances upon or in respect of any of their Property; and (c) to not grant credit or incur liabilities except in the ordinary course of the Business.

RESTRUCTURING

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall, subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA, have the right to:

(a) permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of their businesses or operations, and to dispose of redundant or non-material assets not exceeding $500,000 in any one transaction or $1,000,000 in the aggregate;

(b) terminate the employment of such of their employees or temporarily lay off such of their employees as it deems appropriate; and

(c) pursue all avenues of refinancing or selling their Business or Property, in whole or part, subject to prior approval of this Court being obtained before any material refinancing or sale,

all of the foregoing to permit the Applicants to proceed with an orderly restructuring of the Business (the "**Restructuring**").

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall provide each of the relevant landlords with notice of the Applicants' intention to remove any fixtures from any leased premises at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the intended removal. The relevant landlord shall be entitled to have a representative present in the leased premises to observe such removal and, if the landlord disputes the Applicants' entitlement to remove any such fixture under the provisions of the lease, such fixture shall remain on the premises and shall be dealt with as agreed between any applicable secured creditors, such landlord and the Applicants, or by further Order of this Court upon application by the Applicants on at least two (2) days notice to such landlord and any such secured creditors. If the Applicants disclaim the lease governing such leased premises in accordance with Section 32 of the CCAA, it shall not be required to pay Rent under such lease pending resolution of any such dispute (other than Rent payable for the notice period provided for in Section 32(5) of the CCAA), and the disclaimer of the lease shall be without prejudice to the Applicants' claims to the fixtures in dispute.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if a notice of disclaimer is delivered pursuant to Section 32 of the CCAA, then (a) during the notice period prior to the effective time of the disclaimer, the landlord may show the affected leased premises to prospective tenants during normal business hours, on giving the Applicants and the Monitor 24 hours' prior written notice, and (b) at the effective time of the disclaimer, the relevant landlord shall be entitled to take possession of any such leased premises without waiver of or prejudice to any claims or rights such landlord may have against the Applicants in respect of such lease or leased premises, provided that nothing herein shall relieve such landlord of its obligation to mitigate any damages claimed in connection therewith.

NO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANTS OR THE PROPERTY

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that from the Initial Filing Date until and including July 5, 2020, or such later date as this Court may order (the "**Stay Period**"), no proceeding or enforcement process in any court or tribunal (each, a "**Proceeding**") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the Applicants or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property (including, for greater certainty, any process or steps or other rights and remedies under or relating to any class action proceeding against any of the Applicants or in respect of the Property), except with the written consent of the Applicants and the Monitor, or with leave of this Court, and any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Applicants or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further Order of this Court.

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, none of the Pending Litigation (as defined in the Guyatt Affidavit) or any Proceeding in relation thereto shall be commenced, continued or take place against or in respect of any Person named as a defendant or respondent in any of the Pending Litigation (such Persons, the "**Other Defendants**"), except with leave of this Court, and any and all such Proceedings currently underway or directed to take place against or in respect of any of the Other Defendants, or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further Order of this Court.

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, to the extent any prescription, time or limitation period relating to any Proceeding by, against or in respect of the Applicants or any of the Other Defendants that is stayed pursuant to this Order may expire, the term of such prescription, time or limitation period shall hereby be deemed to be extended by a period equal to the Stay Period.

NO EXERCISE OF RIGHTS OR REMEDIES

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all rights and remedies of any individual, firm, corporation, governmental body or agency, or any other entities (all of the foregoing, collectively being "**Persons**" and each being a "**Person**") against or in respect of the Applicants or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, are hereby stayed and suspended except with the written consent of the Applicants and the Monitor, or leave of this Court, provided that nothing in this Order shall (i) empower the Applicants to carry on any

business which the Applicants are not lawfully entitled to carry on, (ii) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by Section 11.1 of the CCAA, (iii) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest, or (iv) prevent the registration of a claim for lien.

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, during the Stay Period, all rights and remedies of any Person against or in respect of Cannabis Coffee and Tea Pod Company Ltd., Cannatrek Ltd., Elmcliffe Investments [No. 2] Inc. and O Cannabis We Stand on Guard For Thee Corporation (each, an "**Affected Party**", and collectively, the "**Affected Parties**") arising out of, relating to, or triggered by the insolvency of any of the Applicants, the making or filing of these proceedings or any allegation, admission or evidence in these proceedings (collectively, the "**Cross-Default Matters**"), are hereby stayed and suspended except with the written consent of the relevant Applicants, the relevant Affected Party and the Monitor, or leave of this Court, and the operation of any provision of any agreement or other arrangement between any Person and any of the Affected Parties whether written or oral that purports to accelerate, terminate, cancel, suspend or modify such agreement or arrangement or create a right to purchase, a right of first refusal or a lien with respect to any property of an Affected Party as a result of any of the Cross-Default Matters is hereby stayed and restrained pending further order of this Court.

NO INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, no Person shall discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, licence or permit in favour of or held by the Applicants, except with the written consent of the Applicants and the Monitor, or leave of this Court.

CONTINUATION OF SERVICES

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all Persons having oral or written agreements with the Applicants or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods and/or services, including without limitation all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation services, utility or other services to the Business or the Applicants, are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply of

such goods or services as may be required by the Applicants, and that the Applicants shall be entitled to the continued use of their current premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses and domain names, provided in each case that the normal prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the Initial Filing Date are paid by the Applicants in accordance with normal payment practices of the Applicants or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and each of the Applicants and the Monitor, or as may be ordered by this Court.

NON-DEROGATION OF RIGHTS

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding anything else in this Order, no Person shall be prohibited from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided on or after the Initial Filing Date, nor shall any Person be under any obligation on or after the Initial Filing Date to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to the Applicants. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the rights conferred and obligations imposed by the CCAA.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, and except as permitted by subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA, no Proceeding may be commenced or continued against any of the current or future directors or officers of the Applicants with respect to any claim against the directors or officers that arose before the Initial Filing Date and that relates to any obligations of the Applicants whereby the directors or officers are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors or officers for the payment or performance of such obligations, until a compromise or arrangement in respect of the Applicants, if one is filed, is sanctioned by this Court or is refused by the creditors of the Applicants or this Court.

DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INDEMNIFICATION AND CHARGE

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants shall indemnify their current and future directors and officers against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as directors or officers of the Applicants after the commencement of the within proceedings, except to the extent that, with respect to any officer or director, the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the current and future directors and officers of the Applicants shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**Directors' Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $3.55 million, as security for the indemnity provided in paragraph 27 of this Order. The Directors' Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 57 and 59 herein.

29. THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding any language in any applicable insurance policy to the contrary, (a) no insurer shall be entitled to be subrogated to or claim the benefit of the Directors' Charge, and (b) the Applicants' directors and officers shall only be entitled to the benefit of the Directors' Charge to the extent that they do not have coverage under any directors' and officers' insurance policy, or to the extent that such coverage is insufficient to pay amounts indemnified in accordance with paragraph 27 of this Order.

APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that EYI is, as of the Initial Filing Date, appointed pursuant to the CCAA as the Monitor, an officer of this Court, to monitor the business and financial affairs of the Applicants with the powers and obligations set out in the CCAA or set forth herein and that the Applicants and their shareholders, officers, directors, and Assistants shall advise the Monitor of all material steps taken by the Applicants pursuant to this Order, and shall co-operate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and discharge of its obligations and provide the Monitor with the assistance that is necessary to enable the Monitor to adequately carry out the Monitor's functions.

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is hereby directed and empowered to:

(a) monitor the Applicants' receipts and disbursements;

(b) review and approve Intercompany Advances (as defined below);

(c) report to this Court at such times and intervals as the Monitor may deem appropriate with respect to matters relating to the Property, the Business, and such other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein;

(d) advise the Applicants in the preparation of the Applicants' cash flow statements, which information shall be reviewed with the Monitor;

(e) advise the Applicants in its development of the Plan and any amendments to the Plan;

(f) assist the Applicants, to the extent required by the Applicants, with the holding and administering of creditors' meetings for voting on the Plan;

(g) assist the Applicants, to the extent required by the Applicants, in connection with any sale and investment solicitation process conducted by the Applicants;

(h) have full and complete access to the Property, including the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and other financial documents of the Applicants, to the extent that is necessary to adequately assess the Applicants' business and financial affairs or to perform its duties arising under this Order;

(i) be at liberty to engage independent legal counsel or such other persons as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under this Order; and

(j) perform such other duties as are required by this Order or by this Court from time to time.

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and shall take no part whatsoever in the management or supervision of the management of the Business and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder, be deemed to have taken or maintained possession or control of the Business or Property, or any part thereof.

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to occupy or to take control, care, charge, possession or management (separately and/or collectively, "**Possession**") of (i) any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, might be a pollutant or a contaminant, or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to any federal, provincial or other law respecting the protection, conservation, enhancement, remediation or rehabilitation of the environment or relating to the disposal of waste or other contamination including, without

limitation, the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*, the Ontario *Environmental Protection Act*, the *Ontario Water Resources Act*, or the Ontario *Occupational Health and Safety Act* and regulations thereunder (the "**Environmental Legislation**"), or (ii) any of the Property, the administration and control of which is subject to the provisions of any federal, provincial or other law respecting, among other things, the manufacturing, possession, processing and distribution of cannabis or cannabis products including without limitation, the *Cannabis Act* (Canada), the *Cannabis Regulations* (Canada) the *Controlled Drugs and Substances Act* (Canada), the *Excise Tax Act* (Canada), the *Cannabis Control Act* (Ontario), or other such applicable federal or provincial legislation ("**Cannabis Legislation**"), provided however that nothing herein shall exempt the Monitor from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by applicable Environmental Legislation or Cannabis Legislation. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order or anything done in pursuance of the Monitor's duties and powers under this Order, be deemed to be in Possession of any of the Property within the meaning of any Environmental Legislation or the Cannabis Legislation, unless it is actually in possession.

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall provide any creditor of the Applicants with information provided by the Applicants in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by such creditor addressed to the Monitor. The Monitor shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to the information disseminated by it pursuant to this paragraph. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Applicants is confidential, the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by this Court or on such terms as the Monitor and the Applicants may agree.

35. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the rights and protections afforded the Monitor under the CCAA or as an officer of this Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order or the Initial Order, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part. Nothing in this Order or the Initial Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA or any applicable legislation.

APPROVAL OF CHIEF RESTRUCTURING OFFICER ENGAGEMENT

36. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the agreement dated as of March 27, 2020 pursuant to which the Applicants have engaged FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("**FTI**") to act as Chief

Restructuring Officer ("**CRO**") and provide certain financial advisory and consulting services to the Applicants, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "G" to the Guyatt Affidavit (the "**CRO Engagement Letter**"), the execution of the CRO Engagement Letter by the Applicants, *nunc pro tunc*, and the appointment of the CRO pursuant to the terms thereof is hereby approved, including, without limitation, the payment of the fees and expenses contemplated thereby.

37. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the CRO shall not be or be deemed to be a director, *de facto* director or employee of the Applicants.

38. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the CRO shall not, as a result of the performance of its obligations and duties in accordance with the terms of the CRO Engagement Letter, be deemed to be in Possession of (i) any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, might be a pollutant or a contaminant, or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to the Environmental Legislation, (ii) any of the Property, the administration and control of which is subject to the provisions of the Cannabis Legislation; however, if the CRO is nevertheless later found to be in Possession of any Property, then the CRO shall be entitled to the benefits and protections in relation to the Applicants and such Property as are provided to a monitor under Section 11.8(3) of the CCAA, provided however that nothing herein shall exempt the CRO from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by applicable Environmental Legislation or Cannabis Legislation.

39. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the CRO shall not have any liability with respect to any losses, claims, damages or liabilities, of any nature or kind, to any Person from and after the Initial Filing Date except to the extent such losses, claims, damages or liabilities result from the gross negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of the CRO.

40. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that no action or other proceeding shall be commenced directly, or by way of counterclaim, third party claim or otherwise, against or in respect of the CRO, and all rights and remedies of any Person against or in respect of them are hereby stayed and suspended, except with the written consent of the CRO or with leave of this Court on notice to the Applicant, the Monitor and the CRO. Notice of any such motion seeking leave of this Court shall be served upon the Applicants, the Monitor and the CRO at least seven (7) days prior to the return date of any such motion for leave.

41. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the obligations of the Applicant to the CRO pursuant to the CRO Engagement Letter shall be treated as unaffected and may not be compromised in any Plan or proposal filed under *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) (the "**BIA**") in respect of the Applicants.

APPROVAL OF FINANCIAL ADVISOR ENGAGEMENT

42. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the agreement dated as of April 3, 2020 pursuant to which the Applicants have engaged Greenhill & Co. Canada Ltd. (the "**Financial Advisor**") to assist the Applicants in a review of strategic alternatives, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit "D" to the Second Guyatt Affidavit (the "**Financial Advisor Engagement Letter**"), the execution of the Financial Advisor Engagement Letter by the Applicants, *nunc pro tunc*, and the appointment of the Financial Advisor pursuant to the terms thereof is hereby approved, including, without limitation, the payment of the fees and expenses contemplated thereby.

43. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Financial Advisor shall not be or be deemed to be a director, *de facto* director or employee of the Applicants.

44. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Financial Advisor shall not have any liability with respect to any losses, claims, damages or liabilities, of any nature or kind, to any Person from and after the date of this Order except to the extent such losses, claims, damages or liabilities result from the gross negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of the Financial Advisor.

45. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that no action or other proceeding shall be commenced directly, or by way of counterclaim, third party claim or otherwise, against or in respect of the Financial Advisor, and all rights and remedies of any Person against or in respect of them are hereby stayed and suspended, except with the written consent of the Financial Advisor or with leave of this Court on notice to the Applicant, the Monitor and the Financial Advisor. Notice of any such motion seeking leave of this Court shall be served upon the Applicants, the Monitor and the Financial Advisor at least seven (7) days prior to the return date of any such motion for leave.

46. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the obligations of the Applicant to the Financial Advisor pursuant to the Financial Advisor Engagement Letter shall be treated as unaffected and may not be compromised in any Plan or proposal filed under the BIA in respect of the Applicants.

ADMINISTRATION CHARGE

47. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, the CRO, the Financial Advisor and counsel to the Applicants shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case at their standard rates and charges, and in the case of the CRO in accordance with the CRO Engagement Letter, and in the case of the Financial Advisor in accordance with the Financial Advisor Engagement Letter, by the Applicants as part of the costs of these proceedings. The Applicants are hereby authorized and directed to pay the accounts of the Monitor, counsel for the Monitor, the CRO, the Financial Advisor and counsel for the Applicants on a bi-weekly basis and, in addition, the Applicants are hereby authorized to pay to the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, the CRO and counsel to the Applicants, retainers to be held by them as security for payment of their respective fees and disbursements outstanding from time to time.

48. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor and its legal counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time, and for this purpose the accounts of the Monitor and its legal counsel are hereby referred to a judge of the Commercial List of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

49. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, the CRO and counsel to the Applicants shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**Administration Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $1.4 million, as security for their professional fees and disbursements incurred at their standard rates and charges, and in the case of the CRO in accordance with the CRO Engagement Letter, both before and after the Initial Filing Date in respect of these proceedings. The Administration Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 57 and 59 hereof.

TRANSACTION FEE CHARGE

50. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Financial Advisor shall be entitled to the benefit of and is hereby granted a charge (the "**Transaction Fee Charge**") on the Property, as security for the Transaction Fee (as defined the Financial Advisor Engagement Letter). The Transaction Fee Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 57 and 59 hereof.

INTERCOMPANY FINANCING

51. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that CannTrust Holdings Inc. (the "**Intercompany Lender**") is authorized to loan to each of CannTrust Inc., Elmcliffe Investments Inc. and CTI Holdings (Osoyoos) Inc. (each, an "**Intercompany Borrower**"), and each Intercompany Borrower is authorized to borrow, repay and re-borrow, such amounts from time to time as the Intercompany Borrower, with the approval of the Monitor, considers necessary or desirable on a revolving basis to fund its ongoing expenditures and to pay such other amounts as are permitted by the terms of this Order (the "**Intercompany Advances**"), on terms consistent with existing arrangements or past practice or otherwise approved by the Monitor.

52. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Intercompany Lender shall be entitled to the benefit of and is hereby granted a charge (the "**Intercompany Charge**") on all of the Property of each Intercompany Borrower, as security for the Intercompany Advances made to such Intercompany Borrower, which Intercompany Charge shall not secure an obligation that exists before the Initial Filing Date. The Intercompany Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 57 and 59 hereof.

53. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Intercompany Lender shall be treated as unaffected and may not be compromised in any Plan or any proposal filed under the BIA in respect of the Applicants, with respect to any Intercompany Advances made on or after the Initial Filing Date.

KERP AND KERP CHARGE

54. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Key Employee Retention Plan (the "**KERP**"), as described and defined in the Second Guyatt Affidavit, for the benefit of the Key Employees (as defined in the Second Guyatt Affidavit) is hereby approved and the Applicants are authorized and directed to make payments in accordance with the terms and conditions of the KERP.

55. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Key Employees shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**KERP Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $1.4 million to secure amounts owing to the Key Employees under the KERP. The KERP Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 57 and 59 hereof.

56. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the unredacted version of the KERP, a copy of which is attached as Confidential Exhibit "B" to the Second Guyatt Affidavit, shall be and is hereby sealed, kept confidential, and shall not form part of the public record unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

VALIDITY AND PRIORITY OF CHARGES CREATED BY THIS ORDER

57. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the priorities of the Administration Charge, the Directors' Charge, the KERP Charge, the Transaction Fee Charge and the Intercompany Charge (the "**Charges**"), as among them with respect to any Property to which they apply, shall be as follows:

First – Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of $1.4 million);

Second – Directors' Charge (to the maximum amount of $3.55 million);

Third – KERP Charge (to the maximum amount of $1.4 million);

Fourth – Transaction Fee Charge;

Fifth – Intercompany Charge.

58. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the filing, registration or perfection of the Charges shall not be required, and that the Charges shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected subsequent to the Charges coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.

59. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Charges (all as constituted and defined herein) shall constitute a charge on the Property and such Charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges, encumbrances and claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (collectively, "**Encumbrances**") in favour of any Person.

60. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Applicants shall not grant any Encumbrances over any Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, any of the Charges, unless the Applicants

also obtains the prior written consent of the Monitor and the beneficiaries of the Charges, or further Order of this Court.

61. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Charges shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the chargees entitled to the benefit of the Charges (collectively, the "**Chargees**") thereunder shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by (a) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (b) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to the BIA, or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications; (c) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA; (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other agreement (collectively, an "**Agreement**") which binds the Applicants, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:

(a) the creation of the Charges shall not create or be deemed to constitute a breach by the Applicants of any Agreement to which it is a party;

(b) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the Charges; and

(c) the payments made by the Applicants pursuant to this Order and the granting of the Charges do not and will not constitute preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers at undervalue, oppressive conduct, or other challengeable or voidable transactions under any applicable law.

62. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Charge created by this Order over leases of real property in Canada shall only be a Charge in the Applicants' interest in such real property leases.

RELIEF FROM REPORTING OBLIGATIONS

63. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the decision by the Applicants to incur no further expenses in relation to any filings, disclosures, core or non-core documents, restatements, amendments to existing filings, press releases or any other actions (collectively, the "**Securities**

Filings") that may be required by any federal, provincial or other law respecting securities or capital markets in Canada or the United States, or by the rules and regulations of a stock exchange, including, without limitation, the *Securities Act* (Ontario) and comparable statutes enacted by other provinces of Canada, the *Securities Act of 1933* (United States) and the *Securities Exchange Act of 1934* (United States) and comparable statutes enacted by individual states of the United States, the TSX Company Manual and other rules, regulations and policies of the Toronto Stock Exchange, and the NYSE Listed Company Manual and other rules, regulations and policies of the New York Stock Exchange (collectively, the "**Securities Provisions**"), is hereby authorized, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall prohibit any securities regulator or stock exchange from taking any action or exercising any discretion that it may have of a nature described in section 11.1(2) of the CCAA as a consequence of the Applicants failing to make any Securities Filings required by the Securities Provisions.

64. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that none of the directors, officers, employees, and other representatives of the Applicants, the Monitor (and its directors, officers, employees and representatives), nor the CRO shall have any personal liability for any failure by the Applicants to make any Securities Filings required by the Securities Provisions.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

65. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall (i) without delay, publish in the Globe and Mail (National Edition) a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA, (ii) within five days after the date of this Order, (A) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (B) send, or cause to be sent, in the prescribed manner or by electronic message to the e-mail address as last shown on the records of the Applicants, a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the Applicants of more than $1,000, and (C) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with Section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder.

66. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the E-Service Protocol of the Commercial List (the "**Protocol**") is approved and adopted by reference herein and, in this proceeding, the service of documents made in accordance with the Protocol (which can be found on the Commercial List website at https://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practice-directions/toronto/eservice-

commercial/) shall be valid and effective service. Subject to Rule 17.05 this Order shall constitute an order for substituted service pursuant to Rule 16.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Subject to Rule 3.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and paragraph 21 of the Protocol, service of documents in accordance with the Protocol will be effective on transmission. This Court further orders that a Case Website shall be established in accordance with the Protocol with the following URL: http://www.ey.com/ca/canntrust.

67. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if the service or distribution of documents in accordance with the Protocol is not practicable, the Applicants and the Monitor are at liberty to serve or distribute this Order, any other materials and orders in these proceedings, any notices or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or facsimile transmission to the Applicants' creditors or other interested parties at their respective addresses as last shown on the records of the Applicants and that any such service or distribution by courier, personal delivery or facsimile transmission shall be deemed to be received on the next business day following the date of forwarding thereof, or if sent by ordinary mail, on the third business day after mailing.

GENERAL

68. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants or the Monitor may from time to time apply to this Court for advice and directions in the discharge of their powers and duties hereunder.

69. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as an interim receiver, a receiver, a receiver and manager, or a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicants, the Business or the Property.

70. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory body or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding,

or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

71. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order, and that CannTrust Holdings Inc. is authorized and empowered to act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in the United States and any other jurisdiction outside Canada.

72. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any interested party (including the Applicants and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than seven (7) days notice to any other party or parties likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order.

73. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time on the date of this Order.



IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANNTRUST HOLDINGS INC. ET AL.

Court File No: CV-20-00638930-00CL

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE (COMMERCIAL LIST)

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

AMENDED AND RESTATED INITIAL ORDER

McCarthy Tétrault LLP
Suite 5300, Toronto Dominion Bank Tower
Toronto ON M5K 1E6
Fax: 416-868-0673

James Gage LSO#: 34676I
Tel: 416-601-7539
Email: jgage@mccarthy.ca

Paul Steep LSO#: 21869L
Tel: 416-601-7998
Email: psteep@mccarthy.ca

Trevor Courtis LSO#: 67715A
Tel: 416-601-7643
Email: tcourtis@mccarthy.ca

Alexander Steele LSO#: 475719P
Tel: 416-601-8370
Email: asteele@mccarthy.ca
Lawyers for the Applicants

DOC#: 19528138

TAB 4

CITATION: Timminco Limited (Re), 2012 ONSC 506
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9539-00CL
DATE: 20120202

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO

(COMMERCIAL LIST)

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-36, AS AMENDED

RE: IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TIMMINCO LIMITED AND BÉCANCOUR SILICON INC., Applicants

BEFORE: MORAWETZ J.

COUNSEL: A. J. Taylor, M. Konyukhova and K. Esaw, for the Applicants

D.W. Ellickson, for Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' Union of Canada

C. Sinclair, for United Steelworkers' Union

K. Peters, for AMG Advance Metallurgical Group NV

M. Bailey, for Superintendent of Financial Services (Ontario)

S. Weisz, for FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

A. Kauffman, for Investissement Quebec

HEARD: January 12, 2012
RELEASED: January 16, 2012
REASONS: February 2, 2012

ENDORSEMENT

[1] This motion was heard on January 12, 2012. On January 16, 2012, the following endorsement was released:

Motion granted. Reasons will follow. Order to go subject to proviso that the Sealing Order is subject to modification, if necessary, after reasons provided.

[2] These are those reasons.

Background

[3] On January 3, 2012, Timminco Limited ("Timminco") and Bécancour Silicon Inc. ("BSI") (collectively, the "Timminco Entities") applied for and obtained relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "CCAA").

[4] In my endorsement of January 3, 2012, (*Timminco Limited (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 106), I stated at [11]: "I am satisfied that the record establishes that the Timminco Entities are insolvent and are 'debtor companies' to which the CCAA applies".

[5] On the initial motion, the Applicants also requested an "Administration Charge" and a "Directors' and Officers' Charge" ("D&O Charge"), both of which were granted.

[6] The Timminco Entities requested that the Administration Charge rank ahead of the existing security interest of Investissement Quebec ("IQ") but behind all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise, including any deemed trust created under the *Ontario Pension Benefit Act* (the "PBA") or the *Quebec Supplemental Pensions Plans Act* (the "QSPPA") (collectively, the "Encumbrances") in favour of any persons that have not been served with this application.

[7] IQ had been served and did not object to the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge.

[8] At [35] of my endorsement, I noted that the Timminco Entities had indicated their intention to return to court to seek an order granting super priority ranking for both the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge ahead of the Encumbrances.

[9] The Timminco Entities now bring this motion for an order:

(a) suspending the Timminco Entities' obligations to make special payments with respect to the pension plans (as defined in the Notice of Motion);

(b) granting super priority to the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge;

(c) approving key employee retention plans (the "KERPs") offered by the Timminco Entities to certain employees deemed critical to a successful restructuring and a charge on the current and future assets, undertakings and properties of the Timminco Entities to secure the Timminco Entities' obligations under the KERPs (the "KERP Charge"); and

(d) sealing the confidential supplement (the "Confidential Supplement") to the First Report of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (the "Monitor").

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

[10] If granted, the effect of the proposed Court-ordered charges in relation to each other would be:

- first, the Administration Charge to the maximum amount of $1 million;
- second, the KERP Charge (in the maximum amount of $269,000); and
- third, the D&O Charge (in the maximum amount of $400,000).

[11] The requested relief was recommended and supported by the Monitor. IQ also supported the requested relief. It was, however, opposed by the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers' Union of Canada ("CEP"). The position put forth by counsel to CEP was supported by counsel for the United Steelworkers' Union ("USW").

[12] The motion materials were served on all personal property security registrants in Ontario and in Quebec: the members of the Pension Plan Committees for the Bécancour Union Pension Plan and the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan; the Financial Services Commission of Ontario; the Regie de Rentes du Quebec; the United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and Service Works International Union; and La Section Locale 184 de Syndicat Canadien des Communications, De L'Energie et du Papier; and various government entities, including Ontario and Quebec environmental agencies and federal and provincial taxing authorities.

[13] Counsel to the Applicants identified the issues on the motion as follows:

(a) Should this court grant increased priority to the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge?

(b) Should this court grant an order suspending the Timminco Entities' obligations to make the pension contributions with respect to the pension plans?

(c) Should this court approve the KERPs and grant the KERPs Charge?

(d) Should this court seal the Confidential Supplement?

[14] It was not disputed that the court has the jurisdiction and discretion to order a super priority charge in the context of a CCAA proceeding. However, counsel to CEP submits that this is an extraordinary measure, and that the onus is on the party seeking such an order to satisfy the court that such an order ought to be awarded in the circumstances.

[15] The affidavit of Peter A.M. Kalins, sworn January 5, 2012, provides information relating to the request to suspend the payment of certain pension contributions. Paragraphs 14-28 read as follows:

> 14. The Timminco Entities sponsor the following three pension plans (collectively, the "**Pension Plans**"):

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

(a) the Retirement Pension Plan for The Haley Plant Hourly Employees of Timminco Metals, A Division of Timminco Limited (Ontario Registration Number 0589648) (the "**Haley Pension Plan**");

(b) the Régime de rentes pour les employés non syndiqués de Silicium Bécancour Inc. (Québec Registration Number 26042) (the "**Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan**"); and

(c) the Régime de rentes pour les employés syndiqués de Silicium Bécancour Inc. (Québec Registration Number 32063) (the "**Bécancour Union Pension Plan**").

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

Haley Pension Plan

15. The Haley Pension plan, sponsored and administered by Timminco, applies to former hourly employees at Timminco's magnesium facility in Haley, Ontario.

16. The Haley Pension Plan was terminated effective as of August 1, 2008 and accordingly, no normal cost contributions are payable in connection with the Haley Pension Plan. As required by the Ontario *Pension Benefits Act* (the "**PBA**"), a wind-up valuation in respect of the Haley Pension Plan was filed with the Financial Services Commission of Ontario ("**FSCO**") detailing the plan's funded status as of the wind-up date, and each year thereafter. As of August 1, 2008, the Haley Pension Plan was in a deficit position on a wind-up basis of $5,606,700. The PBA requires that the wind-up deficit be paid down in equal annual installments payable annually in advance over a period of no more than five years.

17. As of August 1, 2010, the date of the most recently filed valuation report, the Haley Pension Plan had a wind-up deficit of $3,922,700. Contributions to the Haley Pension Plan are payable annually in advance every August 1. Contributions in respect of the period from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2011 totalling $4,712,400 were remitted to the plan. Contributions in respect of the period from August 1, 2011 to July 31, 2012 were estimated to be $1,598,500 and have not been remitted to the plan.

18. According to preliminary estimates calculated by the Haley Pension Plan's actuaries, despite Timminco having made contributions of approximately $4,712,400 during the period from August 1, 2008 to July 31, 2011, as of August 1, 2011, the deficit remaining in the Haley Pension Plan is $3,102,900.

Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan

19. The Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan, sponsored by BSI, is an on-going pension plan with both defined benefit ("**DB**") and defined contribution provisions. The plan has four active members and 32 retired and deferred vested members (including surviving spouses).

20. The most recently filed actuarial valuation of the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan performed for funding purposes was performed as of September 30, 2010. As of September 30, 2010, the solvency deficit in the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan was $3,239,600.

21. In 2011, normal cost contributions payable to this plan totaled approximately $9,525 per month (or 16.8% of payroll). Amortization payments owing to this plan totaled approximately $41,710 per month. All contributions in respect of the plan were paid when due in accordance with the Québec *Supplemental Pension Plans Act* (the "**QSPPA**") and regulations.

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

Bécancour Union Pension Plan

22. The BSI-sponsored Bécancour Union Pension Plan is an on-going DB pension plan with two active members and 98 retired and deferred vested members (including surviving spouses).

23. The most recently filed actuarial valuation performed for funding purposes was performed as of September 30, 2010. As of September 30, 2010, the solvency deficit in the Bécancour Union Pension Plan was $7,939,500.

24. In 2011, normal cost contributions payable to the plan totaled approximately $7,083 per month (or 14.7% of payroll). Amortization payments owing to this plan totaled approximately $95,300 per month. All contributions in respect of the plan were paid when due in accordance with the QSPPA and regulations.

25. BSI unionized employees have the option to transfer their employment to QSLP, under the form of the existing collective bargaining agreement. In the event of such transfer, their pension membership in the Bécancour Union Pension Plan will be transferred to the Quebec Silicon Union Pension Plan (as defined and described in greater detail in the Initial Order Affidavit). Also, in the event that any BSI non-union employees transfer employment to QSLP, their pension membership in the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan would be transferred to the Quebec Silicon Non-Union Pension Plan (as defined and described in greater detail in the Initial Order Affidavit). I am advised by Andrea Boctor of Stikeman Elliott LLP, counsel to the Timminco Entities, and do verily believe that if all of the active members of the Bécancour Union Pension Plan and the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan transfer their employment to QSLP, the Régie des rentes du Québec would have the authority to order that the plans be wound up.

Pension Plan Deficiencies and the Timminco Entities' CCAA Proceedings

26. The assets of the Pension Plans have been severely impacted by market volatility and decreasing long-term interest rates in recent years, resulting in increased deficiencies in the Pension Plans. As a result, the special payments payable with respect to the Haley Plan also increased. As at 2010, total annual special payments for the final three years of the wind-up of the Haley Pension Plan were $1,598,500 for 2010, $1,397,000 for 2011 and $1,162,000 for 2012, payable in advance annually every August 1. By contrast, in 2011 total annual special payments to the Haley Pension Plan for the remaining two years of the wind-up increased to $1,728,700 for each of 2011 and 2012.

Suspension of Certain Pension Contributions

27. As is evident from the Cashflow Forecast, the Timminco Entities do not have the funds necessary to make any contributions to the Pension Plans other than (a) contributions in respect of normal cost, (b) contributions to the defined contribution provision of the BSI Non-Union Pension Plan, and (c) employee contributions deducted from pay (together, the "**Normal Cost Contributions**"). Timminco currently owes approximately $1.6 million in respect of special payments to the Haley Pension Plan. In addition, assuming the Bécancour Non-Union Pension Plan and the Bécancour Union Pension Plan are not terminated, as at January 31, 2012, the Timminco Entities will owe approximately $140,000 in respect of amortization payments under those plans. If the Timminco Entities are required to make the pension contributions other than Normal Cost Contributions (the "**Pension Contributions**"), they will not have sufficient funds to continue operating and will be forced to cease operating to the detriment of their stakeholders, including their employees and pensioners.

28. The Timminco Entities intend to make all normal cost contributions when due. However, management of the Timminco Entities does not anticipate an improvement in their cashflows that would permit the making of Pension Contributions with respect to the Pension Plans during these CCAA proceedings.

The Position of CEP and USW

[16] Counsel to CEP submits that the super priority charge sought by the Timminco Entities would have the effect of subordinating the rights of, *inter alia*, the pension plans, including the statutory trusts that are created pursuant to the QSPPA. In considering this matter, I have proceeded on the basis that this submission extends to the PBA as well.

[17] In order to grant a super priority charge, counsel to CEP, supported by USW, submits that the Timminco Entities must show that the application of provincial legislation "would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy". (See *Indalex (Re)*, 2011 ONCA 265 at para. 181.)

[18] Counsel to CEP takes the position that the evidence provided by the Timminco Entities falls short of showing the necessity of the super priority charge. Presently, counsel contends that the Applicants have not provided any plan for the purpose of restructuring the Timminco Entities and, absent a restructuring proposal, the affected creditors, including the pension plans, have no

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

reason to believe that their interests will be protected through the issuance of the orders being sought.

[19] Counsel to CEP takes the position that the Timminco Entities are requesting extraordinary relief without providing the necessary facts to justify same. Counsel further contends that the Timminco Entities must "wear two hats" and act both in their corporate interest and in the best interest of the pension plan and cannot simply ignore their obligations to the pension plans in favour of the corporation. (See *Indalex (Re), supra*, at para. 129.)

[20] Counsel to CEP goes on to submit that, where the "two hats" gives rise to a conflict of interest, if a corporation favours its corporate interest rather than its obligations to its fiduciaries, there will be consequences. In *Indalex (Re), supra*, the court found that the corporation seeking CCAA protection had acted in a manner that revealed a conflict with the duties it owed the beneficiaries of pension plans and ordered the corporation to pay the special payments it owed the plans (See *Indalex (Re), supra*, at paras. 140 and 207.)

[21] In this case, counsel to CEP submits that, given the lack of evidentiary support for the super priority charge, the risk of conflicting interests and the importance of the Timminco Entities' fiduciary duties to the pension plans, the super priority charge ought not to be granted.

[22] Although counsel to CEP acknowledges that the court has the discretion in the context of the CCAA to make orders that override provincial legislation, such discretion must be exercised through a careful weighing of the facts before the court. Only where the applicant proves it is necessary in the context and consistent with the objects of the CCAA may a judge make an order overriding provincial legislation. (*See Indalex (Re), supra*, at paras. 179 and 189.)

[23] In the circumstances of this case, counsel to CEP argues that the position of any super priority charge ordered by the court should rank after the pension plans.

[24] CEP also takes the position that the Timminco Entities' obligations to the pension plans should not be suspended. Counsel notes that the Timminco Entities have contractual obligations through the collective agreement and pension plan documents to make contributions to the pension plans and, as well, the Timminco Entities owe statutory duties to the beneficiaries of the pension funds pursuant to the QSPPA. Counsel further points out that s. 49 of the QSPPA provides that any contributions and accrued interest not paid into the pension fund are deemed to be held in trust for the employer.

[25] In addition, counsel takes the position that the Court of Appeal for Ontario in *Indalex (Re), supra*, confirmed that, in the context of Ontario legislation, all of the contributions an employee owes a pension fund, including the special payments, are subject to the deemed trust provision of the PBA.

[26] In this case, counsel to CEP points out that the special payments the Timminco Entities seek to suspend in the amount of $95,300 per month to the Bécancour Union Pension Plan, and of $47,743 to the Silicium Union Pension Plan, are payments that are to be held in trust for the beneficiaries of the pension plans. Thus, they argue that the Timminco Entities have a fiduciary

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

obligation to the beneficiaries of the pension plans to hold the funds in trust. Further, the Timminco Entities' request to suspend the special payments to the Bécancour Union Pension Plan and the Quebec Silicon Union Pension Plan reveals that its interests are in conflict.

[27] Counsel also submits that the Timminco Entities have not pointed to a particular reason, other than generalized liquidity problems, as to why they are unable to make special payments to their pension plans.

[28] With respect to the KERPs, counsel to CEP acknowledges that the court has the power to approve a KERP, but the court must only do so when it is convinced that it is necessary to make such an order. In this case, counsel contends that the Timminco Entities have not presented any meaningful evidence on the propriety of the proposed KERPs. Counsel notes that the Timminco Entities have not named the KERPs recipients, provided any specific information regarding their involvement with the CCAA proceeding, addressed their replaceability, or set out their individual bonuses. In the circumstances, counsel submits that it would be unfair and inequitable for the court to approve the KERPs requested by the Timminco Entities.

[29] Counsel to CEP's final submission is that, in the event the KERPs are approved, they should not be sealed, but rather should be treated in the same manner as other CCAA documents through the Monitor. Alternatively, counsel to CEP submits that a copy of the KERPs should be provided to the Respondent, CEP.

The Position of the Timminco Entities

[30] At the time of the initial hearing, the Timminco Entities filed evidence establishing that they were facing severe liquidity issues as a result of, among other things, a low profit margin realized on their silicon metal sales due to a high volume, long-term supply contract at below market prices, a decrease in the demand and market price for solar grade silicon, failure to recoup their capital expenditures incurred in connection with the development of their solar grade operations, and the inability to secure additional funding. The Timminco Entities also face significant pension and environmental remediation legacy costs, and financial costs related to large outstanding debts.

[31] I accepted submissions to the effect that without the protection of the CCAA, a shutdown of operations was inevitable, which the Timminco Entities submitted would be extremely detrimental to the Timminco Entities' employees, pensioners, suppliers and customers.

[32] As at December 31, 2011, the Timminco Entities' cash balance was approximately $2.4 million. The 30-day consolidated cash flow forecast filed at the time of the CCAA application projected that the Timminco Entities would have total receipts of approximately $5.5 million and total operating disbursements of approximately $7.7 million for net cash outflow of approximately $2.2 million, leaving an ending cash position as at February 3, 2012 of an estimated $157,000.

[33] The Timminco Entities approached their existing stakeholders and third party lenders in an effort to secure a suitable debtor-in-possession ("DIP") facility. The Timminco Entities

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

existing stakeholders, Bank of America NA, IQ, and AMG Advance Metallurgical Group NV, have declined to advance any funds to the Timminco Entities at this time. In addition, two third-party lenders have apparently refused to enter into negotiations regarding the provision of a DIP Facility.[1]

[34] The Monitor, in its Second Report, dated January 11, 2012, extended the cash forecast through to February 17, 2012. The Second Report provides explanations for the key variances in actual receipts and disbursements as compared to the January 2, 2012 forecast.

[35] There are some timing differences but the Monitor concludes that there are no significant changes in the underlying assumptions in the January 10, 2012 forecast as compared to the January 2, 2012 forecast.

[36] The January 10 forecast projects that the ending cash position goes from positive to negative in mid-February.

[37] Counsel to the Applicants submits that, based on the latest cash flow forecast, the Timminco Entities currently estimate that additional funding will be required by mid-February in order to avoid an interruption in operations.

[38] The Timminco Entities submit that this is an appropriate case in which to grant super priority to the Administration Charge. Counsel submits that each of the proposed beneficiaries will play a critical role in the Timminco Entities' restructuring and it is unlikely that the advisors will participate in the CCAA proceedings unless the Administration Charge is granted to secure their fees and disbursements.

[39] Statutory Authority to grant such a charge derives from s. 11.52(1) of the CCAA. Subsection 11.52(2) contains the authority to grant super-priority to such a charge:

> 11.52(1) Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs — On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of
>
> > (a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

[1] In a subsequent motion relating to approval of a DIP Facility, the Timminco Entities acknowledged they had reached an agreement with a third-party lender with respect to providing DIP financing, subject to court approval. Further argument on this motion will be heard on February 6, 2012.

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

> (b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and
>
> (c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.
>
> 11.52(2) Priority — This court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

[40] Counsel also submits that the Timminco Entities require the continued involvement of their directors and officers in order to pursue a successful restructuring of their business and/or finances and, due to the significant personal exposure associated with the Timminco Entities' liabilities, it is unlikely that the directors and officers will continue their services with the Timminco Entities unless the D&O Charge is granted.

[41] Statutory authority for the granting of a D&O charge on a super priority basis derives from s. 11.51 of the CCAA:

> 11.51(1) Security or charge relating to director's indemnification — On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.
>
> (2) Priority — The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
>
> (3) Restriction — indemnification insurance — The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.
>
> (4) Negligence, misconduct or fault — The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

Analysis

(i) Administration Charge and D&O Charge

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

[42] It seems apparent that the position of the unions' is in direct conflict with the Applicants' positions.

[43] The position being put forth by counsel to the CEP and USW is clearly stated and is quite understandable. However, in my view, the position of the CEP and the USW has to be considered in the context of the practical circumstances facing the Timminco Entities. The Timminco Entities are clearly insolvent and do not have sufficient reserves to address the funding requirements of the pension plans.

[44] Counsel to the Applicants submits that without the relief requested, the Timminco Entities will be deprived of the services being provided by the beneficiaries of the charges, to the company's detriment. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that it is unlikely that the advisors will participate in the CCAA proceedings unless the Administration Charge is granted to secure their fees and disbursements. I also accept the evidence of Mr. Kalins that the role of the advisors is critical to the efforts of the Timminco Entities to restructure. To expect that the advisors will take the business risk of participating in these proceedings without the security of the charge is neither reasonable nor realistic.

[45] Likewise, I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants to the effect that the directors and officers will not continue their service without the D&O Charge. Again, in circumstances such as those facing the Timminco Entities, it is neither reasonable nor realistic to expect directors and officers to continue without the requested form of protection.

[46] It logically follows, in my view, that without the assistance of the advisors, and in the anticipated void caused by the lack of a governance structure, the Timmico Entities will be directionless and unable to effectively proceed with any type or form of restructuring under the CCAA.

[47] The Applicants argue that the CCAA overrides any conflicting requirements of the QSPPA and the BPA.

[48] Counsel submits that the general paramountcy of the CCAA over provincial legislation was confirmed in *ATB Financial v. Metcalf & Mansfield Alternative Investment II Corp.*, (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 104. In addition, in *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, the Court of Appeal held that the doctrine of paramountcy applies either where a provincial and a federal statutory position are in conflict and cannot both be complied with, or where complying with the provincial law will have the effect of frustrating the purpose of the federal law and therefore the intent of Parliament. See *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 23 (Ont. C.A.).

[49] It has long been stated that the purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors, with the purpose of allowing the business to continue. As the Court of Appeal for Ontario stated in *Stelco Inc., (Re)* (2005), 75 O.R. (3d) 5, at para. 36:

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

> In the CCAA context, Parliament has provided a statutory framework to extend protection to a company while it holds its creditors at bay and attempts to negotiate a compromised plan of arrangement that will enable it to emerge and continue as a viable economic entity, thus benefiting society and the company in the long run, along with the company's creditors, shareholders, employees and other stakeholders. The s. 11 discretion is the engine that drives this broad and flexible statutory scheme...

[50] Further, as I indicated in *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J.), this purpose continues to exist regardless of whether a company is actually restructuring or is continuing operations during a sales process in order to maintain maximum value and achieve the highest price for the benefit of all stakeholders. Based on this reasoning, the fact that Timminco has not provided any plan for restructuring at this time does not change the analysis.

[51] The Court of Appeal in *Indalex Ltd. (Re)* (2011), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 19 (Ont. C.A.) confirmed the CCAA court's ability to override conflicting provisions of provincial statutes where the application of the provincial legislation would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy. The Court stated, *inter alia*, as follows (beginning at paragraph 176):

> The CCAA court has the authority to grant a super-priority charge to DIP lenders in CCAA proceedings. I fully accept that the CCAA judge can make an order granting a super-priority charge that has the effect of overriding provincial legislation, including the PBA. …
>
> …
>
> What of the contention that recognition of the deemed trust will cause DIP lenders to be unwilling to advance funds in CCAA proceedings? It is important to recognize that the conclusion I have reached does not mean that a finding of paramountcy will never be made. That determination must be made on a case by case basis. There may well be situations in which paramountcy is invoked and the record satisfies the CCAA judge that application of the provincial legislation would frustrate the company's ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy.

[52] The Timminco Entities seek approval to suspend Special Payments in order to maintain sufficient liquidity to continue operations for the benefit of all stakeholders, including employees and pensioners. It is clear that based on the January 2 forecast, as modified by the Second Report, the Timminco Entities have insufficient liquidity to make the Special Payments at this time.

[53] Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that where it is necessary to achieve the objective of the CCAA, the court has the jurisdiction to make an order under the CCAA granting, in the present case, super priority over the Encumbrances for the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge, even if such an order conflicts with, or overrides, the QSPPA or the PBA.

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

[54] Further, the Timminco Entities submit that the doctrine of paramountcy is properly invoked in this case and that the court should order that the Administration Charge and the D&O Charge have super priority over the Encumbrances in order to ensure the continued participation of the beneficiaries of these charges in the Timminco Entities' CCAA proceedings.

[55] The Timminco Entities also submit that payment of the pension contributions should be suspended. These special (or amortization) payments are required to be made to liquidate a going concern or solvency deficiency in a pension plan as identified in the most recent funding valuation report for the plan that is filed with the applicable pension regulatory authority. The requirement for the employer to make such payments is provided for under applicable provincial pension minimum standards legislation.

[56] The courts have characterized special (or amortization) payments as pre-filing obligations which are stayed upon an initial order being granted under the CCAA. (See *AbitibiBowater Inc*., (Re) (2009) 57 C.B.R. (5th) 285 (Q.S.C.); *Collins & Aikman Automotive Canada Inc*. (2007), 37 C.B.R. (5th) 282 (Ont. S.C.J.) and *Fraser Papers Inc. (Re)* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 217 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[57] I accept the submission of counsel to the Applicants to the effect that courts in Ontario and Quebec have addressed the issue of suspending special (or amortization) payments in the context of a CCAA restructuring and have ordered the suspension of such payments where the failure to stay the obligation would jeopardize the business of the debtor company and the company's ability to restructure.

[58] The Timminco Entities also submit that there should be no director or officer liability incurred as a result of a court-ordered suspension of payment of pension contributions. Counsel references *Fraser Papers*, where Pepall J. stated:

> Given that I am ordering that the special payments need not be made during the stay period pending further order of the Court, the Applicants and the officers and directors should not have any liability for failure to pay them in that same period. The latter should be encouraged to remain during the CCAA process so as to govern and assist with the restructuring effort and should be provided with protection without the need to have recourse to the Director's Charge.

[59] Importantly, *Fraser Papers* also notes that there is no priority for special payments in bankruptcy. In my view, it follows that the employees and former employees are not prejudiced by the relief requested since the likely outcome should these proceedings fail is bankruptcy, which would not produce a better result for them. Thus, the "two hats" doctrine from *Indalex (Re), supra*, discussed earlier in these reasons at [20], would not be infringed by the relief requested. Because it would avoid bankruptcy, to the benefit of both the Timminco Entities and beneficiaries of the pension plans, the relief requested would not favour the interests of the corporate entity over its obligations to its fiduciaries.

[60] Counsel to the Timminco Entities submits that where it is necessary to achieve the objective of the CCAA, the court has the jurisdiction to make an order under the CCAA

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

suspending the payment of the pension contributions, even if such order conflicts with, or overrides, the QSPPA or the PBA.

[61] The evidence has established that the Timminco Entities are in a severe liquidity crisis and, if required to make the pension contributions, will not have sufficient funds to continue operating. The Timminco Entities would then be forced to cease operations to the detriment of their stakeholders, including their employees and pensioners.

[62] On the facts before me, I am satisfied that the application of the QSPPA and the PBA would frustrate the Timminco Entities ability to restructure and avoid bankruptcy. Indeed, while the Timminco Entities continue to make Normal Cost Contributions to the pension plans, requiring them to pay what they owe in respect of special and amortization payments for those plans would deprive them of sufficient funds to continue operating, forcing them to cease operations to the detriment of their stakeholders, including their employees and pensioners.

[63] In my view, this is exactly the kind of result the CCAA is intended to avoid. Where the facts demonstrate that ordering a company to make special payments in accordance with provincial legislation would have the effect of forcing the company into bankruptcy, it seems to me that to make such an order would frustrate the rehabilitative purpose of the CCAA. In such circumstances, therefore, the doctrine of paramountcy is properly invoked, and an order suspending the requirement to make special payments is appropriate (see *ATB Financial* and *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*).

[64] In my view, the circumstances are such that the position put forth by the Timminco Entities must prevail. I am satisfied that bankruptcy is not the answer and that, in order to ensure that the purpose and objective of the CCAA can be fulfilled, it is necessary to invoke the doctrine of paramountcy such that the provisions of the CCAA override those of QSPPA and the PBA.

[65] There is a clear inter-relationship between the granting of the Administration Charge, the granting of the D&O Charge and extension of protection for the directors and officers for the company's failure to pay the pension contributions.

[66] In my view, in the absence of the court granting the requested super priority and protection, the objectives of the CCAA would be frustrated. It is not reasonable to expect that professionals will take the risk of not being paid for their services, and that directors and officers will remain if placed in a compromised position should the Timminco Entities continue CCAA proceedings without the requested protection. The outcome of the failure to provide these respective groups with the requested protection would, in my view, result in the overwhelming likelihood that the CCAA proceedings would come to an abrupt halt, followed, in all likelihood, by bankruptcy proceedings.

[67] If bankruptcy results, the outcome for employees and pensioners is certain. This alternative will not provide a better result for the employees and pensioners. The lack of a desirable alternative to the relief requested only serves to strengthen my view that the objectives of the CCAA would be frustrated if the relief requested was not granted.

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

[68] For these reasons, I have determined that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant super priority to both the Administrative Charge and D&O Charge.

[69] I have also concluded that it is both necessary and appropriate to suspend the Timminco Entities' obligations to make pension contributions with respect to the Pension Plans. In my view, this determination is necessary to allow the Timminco Entities to restructure or sell the business as a going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders.

[70] I am also satisfied that, in order to encourage the officers and directors to remain during the CCAA proceedings, an order should be granted relieving them from any liability for the Timminco Entities' failure to make pension contributions during the CCAA proceedings. At this point in the restructuring, the participation of its officers and directors is of vital importance to the Timminco Entities.

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

(ii) The KERPs

[71] Turning now to the issue of the employee retention plans (KERPs), the Timminco Entities seek an order approving the KERPs offered to certain employees who are considered critical to successful proceedings under the CCAA.

[72] In this case, the KERPs have been approved by the board of directors of Timminco. The record indicates that in the opinion of the Chief Executive Officer and the Special Committee of the Board, all of the KERPs participants are critical to the Timminco Entities' CCAA proceedings as they are experienced employees who have played central roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date and will play critical roles in the steps taken in the future. The total amount of the KERPs in question is $269,000. KERPs have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings where the retention of certain employees has been deemed critical to a successful restructuring. See *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, (2009) O.J. No. 1044 (S.C.J.), *Grant Forest Products Inc. (Re)*, (2009) 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Commercial List], and *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)*, (2009) 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J.).

[73] In *Grant Forest Products*, Newbould J. noted that the business judgment of the board of directors of the debtor company and the monitor should rarely be ignored when it comes to approving a KERP charge.

[74] The Monitor also supports the approval of the KERPs and, following review of several court-approved retention plans in CCAA proceedings, is satisfied that the KERPs are consistent with the current practice for retention plans in the context of a CCAA proceeding and that the quantum of the proposed payments under the KERPs are reasonable in the circumstances.

[75] I accept the submissions of counsel to the Timminco Entities. I am satisfied that it is necessary, in these circumstances, that the KERPs participants be incentivized to remain in their current positions during the CCAA process. In my view, the continued participation of these experienced and necessary employees will assist the company in its objectives during its restructuring process. If these employees were not to remain with the company, it would be

necessary to replace them. It is reasonable to conclude that the replacement of such employees would not provide any substantial economic benefits to the company. The KERPs are approved.

[76] The Timminco Entities have also requested that the court seal the Confidential Supplement which contains copies of the unredacted KERPs, taking the position that the KERPs contain sensitive personal compensation information and that the disclosure of such information would compromise the commercial interests of the Timminco Entities and harm the KERPs participants. Further, the KERPs participants have a reasonable expectation that their names and salary information will be kept confidential. Counsel relies on *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)* [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 at para. 53 where Iacobucci J. adopted the following test to determine when a sealing order should be made:

> A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:
>
> (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
>
> (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh the deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

[77] CEP argues that the CCAA process should be open and transparent to the greatest extent possible and that the KERPs should not be sealed but rather should be treated in the same manner as other CCAA documents through the Monitor. In the alternative, counsel to the CEP submits that a copy of the KERPs should be provided to the Respondent, CEP.

[78] In my view, at this point in time in the restructuring process, the disclosure of this personal information could compromise the commercial interests of the Timminco Entities and cause harm to the KERP participants. It is both necessary and important for the parties to focus on the restructuring efforts at hand rather than to get, in my view, potentially side-tracked on this issue. In my view, the Confidential Supplement should be and is ordered sealed with the proviso that this issue can be revisited in 45 days.

Disposition

[79] In the result, the motion is granted. An order shall issue:

(a) suspending the Timminco Entities' obligation to make special payments with respect to the pension plans (as defined in the Notice of Motion);

(b) granting super priority to the Administrative Charge and the D&O Charge;

(c) approving the KERPs and the grant of the KERP Charge;

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

(d) authorizing the sealing of the Confidential Supplement to the First Report of the Monitor.

MORAWETZ J.

Date: February 2, 2012

2012 ONSC 506 (CanLII)

TAB 5

CITATION: Target Canada Co. (Re), 2015 ONSC 303
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-10832-00CL
DATE: 2015-01-16

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TARGET CANADA CO., TARGET CANADA HEALTH CO., TARGET CANADA MOBILE GP CO., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (BC) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (ONTARIO) CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY CORP., TARGET CANADA PHARMACY (SK) CORP., and TARGET CANADA PROPERTY LLC.

BEFORE: Regional Senior Justice Morawetz

COUNSEL: *Tracy Sandler* and *Jeremy Dacks*, for the Target Canada Co., Target Canada Health Co., Target Canada Mobile GP Co., Target Canada Pharmacy (BC) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (Ontario) Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy Corp., Target Canada Pharmacy (SK) Corp., and Target Canada Property LLC (the "Applicants")

Jay Swartz, for the Target Corporation

Alan Mark, *Melaney Wagner*, and *Jesse Mighton*, for the Proposed Monitor, Alvarez and Marsal Canada ULC ("Alvarez")

Terry O'Sullivan, for The Honourable J. Ground, Trustee of the Proposed Employee Trust

Susan Philpott, for the Proposed Employee Representative Counsel for employees of the Applicants

HEARD and ENDORSED: January 15, 2015

REASONS: January 16, 2015

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Target Canada Co. ("TCC") and the other applicants listed above (the "Applicants") seek relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "CCAA"). While the limited partnerships listed in Schedule "A" to the draft Order (the "Partnerships") are not applicants in this proceeding, the Applicants seek to have a stay of

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

proceedings and other benefits of an initial order under the CCAA extended to the Partnerships, which are related to or carry on operations that are integral to the business of the Applicants.

[2] TCC is a large Canadian retailer. It is the Canadian operating subsidiary of Target Corporation, one of the largest retailers in the United States. The other Applicants are either corporations or partners of the Partnerships formed to carry on specific aspects of TCC's Canadian retail business (such as the Canadian pharmacy operations) or finance leasehold improvements in leased Canadian stores operated by TCC. The Applicants, therefore, do not represent the entire Target enterprise; the Applicants consist solely of entities that are integral to the Canadian retail operations. Together, they are referred as the "Target Canada Entities".

[3] In early 2011, Target Corporation determined to expand its retail operations into Canada, undertaking a significant investment (in the form of both debt and equity) in TCC and certain of its affiliates in order to permit TCC to establish and operate Canadian retail stores. As of today, TCC operates 133 stores, with at least one store in every province of Canada. All but three of these stores are leased.

[4] Due to a number of factors, the expansion into Canada has proven to be substantially less successful than expected. Canadian operations have shown significant losses in every quarter since stores opened. Projections demonstrate little or no prospect of improvement within a reasonable time.

[5] After exploring multiple solutions over a number of months and engaging in extensive consultations with its professional advisors, Target Corporation concluded that, in the interest of all of its stakeholders, the responsible course of action is to cease funding the Canadian operations.

[6] Without ongoing investment from Target Corporation, TCC and the other Target Canada Entities cannot continue to operate and are clearly insolvent. Due to the magnitude and complexity of the operations of the Target Canada Entities, the Applicants are seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to accomplish a fair, orderly and controlled wind-down of their operations. The Target Canada Entities have indicated that they intend to treat all of their stakeholders as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow, particularly the approximately 17,600 employees of the Target Canada Entities.

[7] The Applicants are of the view that an orderly wind-down under Court supervision, with the benefit of inherent jurisdiction of the CCAA, and the oversight of the proposed monitor, provides a framework in which the Target Canada Entities can, among other things:

a) Pursue initiatives such as the sale of real estate portfolios and the sale of inventory;

b) Develop and implement support mechanisms for employees as vulnerable stakeholders affected by the wind-down, particularly (i) an employee trust (the "Employee Trust") funded by Target Corporation; (ii) an employee representative counsel to safeguard employee interests; and (iii) a key

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

employee retention plan (the "KERP") to provide essential employees who agree to continue their employment and to contribute their services and expertise to the Target Canada Entities during the orderly wind-down;

c) Create a level playing field to ensure that all affected stakeholders are treated as fairly and equitably as the circumstances allow; and

d) Avoid the significant maneuvering among creditors and other stakeholders that could be detrimental to all stakeholders, in the absence of a court-supervised proceeding.

[8] The Applicants are of the view that these factors are entirely consistent with the well-established purpose of a CCAA stay: to give a debtor the "breathing room" required to restructure with a view to maximizing recoveries, whether the restructuring takes place as a going concern or as an orderly liquidation or wind-down.

[9] TCC is an indirect, wholly-owned subsidiary of Target Corporation and is the operating company through which the Canadian retail operations are carried out. TCC is a Nova Scotia unlimited liability company. It is directly owned by Nicollet Enterprise 1 S. à r.l. ("NE1"), an entity organized under the laws of Luxembourg. Target Corporation (which is incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota) owns NE1 through several other entities.

[10] TCC operates from a corporate headquarters in Mississauga, Ontario. As of January 12, 2015, TCC employed approximately 17,600 people, almost all of whom work in Canada. TCC's employees are not represented by a union, and there is no registered pension plan for employees.

[11] The other Target Canada Entities are all either: (i) direct or indirect subsidiaries of TCC with responsibilities for specific aspects of the Canadian retail operation; or (ii) affiliates of TCC that have been involved in the financing of certain leasehold improvements.

[12] A typical TCC store has a footprint in the range of 80,000 to 125,000 total retail square feet and is located in a shopping mall or large strip mall. TCC is usually the anchor tenant. Each TCC store typically contains an in-store Target brand pharmacy, Target Mobile kiosk and a Starbucks café. Each store typically employs approximately 100 – 150 people, described as "Team Members" and "Team Leaders", with a total of approximately 16,700 employed at the "store level" of TCC's retail operations.

[13] TCC owns three distribution centres (two in Ontario and one in Alberta) to support its retail operations. These centres are operated by a third party service provider. TCC also leases a variety of warehouse and office spaces.

[14] In every quarter since TCC opened its first store, TCC has faced lower than expected sales and greater than expected losses. As reported in Target Corporation's Consolidated Financial Statements, the Canadian segment of the Target business has suffered a significant loss in every quarter since TCC opened stores in Canada.

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

[15] TCC is completely operationally funded by its ultimate parent, Target Corporation, and related entities. It is projected that TCC's cumulative pre-tax losses from the date of its entry into the Canadian market to the end of the 2014 fiscal year (ending January 31, 2015) will be more than $2.5 billion. In his affidavit, Mr. Mark Wong, General Counsel and Secretary of TCC, states that this is more than triple the loss originally expected for this period. Further, if TCC's operations are not wound down, it is projected that they would remain unprofitable for at least 5 years and would require significant and continued funding from Target Corporation during that period.

[16] TCC attributes its failure to achieve expected profitability to a number of principal factors, including: issues of scale; supply chain difficulties; pricing and product mix issues; and the absence of a Canadian online retail presence.

[17] Following a detailed review of TCC's operations, the Board of Directors of Target Corporation decided that it is in the best interests of the business of Target Corporation and its subsidiaries to discontinue Canadian operations.

[18] Based on the stand-alone financial statements prepared for TCC as of November 1, 2014 (which consolidated financial results of TCC and its subsidiaries), TCC had total assets of approximately $5.408 billion and total liabilities of approximately $5.118 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC's financial situation.

[19] Mr. Wong states that TCC's operational funding is provided by Target Corporation. As of November 1, 2014, NE1 (TCC's direct parent) had provided equity capital to TCC in the amount of approximately $2.5 billon. As a result of continuing and significant losses in TCC's operations, NE1 has been required to make an additional equity investment of $62 million since November 1, 2014.

[20] NE1 has also lent funds to TCC under a Loan Facility with a maximum amount of $4 billion. TCC owed NE1 approximately $3.1 billion under this Facility as of January 2, 2015. The Loan Facility is unsecured. On January 14, 2015, NE1 agreed to subordinate all amounts owing by TCC to NE1 under this Loan Facility to payment in full of proven claims against TCC.

[21] As at November 1, 2014, Target Canada Property LLC ("TCC Propco") had assets of approximately $1.632 billion and total liabilities of approximately $1.643 billion. Mr. Wong states that this does not reflect a significant impairment charge that will likely be incurred at fiscal year end due to TCC Propco's financial situation. TCC Propco has also borrowed approximately $1.5 billion from Target Canada Property LP and TCC Propco also owes U.S. $89 million to Target Corporation under a Demand Promissory Note.

[22] TCC has subleased almost all the retail store leases to TCC Propco, which then made real estate improvements and sub-sub leased the properties back to TCC. Under this arrangement, upon termination of any of these sub-leases, a "make whole" payment becomes owing from TCC to TCC Propco.

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

[23] Mr. Wong states that without further funding and financial support from Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities are unable to meet their liabilities as they become due, including TCC's next payroll (due January 16, 2015). The Target Canada Entities, therefore state that they are insolvent.

[24] Mr. Wong also states that given the size and complexity of TCC's operations and the numerous stakeholders involved in the business, including employees, suppliers, landlords, franchisees and others, the Target Canada Entities have determined that a controlled wind-down of their operations and liquidation under the protection of the CCAA, under Court supervision and with the assistance of the proposed monitor, is the only practical method available to ensure a fair and orderly process for all stakeholders. Further, Mr. Wong states that TCC and Target Corporation seek to benefit from the framework and the flexibility provided by the CCAA in effecting a controlled and orderly wind-down of the Canadian operations, in a manner that treats stakeholders as fairly and as equitably as the circumstances allow.

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

[25] On this initial hearing, the issues are as follows:

a) Does this court have jurisdiction to grant the CCAA relief requested?

   a) Should the stay be extended to the Partnerships?

   b) Should the stay be extended to "Co-tenants" and rights of third party tenants?

   c) Should the stay extend to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims that are derivative of claims against the Target Canada Entities?

   d) Should the Court approve protections for employees?

   e) Is it appropriate to allow payment of certain pre-filing amounts?

   f) Does this court have the jurisdiction to authorize pre-filing claims to "critical" suppliers;

   g) Should the court should exercise its discretion to authorize the Applicants to seek proposals from liquidators and approve the financial advisor and real estate advisor engagement?

   h) Should the court exercise its discretion to approve the Court-ordered charges?

[26] "Insolvent" is not expressly defined in the CCAA. However, for the purposes of the CCAA, a debtor is insolvent if it meets the definition of an "insolvent person" in section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3 ("BIA") or if it is "insolvent" as described in *Stelco Inc. (Re)*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [*Stelco*], leave to appeal refused, [2004] O.J. No. 1903, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, where Farley, J. found that "insolvency" includes a corporation "reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within [a]

reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring" (at para 26). The decision of Farley, J. in *Stelco* was followed in *Priszm Income Fund (Re)*, [2011] O.J. No. 1491 (SCJ), 2011 and *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)*, [2009] O.J. No. 4286, (SCJ) [*Canwest*].

[27] Having reviewed the record and hearing submissions, I am satisfied that the Target Canada Entities are all insolvent and are debtor companies to which the CCAA applies, either by reference to the definition of "insolvent person" under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA") or under the test developed by Farley J. in *Stelco*.

[28] I also accept the submission of counsel to the Applicants that without the continued financial support of Target Corporation, the Target Canada Entities face too many legal and business impediments and too much uncertainty to wind-down their operations without the "breathing space" afforded by a stay of proceedings or other available relief under the CCAA.

[29] I am also satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction over the proceeding. Section 9(1) of the CCAA provides that an application may be made to the court that has jurisdiction in (a) the province in which the head office or chief place of business of the company in Canada is situated; or (b) any province in which the company's assets are situated, if there is no place of business in Canada.

[30] In this case, the head office and corporate headquarters of TCC is located in Mississauga, Ontario, where approximately 800 employees work. Moreover, the chief place of business of the Target Canada Entities is Ontario. A number of office locations are in Ontario; 2 of TCC's 3 primary distribution centres are located in Ontario; 55 of the TCC retail stores operate in Ontario; and almost half the employees that support TCC's operations work in Ontario.

[31] The Target Canada Entities state that the purpose for seeking the proposed initial order in these proceedings is to effect a fair, controlled and orderly wind-down of their Canadian retail business with a view to developing a plan of compromise or arrangement to present to their creditors as part of these proceedings. I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that although there is no prospect that a restructured "going concern" solution involving the Target Canada Entities will result, the use of the protections and flexibility afforded by the CCAA is entirely appropriate in these circumstances. In arriving at this conclusion, I have noted the comments of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Century Services Inc.* v. *Canada (Attorney General)*, [2010] SCC 50 ("*Century Services*") that "courts frequently observe that the CCAA is skeletal in nature", and does not "contain a comprehensive code that lays out all that is permitted or barred". The flexibility of the CCAA, particularly in the context of large and complex restructurings, allows for innovation and creativity, in contrast to the more "rules-based" approach of the BIA.

[32] Prior to the 2009 amendments to the CCAA, Canadian courts accepted that, in appropriate circumstances, debtor companies were entitled to seek the protection of the CCAA where the outcome was not going to be a going concern restructuring, but instead, a "liquidation" or wind-down of the debtor companies' assets or business.

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

[33] The 2009 amendments did not expressly address whether the CCAA could be used generally to wind-down the business of a debtor company. However, I am satisfied that the enactment of section 36 of the CCAA, which establishes a process for a debtor company to sell assets outside the ordinary course of business while under CCAA protection, is consistent with the principle that the CCAA can be a vehicle to downsize or wind-down a debtor company's business.

[34] In this case, the sheer magnitude and complexity of the Target Canada Entities business, including the number of stakeholders whose interests are affected, are, in my view, suited to the flexible framework and scope for innovation offered by this "skeletal" legislation.

[35] The required audited financial statements are contained in the record.

[36] The required cash flow statements are contained in the record.

[37] Pursuant to s. 11.02 of the CCAA, the court may make an order staying proceedings, restraining further proceedings, or prohibiting the commencement of proceedings, "on any terms that it may impose" and "effective for the period that the court considers necessary" provided the stay is no longer than 30 days. The Target Canada Entities, in this case, seek a stay of proceedings up to and including February 13, 2015.

[38] Certain of the corporate Target Canada Entities (TCC, TCC Health and TCC Mobile) act as general or limited partners in the partnerships. The Applicants submit that it is appropriate to extend the stay of proceedings to the Partnerships on the basis that each performs key functions in relation to the Target Canada Entities' businesses.

[39] The Applicants also seek to extend the stay to Target Canada Property LP which was formerly the sub-leasee/sub-sub lessor under the sub-sub lease back arrangement entered into by TCC to finance the leasehold improvements in its leased stores. The Applicants contend that the extension of the stay to Target Canada Property LP is necessary in order to safeguard it against any residual claims that may be asserted against it as a result of TCC Propco's insolvency and filing under the CCAA.

[40] I am satisfied that it is appropriate that an initial order extending the protection of a CCAA stay of proceedings under section 11.02(1) of the CCAA should be granted.

[41] Pursuant to section 11.7(1) of the CCAA, Alvarez & Marsal Inc. is appointed as Monitor.

[42] It is well established that the court has the jurisdiction to extend the protection of the stay of proceedings to Partnerships in order to ensure that the purposes of the CCAA can be achieved (see: *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (1993), 17 CBR (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.)*; *Re Priszm Income Fund,* 2011 ONSC 2061; *Re Canwest Publishing Inc.* 2010 ONSC 222 ("*Canwest Publishing*") and *Re Canwest Global Communications Corp*., 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 ("*Canwest Global*").

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

[43] In these circumstances, I am also satisfied that it is appropriate to extend the stay to the Partnerships as requested.

[44] The Applicants also seek landlord protection in relation to third party tenants. Many retail leases of non-anchored tenants provide that tenants have certain rights against their landlords if the anchor tenant in a particular shopping mall or centre becomes insolvent or ceases operations. In order to alleviate the prejudice to TCC's landlords if any such non-anchored tenants attempt to exercise these rights, the Applicants request an extension of the stay of proceedings (the "Co-Tenancy Stay") to all rights of these third party tenants against the landlords that arise out of the insolvency of the Target Canada Entities or as a result of any steps taken by the Target Canada Entities pursuant to the Initial Order.

[45] The Applicants contend that the authority to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay derives from the broad jurisdiction under sections 11 and 11.02(1) of the CCAA to make an initial order on any terms that the court may impose. Counsel references *Re T. Eaton Co.*, 1997 CarswellOnt 1914 (Gen. Div.) as a precedent where a stay of proceedings of the same nature as the Co-Tenancy Stay was granted by the court in Eaton's second CCAA proceeding. The Court noted that, if tenants were permitted to exercise these "co-tenancy" rights during the stay, the claims of the landlord against the debtor company would greatly increase, with a potentially detrimental impact on the restructuring efforts of the debtor company.

[46] In these proceedings, the Target Canada Entities propose, as part of the orderly wind-down of their businesses, to engage a financial advisor and a real estate advisor with a view to implementing a sales process for some or all of its real estate portfolio. The Applicants submit that it is premature to determine whether this process will be successful, whether any leases will be conveyed to third party purchasers for value and whether the Target Canada Entities can successfully develop and implement a plan that their stakeholders, including their landlords, will accept. The Applicants further contend that while this process is being resolved and the orderly wind-down is underway, the Co-Tenancy Stay is required to postpone the contractual rights of these tenants for a finite period. The Applicants contend that any prejudice to the third party tenants' clients is significantly outweighed by the benefits of the Co-Tenancy Stay to all of the stakeholders of the Target Canada Entities during the wind-down period.

[47] The Applicants therefore submit that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant the Co-Tenancy Stay in these circumstances.

[48] I am satisfied the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time. To the extent that the affected parties wish to challenge the broad nature of this stay, the same can be addressed at the "comeback hearing".

[49] The Applicants also request that the benefit of the stay of proceedings be extended (subject to certain exceptions related to the cash management system) to Target Corporation and its U.S. subsidiaries in relation to claims against these entities that are derivative of the primary liability of the Target Canada Entities.

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

[50] I am satisfied that the Court has the jurisdiction to grant such a stay. In my view, it is appropriate to preserve the status quo at this time and the stay is granted, again, subject to the proviso that affected parties can challenge the broad nature of the stay at a comeback hearing directed to this issue.

[51] With respect to the protection of employees, it is noted that TCC employs approximately 17,600 individuals.

[52] Mr. Wong contends that TCC and Target Corporation have always considered their employees to be integral to the Target brand and business. However, the orderly wind-down of the Target Canada Entities' business means that the vast majority of TCC employees will receive a notice immediately after the CCAA filing that their employment is to be terminated as part of the wind-down process.

[53] In order to provide a measure of financial security during the orderly wind-down and to diminish financial hardship that TCC employees may suffer, Target Corporation has agreed to fund an Employee Trust to a maximum of $70 million.

[54] The Applicants seek court approval of the Employee Trust which provides for payment to eligible employees of certain amounts, such as the balance of working notice following termination. Counsel contends that the Employee Trust was developed in consultation with the proposed monitor, who is the administrator of the trust, and is supported by the proposed Representative Counsel. The proposed trustee is The Honourable J. Ground. The Employee Trust is exclusively funded by Target Corporation and the costs associated with administering the Employee Trust will be borne by the Employee Trust, not the estate of Target Canada Entities. Target Corporation has agreed not to seek to recover from the Target Canada Entities estates any amounts paid out to employee beneficiaries under the Employee Trust.

[55] In my view, it is questionable as to whether court authorization is required to implement the provisions of the Employee Trust. It is the third party, Target Corporation, that is funding the expenses for the Employee Trust and not one of the debtor Applicants. However, I do recognize that the implementation of the Employee Trust is intertwined with this proceeding and is beneficial to the employees of the Applicants. To the extent that Target Corporation requires a court order authorizing the implementation of the employee trust, the same is granted.

[56] The Applicants seek the approval of a KERP and the granting of a court ordered charge up to the aggregate amount of $6.5 million as security for payments under the KERP. It is proposed that the KERP Charge will rank after the Administration Charge but before the Directors' Charge.

[57] The approval of a KERP and related KERP Charge is in the discretion of the Court. KERPs have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings, including *Re Nortel Networks Corp.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 1330 (S.C.J.) [*Nortel Networks (KERP)]*, and *Re Grant Forest Products Inc.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 4699 (Ont. S.C.J.). In *U.S. Steel Canada Inc.*, 2014 ONSC 6145, I recently approved the KERP for employees whose continued services were critical to the stability of the business and for the implementation of the marketing process and whose services

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

could not easily be replaced due, in part, to the significant integration between the debtor company and its U.S. parent.

[58] In this case, the KERP was developed by the Target Canada Entities in consultation with the proposed monitor. The proposed KERP and KERP Charge benefits between 21 and 26 key management employees and approximately 520 store-level management employees.

[59] Having reviewed the record, I am of the view that it is appropriate to approve the KERP and the KERP Charge. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account the submissions of counsel to the Applicants as to the importance of having stability among the key employees in the liquidation process that lies ahead.

[60] The Applicants also request the Court to appoint Koskie Minsky LLP as employee representative counsel (the "Employee Representative Counsel"), with Ms. Susan Philpott acting as senior counsel. The Applicants contend that the Employee Representative Counsel will ensure that employee interests are adequately protected throughout the proceeding, including by assisting with the Employee Trust. The Applicants contend that at this stage of the proceeding, the employees have a common interest in the CCAA proceedings and there appears to be no material conflict existing between individual or groups of employees. Moreover, employees will be entitled to opt out, if desired.

[61] I am satisfied that section 11 of the CCAA and the *Rules of Civil Procedure* confer broad jurisdiction on the court to appoint Representative Counsel for vulnerable stakeholder groups such as employee or investors (see *Re Nortel Networks Corp.*, 2009 CarswellOnt 3028 (S.C.J.) (Nortel Networks Representative Counsel)). In my view, it is appropriate to approve the appointment of Employee Representative Counsel and to provide for the payment of fees for such counsel by the Applicants. In arriving at this conclusion, I have taken into account:

(i) the vulnerability and resources of the groups sought to be represented;

(ii) the social benefit to be derived from the representation of the groups;

(iii) the avoidance of multiplicity of legal retainers; and

(iv) the balance of convenience and whether it is fair and just to creditors of the estate.

[62] The Applicants also seek authorization, if necessary, and with the consent of the Monitor, to make payments for pre-filing amounts owing and arrears to certain critical third parties that provide services integral to TCC's ability to operate during and implement its controlled and orderly wind-down process.

[63] Although the objective of the CCAA is to maintain the status quo while an insolvent company attempts to negotiate a plan of arrangement with its creditors, the courts have expressly acknowledged that preservation of the status quo does not necessarily entail the preservation of the relative pre-stay debt status of each creditor.

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

[64] The Target Canada Entities seek authorization to pay pre-filing amounts to certain specific categories of suppliers, if necessary and with the consent of the Monitor. These include:

a) Logistics and supply chain providers;

b) Providers of credit, debt and gift card processing related services; and

c) Other suppliers up to a maximum aggregate amount of $10 million, if, in the opinion of the Target Canada Entities, the supplier is critical to the orderly wind-down of the business.

[65] In my view, having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant this requested relief in respect of critical suppliers.

[66] In order to maximize recovery for all stakeholders, TCC indicates that it intends to liquidate its inventory and attempt to sell the real estate portfolio, either en bloc, in groups, or on an individual property basis. The Applicants therefore seek authorization to solicit proposals from liquidators with a view to entering into an agreement for the liquidation of the Target Canada Entities inventory in a liquidation process.

[67] TCC's liquidity position continues to deteriorate. According to Mr. Wong, TCC and its subsidiaries have an immediate need for funding in order to satisfy obligations that are coming due, including payroll obligations that are due on January 16, 2015. Mr. Wong states that Target Corporation and its subsidiaries are no longer willing to provide continued funding to TCC and its subsidiaries outside of a CCAA proceeding. Target Corporation (the "DIP Lender") has agreed to provide TCC and its subsidiaries (collectively, the "Borrower") with an interim financing facility (the "DIP Facility") on terms advantageous to the Applicants in the form of a revolving credit facility in an amount up to U.S. $175 million. Counsel points out that no fees are payable under the DIP Facility and interest is to be charged at what they consider to be the favourable rate of 5%. Mr. Wong also states that it is anticipated that the amount of the DIP Facility will be sufficient to accommodate the anticipated liquidity requirements of the Borrower during the orderly wind-down process.

[68] The DIP Facility is to be secured by a security interest on all of the real and personal property owned, leased or hereafter acquired by the Borrower. The Applicants request a court-ordered charge on the property of the Borrower to secure the amount actually borrowed under the DIP Facility (the "DIP Lenders Charge"). The DIP Lenders Charge will rank in priority to all unsecured claims, but subordinate to the Administration Charge, the KERP Charge and the Directors' Charge.

[69] The authority to grant an interim financing charge is set out at section 11.2 of the CCAA. Section 11.2(4) sets out certain factors to be considered by the court in deciding whether to grant the DIP Financing Charge.

[70] The Target Canada Entities did not seek alternative DIP Financing proposals based on their belief that the DIP Facility was being offered on more favourable terms than any other

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

potentially available third party financing. The Target Canada Entities are of the view that the DIP Facility is in the best interests of the Target Canada Entities and their stakeholders. I accept this submission and grant the relief as requested.

[71] Accordingly, the DIP Lenders' Charge is granted in the amount up to U.S. $175 million and the DIP Facility is approved.

[72] Section 11 of the CCAA provides the court with the authority to allow the debtor company to enter into arrangements to facilitate a restructuring under the CCAA. The Target Canada Entities wish to retain Lazard and Northwest to assist them during the CCCA proceeding. Both the Target Canada Entities and the Monitor believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration to be paid to Lazard and Northwest is fair and reasonable. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the engagement of Lazard and Northwest.

[73] With respect to the Administration Charge, the Applicants are requesting that the Monitor, along with its counsel, counsel to the Target Canada Entities, independent counsel to the Directors, the Employee Representative Counsel, Lazard and Northwest be protected by a court ordered charge and all the property of the Target Canada Entities up to a maximum amount of $6.75 million as security for their respective fees and disbursements (the "Administration Charge"). Certain fees that may be payable to Lazard are proposed to be protected by a Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

[74] In *Canwest Publishing Inc.*, 2010 ONSC 222, Pepall J. (as she then was) provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to be considered in approving an administration charge, including:

a. The size and complexity of the business being restructured;

b. The proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

c. Whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. Whether the quantum of the proposed Charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

e. The position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the Charge; and

f. The position of the Monitor.

[75] Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied, that it is appropriate to approve the Administration Charge and the Financial Advisor Subordinated Charge.

[76] The Applicants seek a Directors' and Officers' charge in the amount of up to $64 million. The Directors Charge is proposed to be secured by the property of the Target Canada Entities and to rank behind the Administration Charge and the KERP Charge, but ahead of the DIP Lenders' Charge.

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

[77] Pursuant to section 11.51 of the CCAA, the court has specific authority to grant a "super priority" charge to the directors and officers of a company as security for the indemnity provided by the company in respect of certain obligations.

[78] I accept the submissions of counsel to the Applicants that the requested Directors' Charge is reasonable given the nature of the Target Canada Entities retail business, the number of employees in Canada and the corresponding potential exposure of the directors and officers to personal liability. Accordingly, the Directors' Charge is granted.

[79] In the result, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant the Initial Order in these proceedings.

[80] The stay of proceedings is in effect until February 13, 2015.

[81] A comeback hearing is to be scheduled on or prior to February 13, 2015. I recognize that there are many aspects of the Initial Order that go beyond the usual first day provisions. I have determined that it is appropriate to grant this broad relief at this time so as to ensure that the status quo is maintained.

[82] The comeback hearing is to be a "true" comeback hearing. In moving to set aside or vary any provisions of this order, moving parties do not have to overcome any onus of demonstrating that the order should be set aside or varied.

[83] Finally, a copy of Lazard's engagement letter (the "Lazard Engagement Letter") is attached as Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report. The Applicants request that the Lazard Engagement Letter be sealed, as the fee structure contemplated in the Lazard Engagement Letter could potentially influence the structure of bids received in the sales process.

[84] Having considered the principles set out in *Sierra Club of Canada* v. *Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 211 D.L.R (4^{th}) 193 2 S.C.R. 522, I am satisfied that it is appropriate in the circumstances to seal Confidential Appendix "A" to the Monitor's pre-filing report.

[85] The Initial Order has been signed in the form presented.

Regional Senior Justice Morawetz

Date: January 16, 2015

2015 ONSC 303 (CanLII)

TAB 6

CITATION: Cinram International Inc. (Re), 2012 ONSC 3767
COURT FILE NO.: CV-12-9767-00CL
DATE: 20120626

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

RE: **IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED**

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CINRAM INTERNATIONAL INC., CINRAM INTERNATIONAL INCOME FUND, CII TRUST AND THE COMPANIES LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A", Applicants

BEFORE: **MORAWETZ J.**

COUNSEL: **Robert J. Chadwick, Melaney Wagner and Caroline Descours, for the Applicants**

Steven Golick, for Warner Electra-Atlantic Corp.

Steven Weisz, for Pre-Petition First Lien Agent, Pre-Petition Second Lien Agent and DIP Agent

Tracy Sandler, for Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation

David Byers, for the Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Inc.

HEARD &
ENDORSED: **JUNE 25, 2012**

REASONS: **JUNE 26, 2012**

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Cinram International Inc. ("CII"), Cinram International Income Fund ("Cinram Fund"), CII Trust and the Companies listed in Schedule "A" (collectively, the "Applicants") brought this application seeking an initial order (the "Initial Order") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA"). The Applicants also request that the court exercise its jurisdiction to extend a stay of proceedings and other benefits under the Initial Order to Cinram International Limited Partnership ("Cinram LP", collectively with the Applicants, the "CCAA Parties").

[2] Cinram Fund, together with its direct and indirect subsidiaries (collectively, "Cinram" or the "Cinram Group") is a replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs. Cinram has a diversified operational footprint across North America and Europe that enables it to meet the replication and logistics demands of its customers.

[3] The evidentiary record establishes that Cinram has experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, which, according to Cinram, are a result of the economic downturn in Cinram's primary markets of North America and Europe, which impacted consumers' discretionary spending and adversely affected the entire industry.

[4] Cinram advises that over the past several years it has continued to evaluate its strategic alternatives and rationalize its operating footprint in order to attempt to balance its ongoing operations and financial challenges with its existing debt levels. However, despite cost reductions and recapitalized initiatives and the implementation of a variety of restructuring alternatives, the Cinram Group has experienced a number of challenges that has led to it seeking protection under the CCAA.

[5] Counsel to Cinram outlined the principal objectives of these CCAA proceedings as:

(i) to ensure the ongoing operations of the Cinram Group;

(ii) to ensure the CCAA Parties have the necessary availability of working capital funds to maximize the ongoing business of the Cinram Group for the benefit of its stakeholders; and

(iii) to complete the sale and transfer of substantially all of the Cinram Group's business as a going concern (the "Proposed Transaction").

[6] Cinram contemplates that these CCAA proceedings will be the primary court supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. Cinram has operations in the United States and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States. Cinram, however, takes the position that Canada is the nerve centre of the Cinram Group.

[7] The Applicants also seek authorization for Cinram International ULC ("Cinram ULC") to act as "foreign representative" in the within proceedings to seek a recognition order under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code ("Chapter 15"). Cinram advises that the proceedings under Chapter 15 are intended to ensure that the CCAA Parties are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction to be undertaken pursuant to these CCAA proceedings.

[8] Counsel to the Applicants submits that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Cinram is one of the world's largest providers of pre-recorded multi-media products and related logistics services. It has facilities in North America and Europe, and it:

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

(i) manufactures DVDs, blue ray disks and CDs, and provides distribution services for motion picture studios, music labels, video game publishers, computer software companies, telecommunication companies and retailers around the world;

(ii) provides various digital media services through One K Studios, LLC; and

(iii) provides retail inventory control and forecasting services through Cinram Retail Services LLC (collectively, the "Cinram Business").

[9] Cinram contemplates that the Proposed Transaction could allow it to restore itself as a market leader in the industry. Cinram takes the position that it requires CCAA protection to provide stability to its operations and to complete the Proposed Transaction.

[10] The Proposed Transaction has the support of the lenders forming the steering committee with respect to Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Steering Committee"), the members of which have been subject to confidentiality agreements and represent 40% of the loans under Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Initial Consenting Lenders"). Cinram also anticipates further support of the Proposed Transaction from additional lenders under its credit facilities following the public announcement of the Proposed Transaction.

[11] Cinram Fund is the direct or indirect parent and sole shareholder of all of the subsidiaries in Cinram's corporate structure. A simplified corporate structure of the Cinram Group showing all of the CCAA Parties, including the designation of the CCAA Parties' business segments and certain non-filing entities, is set out in the Pre-Filing Report of FTI Consulting Inc. (the "Monitor") at paragraph 13. A copy is attached as Schedule "B".

[12] Cinram Fund, CII, Cinram International General Partner Inc. ("Cinram GP"), CII Trust, Cinram ULC and 1362806 Ontario Limited are the Canadian entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "Canadian Applicants"). Cinram Fund and CII Trust are both open-ended limited purpose trusts, established under the laws of Ontario, and each of the remaining Canadian Applicants is incorporated pursuant to Federal or Provincial legislation.

[13] Cinram (US) Holdings Inc. ("CUSH"), Cinram Inc., IHC Corporation ("IHC"), Cinram Manufacturing, LLC ("Cinram Manufacturing"), Cinram Distribution, LLC ("Cinram Distribution"), Cinram Wireless, LLC ("Cinram Wireless"), Cinram Retail Services, LLC ("Cinram Retail") and One K Studios, LLC ("One K") are the U.S. entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "U.S. Applicants"). Each of the U.S. Applicants is incorporated under the laws of Delaware, with the exception of One K, which is incorporated under the laws of California. On May 25, 2012, each of the U.S. Applicants opened a new Canadian-based bank account with J.P. Morgan.

[14] Cinram LP is not an Applicant in these proceedings. However, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other relief under the CCAA extended to Cinram LP as it forms

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

part of Cinram's income trust structure with Cinram Fund, the ultimate parent of the Cinram Group.

[15] Cinram's European entities are not part of these proceedings and it is not intended that any insolvency proceedings will be commenced with respect to Cinram's European entities, except for Cinram Optical Discs SAC, which has commenced insolvency proceedings in France.

[16] The Cinram Group's principal source of long-term debt is the senior secured credit facilities provided under credit agreements known as the "First-Lien Credit Agreement" and the "Second-Lien Credit Agreement" (together with the First-Lien Credit Agreement, the "Credit Agreements").

[17] All of the CCAA Parties, with the exception of Cinram Fund, Cinram GP, CII Trust and Cinram LP (collectively, the "Fund Entities"), are borrowers and/or guarantors under the Credit Agreements. The obligations under the Credit Agreements are secured by substantially all of the assets of the Applicants and certain of their European subsidiaries.

[18] As at March 31, 2012, there was approximately $233 million outstanding under the First-Lien Term Loan Facility; $19 million outstanding under the First-Lien Revolving Credit Facilities; approximately $12 million of letter of credit exposure under the First-Lien Credit Agreement; and approximately $12 million outstanding under the Second-Lien Credit Agreement.

[19] Cinram advises that in light of the financial circumstances of the Cinram Group, it is not possible to obtain additional financing that could be used to repay the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

[20] Mr. John Bell, Chief Financial Officer of CII, stated in his affidavit that in connection with certain defaults under the Credit Agreements, a series of waivers was extended from December 2011 to June 30, 2012 and that upon expiry of the waivers, the lenders have the ability to demand immediate repayment of the outstanding amounts under the Credit Agreements and the borrowers and the other Applicants that are guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Mr. Bell further stated that there is no reasonable expectation that Cinram would be able to service its debt load in the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012, fiscal 2013, and fiscal 2014. The cash flow forecast attached to his affidavit indicates that, without additional funding, the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

[21] The Applicants request a stay of proceedings. They take the position that in light of their financial circumstances, there could be a vast and significant erosion of value to the detriment of all stakeholders. In particular, the Applicants are concerned about the following risks, which, because of the integration of the Cinram business, also apply to the Applicants' subsidiaries, including Cinram LP:

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

(a) the lenders demanding payment in full for money owing under the Credit Agreements;

(b) potential termination of contracts by key suppliers; and

(c) potential termination of contracts by customers.

[22] As indicated in the cash flow forecast, the Applicants do not have sufficient funds available to meet their immediate cash requirements as a result of their current liquidity challenges. Mr. Bell states in his affidavit that the Applicants require access to Debtor-In-Possession ("DIP") Financing in the amount of $15 millions to continue operations while they implement their restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction. Cinram has negotiated a DIP Credit Agreement with the lenders forming the Steering Committee (the "DIP Lenders") through J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA as Administrative Agent (the "DIP Agent") whereby the DIP Lenders agree to provide the DIP Financing in the form of a term loan in the amount of $15 million.

[23] The Applicants also indicate that during the course of the CCAA proceedings, the CCAA Parties intend to generally make payments to ensure their ongoing business operations for the benefit of their stakeholders, including obligations incurred prior to, on, or after the commencement of these proceedings relating to:

(a) the active employment of employees in the ordinary course;

(b) suppliers and service providers the CCAA Parties and the Monitor have determined to be critical to the continued operation of the Cinram business;

(c) certain customer programs in place pursuant to existing contracts or arrangements with customers; and

(d) inter-company payments among the CCAA Parties in respect of, among other things, shared services.

[24] Mr. Bell states that the ability to make these payments relating to critical suppliers and customer programs is subject to a consultation and approval process agreed to among the Monitor, the DIP Agent and the CCAA Parties.

[25] The Applicants also request an Administration Charge for the benefit of the Monitor and Moelis and Company, LLC ("Moelis"), an investment bank engaged to assist Cinram in a comprehensive and thorough review of its strategic alternatives.

[26] In addition, the directors (and in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, the Trustees, referred to collectively with the directors as the "Directors/Trustees") requested a Director's Charge to provide certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities. Mr. Bell states that in order to complete a successful restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction, the Applicants require the active and committed involvement of their

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

Directors/Trustees and officers. Further, Cinram's insurers have advised that if Cinram was to file for CCAA protection, and the insurers agreed to renew the existing D&O policies, there would be a significant increase in the premium for that insurance.

[27] Cinram has also developed a key employee retention program (the "KERP") with the principal purpose of providing an incentive for eligible employees, including eligible officers, to remain with the Cinram Group despite its financial difficulties. The KERP has been reviewed and approved by the Board of Trustees of the Cinram Fund. The KERP includes retention payments (the "KERP Retention Payments") to certain existing employees, including certain officers employed at Canadian and U.S. Entities, who are critical to the preservation of Cinram's enterprise value.

[28] Cinram also advises that on June 22, 2012, Cinram Fund, the borrowers under the Credit Agreements, and the Initial Consenting Lenders entered into a support agreement pursuant to which the Initial Consenting Lenders agreed to support the Proposed Transaction to be pursued through these CCAA proceedings (the "Support Agreement").

[29] Pursuant to the Support Agreement, lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement or Consent Agreement prior to July 10, 2012 (the "Consent Date") are entitled to receive consent consideration (the "Early Consent Consideration") equal to 4% of the principal amount of loans under the First-Lien Credit Agreement held by such consenting lenders as of the Consent Date, payable in cash from the net sale proceeds of the Proposed Transaction upon distribution of such proceeds in the CCAA proceedings.

[30] Mr. Bell states that it is contemplated that the CCAA proceedings will be the primary court-supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. He states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Mr. Bell further states that although Cinram has operations in the United States, and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States, it is Ontario that is Cinram's home jurisdiction and the nerve centre of the CCAA Parties' management, business and operations.

[31] The CCAA Parties have advised that they will be seeking a recognition order under Chapter 15 to ensure that they are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction. Thus, the Applicants seek authorization in the Proposed Initial Order for:

> Cinram ULC to seek recognition of these proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" and to seek such additional relief required in connection with the prosecution of any sale transaction, including the Proposed Transaction, as well as authorization for the Monitor, as a court-appointed officer, to assist the CCAA Parties with any matters relating to any of the CCAA Parties' subsidiaries and any foreign proceedings commenced in relation thereto.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

[32] Mr. Bell further states that the Monitor will be actively involved in assisting Cinram ULC as the foreign representative of the Applicants in the Chapter 15 proceedings and will assist in keeping this court informed of developments in the Chapter 15 proceedings.

[33] The facts relating to the CCAA Parties, the Cinram business, and the requested relief are fully set out in Mr. Bell's affidavit.

[34] Counsel to the Applicants filed a comprehensive factum in support of the requested relief in the Initial Order. Part III of the factum sets out the issues and the law.

[35] The relief requested in the form of the Initial Order is extensive. It goes beyond what this court usually considers on an initial hearing. However, in the circumstances of this case, I have been persuaded that the requested relief is appropriate.

[36] In making this determination, I have taken into account that the Applicants have spent a considerable period of time reviewing their alternatives and have done so in a consultative manner with their senior secured lenders. The senior secured lenders support this application, notwithstanding that it is clear that they will suffer a significant shortfall on their positions. It is also noted that the Early Consent Consideration will be available to lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement prior to July 10, 2012. Thus, all of these lenders will have the opportunity to participate in this arrangement.

[37] As previously indicated, the Applicants' factum is comprehensive. The submissions on the law are extensive and cover all of the outstanding issues. It provides a fulsome review of the jurisprudence in the area, which for purposes of this application, I accept. For this reason, paragraphs 41-96 of the factum are attached as Schedule "C" for reference purposes.

[38] The Applicants have also requested that the confidential supplement – which contains the KERP summary listing the individual KERP Payments and certain DIP Schedules – be sealed. I am satisfied that the KERP summary contains individually identifiable information and compensation information, including sensitive salary information, about the individuals who are covered by the KERP and that the DIP schedules contain sensitive competitive information of the CCAA Parties which should also be treated as being confidential. Having considered the principals of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, (2002) 2 S.C.R. 522, I accept the Applicants' submission on this issue and grant the requested sealing order in respect of the confidential supplement.

[39] Finally, the Applicants have advised that they intend to proceed with a Chapter 15 application on June 26, 2012 before the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District of Delaware. I am given to understand that Cinram ULC, as proposed foreign representative, will be seeking recognition of the CCAA proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" on the basis that Ontario, Canada is the Centre of Main Interest or "COMI" of the CCAA Applicants.

[40] In his affidavit at paragraph 195, Mr. Bell states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

integrated in many significant respects and that, as a result of the following factors, the Applicants submit the COMI of the CCAA Parties is Ontario, Canada:

(a) the Cinram Group is managed on a consolidated basis out of the corporate headquarters in Toronto, Ontario, where corporate-level decision-making and corporate administrative functions are centralized;

(b) key contracts, including, among others, major customer service agreements, are negotiated at the corporate level and created in Canada;

(c) the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of CII, who are also directors, trustees and/or officers of other entities in the Cinram Group, are based in Canada;

(d) meetings of the board of trustees and board of directors typically take place in Canada;

(e) pricing decisions for entities in the Cinram Group are ultimately made by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer in Toronto, Ontario;

(f) cash management functions for Cinram's North American entities, including the administration of Cinram's accounts receivable and accounts payable, are managed from Cinram's head office in Toronto, Ontario;

(g) although certain bookkeeping, invoicing and accounting functions are performed locally, corporate accounting, treasury, financial reporting, financial planning, tax planning and compliance, insurance procurement services and internal audits are managed at a consolidated level in Toronto, Ontario;

(h) information technology, marketing, and real estate services are provided by CII at the head office in Toronto, Ontario;

(i) with the exception of routine maintenance expenditures, all capital expenditure decisions affecting the Cinram Group are managed in Toronto, Ontario;

(j) new business development initiatives are centralized and managed from Toronto, Ontario; and

(k) research and development functions for the Cinram Group are corporate-level activities centralized at Toronto, Ontario, including the Cinram Group's corporate-level research and development budget and strategy.

[41] Counsel submits that the CCAA Parties are highly dependent upon the critical business functions performed on their behalf from Cinram's head office in Toronto and would not be able to function independently without significant disruptions to their operations.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

[42] The above comments with respect to the COMI are provided for informational purposes only. This court clearly recognizes that it is the function of the receiving court – in this case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware – to make the determination on the location of the COMI and to determine whether this CCAA proceeding is a "foreign main proceeding" for the purposes of Chapter 15.

[43] In the result, I am satisfied that the Applicants meet all of the qualifications established for relief under the CCAA and I have signed the Initial Order in the form submitted, which includes approvals of the Charges referenced in the Initial Order.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

MORAWETZ J.

Date: June 26, 2012

SCHEDULE "A"

ADDITIONAL APPLICANTS

Cinram International General Partner Inc.

Cinram International ULC

1362806 Ontario Limited

Cinram (U.S.) Holdings Inc.

Cinram, Inc.

IHC Corporation

Cinram Manufacturing LLC

Cinram Distribution LLC

Cinram Wireless LLC

Cinram Retail Services, LLC

One K Studios, LLC

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

SCHEDULE "B"



2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

SCHEDULE "C"

A. THE APPLICANTS ARE "DEBTOR COMPANIES" TO WHICH THE CCAA APPLIES

41. The CCAA applies in respect of a "debtor company" (including a foreign company having assets or doing business in Canada) or "affiliated debtor companies" where the total of claims against such company or companies exceeds $5 million.

> CCAA, Section 3(1).

42. The Applicants are eligible for protection under the CCAA because each is a "debtor company" and the total of the claims against the Applicants exceeds $5 million.

(1) The Applicants are Debtor Companies

43. The terms "company" and "debtor company" are defined in Section 2 of the CCAA as follows:

> "company" means any company, corporation or legal person incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province and any incorporated company having assets or doing business in Canada, wherever incorporated, and any income trust, but does not include banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*, railway or telegraph companies, insurance companies and companies to which the *Trust and Loan Companies Act* applies.
>
> "debtor company" means any company that:
>
> (a) is bankrupt or insolvent;
>
> (b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;
>
> (c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

(d) is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent.

CCAA, Section 2 ("company" and "debtor company").

44. The Applicants are debtor companies within the meaning of these definitions.

(2) The Applicants are "companies"

45. The Applicants are "companies" because:

a. with respect to the Canadian Applicants, each is incorporated pursuant to federal or provincial legislation or, in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, is an income trust; and

b. with respect to the U.S. Applicants, each is an incorporated company with certain funds in bank accounts in Canada opened in May 2012 and therefore each is a company having assets or doing business in Canada.

Bell Affidavit at paras. 4, 80, 84, 86, 91, 94, 98, 102, 105, 108, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 212; Application Record, Tab 2.

46. The test for "having assets or doing business in Canada" is disjunctive, such that either "having assets" in Canada or "doing business in Canada" is sufficient to qualify an incorporated company as a "company" within the meaning of the CCAA.

47. Having only nominal assets in Canada, such as funds on deposit in a Canadian bank account, brings a foreign corporation within the definition of "company". In order to meet the threshold statutory requirements of the CCAA, an applicant need only be in technical compliance with the plain words of the CCAA.

Re Canwest Global Communications Corp. (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. [Commercial List]) at para. 30 [*Canwest Global*]; Book of Authorities of the Applicants ("**Book of Authorities**"), Tab 1.
Re Global Light Telecommunications Ltd. (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 17 [*Global Light*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

48. The Courts do not engage in a quantitative or qualitative analysis of the assets or the circumstances in which the assets were created. Accordingly, the use of "instant" transactions immediately preceding a CCAA application, such as the creation of "instant debts" or "instant assets" for the purposes of bringing an entity within the scope of the CCAA, has received judicial approval as a legitimate device to bring a debtor within technical requirements of the CCAA.

> *Global Light, supra* at para. 17; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.
> *Re Cadillac Fairview Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at paras. 5-6; Book of Authorities, Tab 3.
> *Elan Corporation v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 74, 83; Book of Authorities, Tab 4.

(3) The Applicants are insolvent

49. The Applicants are "debtor companies" as defined in the CCAA because they are companies (as set out above) and they are insolvent.

50. The insolvency of the debtor is assessed as of the time of filing the CCAA application. The CCAA does not define insolvency. Accordingly, in interpreting the meaning of "insolvent", courts have taken guidance from the definition of "insolvent person" in Section 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA"), which defines an "insolvent person" as a person (i) who is not bankrupt; and (ii) who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada; (iii) whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under the BIA amount to one thousand dollars; and (iv) who is "insolvent" under one of the following tests:

a. is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due;

b. has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due; or

c. the aggregate of his property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

BIA, Section 2 ("insolvent person").

Re Stelco Inc. (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.[Commercial List]); leave to appeal to C.A. refused [2004] O.J. No. 1903; leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, at para. 4 [*Stelco*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

51. These tests for insolvency are disjunctive. A company satisfying any one of these tests is considered insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA.

Stelco, supra at paras. 26 and 28; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

52. A company is also insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA if, at the time of filing, there is a reasonably foreseeable expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis that would result in the company being unable to pay its debts as they generally become due if a stay of proceedings and ancillary protection are not granted by the court.

Stelco, supra at para. 40; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

53. The Applicants meet both the traditional test for insolvency under the BIA and the expanded test for insolvency based on a looming liquidity condition as a result of the following:

a. The Applicants are unable to comply with certain financial covenants under the Credit Agreements and have entered into a series of waivers with their lenders from December 2011 to June 30, 2012.

b. Were the Lenders to accelerate the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements, the Borrowers and the other Applicants that are Guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Cinram Fund would be the ultimate parent of an insolvent business.

d. The Applicants have been unable to repay or refinance the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements or find an out-of-court transaction for the sale of the Cinram Business with proceeds that equal or exceed the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

e. Reduced revenues and EBITDA and increased borrowing costs have significantly impaired Cinram's ability to service its debt obligations. There is no reasonable expectation that Cinram will be able to service its debt load in the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012 and for fiscal 2013 and 2014.

f. The decline in revenues and EBITDA generated by the Cinram Business has caused the value of the Cinram Business to decline. As a result, the aggregate value of the Property, taken at fair value, is not sufficient to allow for payment of all of the Applicants' obligations due and accruing due.

g. The Cash Flow Forecast indicates that without additional funding the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 23, 179-181, 183, 197-199; Application Record, Tab 2.

(4) The Applicants are affiliated companies with claims outstanding in excess of $5 million

54. The Applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims exceeding 5 million dollars. Therefore, the CCAA applies to the Applicants in accordance with Section 3(1).

55. Affiliated companies are defined in Section 3(2) of the CCAA as follows:

a. companies are affiliated companies if one of them is the subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same company or each is controlled by the same person; and

b. two companies are affiliated with the same company at the same time are deemed to be affiliated with each other.

CCAA, Section 3(2).

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

56. CII, CII Trust and all of the entities listed in Schedule "A" hereto are indirect, wholly owned subsidiaries of Cinram Fund; thus, the Applicants are "affiliated companies" for the purpose of the CCAA.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 3, 71; Application Record, Tab 2.

57. All of the CCAA Parties (except for the Fund Entities) are each a Borrower and/or Guarantor under the Credit Agreements. As at March 31, 2012 there was approximately $252 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the First Lien Credit Agreement (plus approximately $12 million in letter of credit exposure) and approximately $12 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the Second Lien Credit Agreement. The total claims against the Applicants far exceed $5 million.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 75; Application Record, Tab 2.

B. THE RELIEF IS AVAILABLE UNDER THE CCAA AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE AND POLICY OF THE CCAA

(1) The CCAA is Flexible, Remedial Legislation

58. The CCAA is remedial legislation, intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy. In particular during periods of financial hardship, debtors turn to the Court so that the Court may apply the CCAA in a flexible manner in order to accomplish the statute's goals. The Court should give the CCAA a broad and liberal interpretation so as to encourage and facilitate successful restructurings whenever possible.

Elan Corp. v. Comiskey, supra at paras. 22 and 56-60; Book of Authorities, Tab 4.
Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 at para. 5 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); Book of Authorities, Tab 6.
Re Chef Ready Foods Ltd; Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C.C.A.) at pp. 4 and 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 7.

59. On numerous occasions, courts have held that Section 11 of the CCAA provides the courts with a broad and liberal power, which is at their disposal in order to achieve the overall

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

objective of the CCAA. Accordingly, an interpretation of the CCAA that facilitates restructurings accords with its purpose.

> *Re Sulphur Corporation of Canada Ltd.* (2002), 35 C.B.R. (4th) 304 (Alta Q.B.) ("*Sulphur*") at para. 26; Book of Authorities, Tab 8.

60. Given the nature and purpose of the CCAA, this Honourable Court has the authority and jurisdiction to depart from the Model Order as is reasonable and necessary in order to achieve a successful restructuring.

(2) The Stay of Proceedings Against Non-Applicants is Appropriate

61. The relief sought in this application includes a stay of proceedings in favour of Cinram LP and the Applicants' direct and indirect subsidiaries that are also party to an agreement with an Applicant (whether as surety, guarantor or otherwise) (each, a "Subsidiary Counterparty"), including any contract or credit agreement. It is just and reasonable to grant the requested stay of proceedings because:

a. the Cinram Business is integrated among the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties;

b. if any proceedings were commenced against Cinram LP, or if any of the third parties to such agreements were to commence proceedings or exercise rights and remedies against the Subsidiary Counterparties, this would have a detrimental effect on the Applicants' ability to restructure and implement the Proposed Transaction and would lead to an erosion of value of the Cinram Business; and

c. a stay of proceedings that extends to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties is necessary in order to maintain stability with respect to the Cinram Business and maintain value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders.

> Bell Affidavit, paras. 185-186; Application Record, Tab 2.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

62. The purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the *status quo* to enable a plan of compromise to be prepared, filed and considered by the creditors:

> In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors.
>
> *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re, supra* at para. 5; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.
> *Canwest Global, supra* at para. 27; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.
> CCAA, Section 11.

63. The Court has broad inherent jurisdiction to impose stays of proceedings that supplement the statutory provisions of Section 11 of the CCAA, providing the Court with the power to grant a stay of proceedings where it is just and reasonable to do so, including with respect to non-applicant parties.

> *Lehndorff, supra* at paras. 5 and 16; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.
> *T. Eaton Co., Re* (1997), 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 6; Book of Authorities, Tab 9.

64. The Courts have found it just and reasonable to grant a stay of proceedings against third party non-applicants in a number of circumstances, including:

a. where it is important to the reorganization process;

b. where the business operations of the Applicants and the third party non-applicants are intertwined and the third parties are not subject to the jurisdiction of the CCAA, such as partnerships that do not qualify as "companies" within the meaning of the CCAA;

c. against non-applicant subsidiaries of a debtor company where such subsidiaries were guarantors under the note indentures issued by the debtor company; and

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

d. against non-applicant subsidiaries relating to any guarantee, contribution or indemnity obligation, liability or claim in respect of obligations and claims against the debtor companies.

Re Woodward's Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 10.
Lehndorff, supra at para. 21; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.
Canwest Global, supra at paras. 28 and 29; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.
Re Sino-Forest Corp. 2012 ONSC 2063 (Commercial List) at paras. 5, 18, and 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 11.
Re MAAX Corp, Initial Order granted June 12, 2008, Montreal 500-11-033561-081, (Que. Sup. Ct. [Commercial Division]) at para. 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 12.

65. The Applicants submit the balance of convenience favours extending the relief in the proposed Initial Order to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties. The business operations of the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties are intertwined and the stay of proceedings is necessary to maintain stability and value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders, as well as allow an orderly, going-concern sale of the Cinram Business as an important component of its reorganization process.

(3) Entitlement to Make Pre-Filing Payments

66. To ensure the continued operation of the CCAA Parties' business and maximization of value in the interests of Cinram's stakeholders, the Applicants seek authorization (but not a requirement) for the CCAA Parties to make certain pre-filing payments, including: (a) payments to employees in respect of wages, benefits, and related amounts; (b) payments to suppliers and service providers critical to the ongoing operation of the business; (c) payments and the application of credits in connection with certain existing customer programs; and (d) intercompany payments among the Applicants related to intercompany loans and shared services. Payments will be made with the consent of the Monitor and, in certain circumstances, with the consent of the Agent.

67. There is ample authority supporting the Court's general jurisdiction to permit payment of pre-filing obligations to persons whose services are critical to the ongoing operations of the debtor companies. This jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted by Section 11.4 of the CCAA, which became effective as part of the 2009 amendments to the CCAA and codified the Court's

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

practice of declaring a person to be a critical supplier and granting a charge on the debtor's property in favour of such critical supplier. As noted by Pepall J. in *Re Canwest Global*, the recent amendments, including Section 11.4, do not detract from the inherently flexible nature of the CCAA or the Court's broad and inherent jurisdiction to make such orders that will facilitate the debtor's restructuring of its business as a going concern.

Canwest Global supra, at paras. 41 and 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

68. There are many cases since the 2009 amendments where the Courts have authorized the applicants to pay certain pre-filing amounts where the applicants were not seeking a charge in respect of critical suppliers. In granting this authority, the Courts considered a number of factors, including:

a. whether the goods and services were integral to the business of the applicants;

b. the applicants' dependency on the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;

c. the fact that no payments would be made without the consent of the Monitor;

d. the Monitor's support and willingness to work with the applicants to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized;

e. whether the applicants had sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet their needs; and

f. the effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if they were unable to make pre-filing payments to their critical suppliers.

Canwest Global supra, at para. 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.
Re Brainhunter Inc., [2009] O.J. No. 5207 (Sup. Ct. J. [Commercial List]) at para. 21 [*Brainhunter*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 13.
Re Priszm Income Fund (2012), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) at paras. 29-34; Book of Authorities, Tab 14.

69. The CCAA Parties rely on the efficient and expedited supply of products and services from their suppliers and service providers in order to ensure that their operations continue in an

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

efficient manner so that they can satisfy customer requirements. The CCAA Parties operate in a highly competitive environment where the timely provision of their products and services is essential in order for the company to remain a successful player in the industry and to ensure the continuance of the Cinram Business. The CCAA Parties require flexibility to ensure adequate and timely supply of required products and to attempt to obtain and negotiate credit terms with its suppliers and service providers. In order to accomplish this, the CCAA Parties require the ability to pay certain pre-filing amounts and post-filing payables to those suppliers they consider essential to the Cinram Business, as approved by the Monitor. The Monitor, in determining whether to approve pre-filing payments as critical to the ongoing business operations, will consider various factors, including the above factors derived from the caselaw.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 226, 228, 230; Application Record, Tab 2.

70. In addition, the CCAA Parties' continued compliance with their existing customer programs, as described in the Bell Affidavit, including the payment of certain pre-filing amounts owing under certain customer programs and the application of certain credits granted to customers pre-filing to post-filing receivables, is essential in order for the CCAA Parties to maintain their customer relationships as part of the CCAA Parties' going concern business.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 234; Application Record, Tab 2.

71. Further, due to the operational integration of the businesses of the CCAA Parties, as described above, there is a significant volume of financial transactions between and among the Applicants, including, among others, charges by an Applicant providing shared services to another Applicant of intercompany accounts due from the recipients of those services, and charges by a Applicant that manufactures and furnishes products to another Applicant of inter-company accounts due from the receiving entity.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 225; Application Record, Tab 2.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

72. Accordingly, the Applicants submit that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the CCAA Parties the authority to make the pre-filing payments described in the proposed Initial Order subject to the terms therein.

(4) The Charges Are Appropriate

73. The Applicants seek approval of certain Court-ordered charges over their assets relating to their DIP Financing (defined below), administrative costs, indemnification of their trustees, directors and officers, KERP and Support Agreement. The Lenders and the Administrative Agent under the Credit Agreements, the senior secured facilities that will be primed by the charges, have been provided with notice of the within Application. The proposed Initial Order does not purport to give the Court-ordered charges priority over any other validly perfected security interests.

(A) DIP Lenders' Charge

74. In the proposed Initial Order, the Applicants seek approval of the DIP Credit Agreement providing a debtor-in-possession term facility in the principal amount of $15 million (the "DIP Financing"), to be secured by a charge over all of the assets and property of the Applicants that are Borrowers and/or Guarantors under the Credit Agreements (the "Charged Property") ranking ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge.

75. Section 11.2 of the CCAA expressly provides the Court the statutory jurisdiction to grant a debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing charge:

> 11.2(1) *Interim financing* - On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

> 11.2(2) *Priority* – secured creditors – The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

Re Timminco Ltd. (2012), 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 881(Ont. Sup. Ct. J. [Commercial List]) at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 15. CCAA, Section 11.2(1) and (2).

76. Section 11.2 of the CCAA sets out the following factors to be considered by the Court in deciding whether to grant a DIP financing charge:

> 11.2(4) Factors to be considered – In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,
>
> (*a*) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;
>
> (*b*) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
>
> (*c*) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
>
> (*d*) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
>
> (*e*) the nature and value of the company's property;
>
> (*f*) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
>
> (*g*) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(*b*), if any.

CCAA, Section 11.2(4).

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

77. The above list of factors is not exhaustive, and it may be appropriate for the Court to consider additional factors in determining whether to grant a DIP financing charge. For example, in circumstances where funds to be borrowed pursuant to a DIP facility were not expected to be immediately necessary, but applicants' cash flow statements projected the need for additional liquidity, the Court in granting the requested DIP charge considered the fact that the applicants' ability to borrows funds that would be secured by a charge would help retain the confidence of their trade creditors, employees and suppliers.

> *Re Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc.* (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 42-43 [*Canwest Publishing*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

78. Courts in recent cross-border cases have exercised their broad power to grant charges to DIP lenders over the assets of foreign applicants. In many of these cases, the debtors have commenced recognition proceedings under Chapter 15.

> *Re Catalyst Paper Corporation*, Initial Order granted on January 31, 2012, Court File No. S-120712 (B.C.S.C.) [*Catalyst Paper*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 17.
> *Angiotech, supra*, Initial Order granted on January 28, 2011, Court File No. S-110587; Book of Authorities, Tab 18
> *Re Fraser Papers Inc.*, Initial Order granted on June 18, 2009, Court File No. CV-09-8241-00CL; Book of Authorities, Tab 19.

79. As noted above, pursuant to Section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, a DIP financing charge may not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The requested DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations.

80. The following factors support the granting of the DIP Lenders' Charge, many of which incorporate the considerations enumerated in Section 11.2(4) listed above:

a. the Cash Flow Forecast indicates the Applicants will need additional liquidity afforded by the DIP Financing in order to continue operations through the duration of these proposed CCAA Proceedings;

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

b. the Cinram Business is intended to continue to operate on a going concern basis during these CCAA Proceedings under the direction of the current management with the assistance of the Applicants' advisors and the Monitor;

c. the DIP Financing is expected to provide the Applicants with sufficient liquidity to implement the Proposed Transaction through these CCAA Proceedings and implement certain operational restructuring initiatives, which will materially enhance the likelihood of a going concern outcome for the Cinram Business;

d. the nature and the value of the Applicants' assets as set out in their consolidated financial statements can support the requested DIP Lenders' Charge;

e. members of the Steering Committee under the First Lien Credit Agreement, who are senior secured creditors of the Applicants, have agreed to provide the DIP Financing;

f. the proposed DIP Lenders have indicated that they will not provide the DIP Financing if the DIP Lenders' Charge is not approved;

g. the DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations;

h. the senior secured lenders under the Credit Agreements affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings; and

i. the proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP Facility, including the DIP Lenders' Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 199-202, 205-208; Application Record, Tab 2.

(B) Administration Charge

81. The Applicants seek a charge over the Charged Property in the amount of CAD$3.5 million to secure the fees of the Monitor and its counsel, the Applicants' Canadian and U.S. counsel, the Applicants' Investment Banker, the Canadian and U.S. Counsel to the DIP Agent,

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

the DIP Lenders, the Administrative Agent and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements, and the financial advisor to the DIP Lenders and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements (the "Administration Charge"). This charge is to rank in priority to all of the other charges set out in the proposed Initial Order.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

82. Prior to the 2009 amendments, administration charges were granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Section 11.52 of the CCAA now expressly provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant an administration charge:

> 11.52(1) *Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs*
> On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate – in respect of the fees and expenses of
> (a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;
>
> (b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and
>
> (c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.
>
> 11.52(2) *Priority*
> The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.
>
> CCAA, Section 11.52(1) and (2).

82. Administration charges were granted pursuant to Section 11.52 in, among other cases, *Timminco*, *Canwest Global* and *Canwest Publishing*.

> *Canwest Global*, *supra*; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.
> *Canwest Publishing*, *supra*; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.
> *Re Timminco Ltd.*, 2012 ONSC 106 (Commercial List) [*Timminco*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

84. In *Canwest Publishing*, the Court noted Section 11.52 does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in granting an administration charge and provided a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider in making such an assessment. These factors were also considered by the Court in *Timminco*. The list of factors to consider in approving an administration charge include:

a. the size and complexity of the business being restructured;

b. the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;

c. whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;

e. the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and

f. the position of the Monitor.

Canwest Publishing supra, at para. 54; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

Timminco, supra, at paras. 26-29; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

85. The Applicants submit that the Administration Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Administration Charge, given:

a. the proposed restructuring of the Cinram Business is large and complex, spanning several jurisdictions across North America and Europe, and will require the extensive involvement of professional advisors;

b. the professionals that are to be beneficiaries of the Administration Charge have each played a critical role in the CCAA Parties' restructuring efforts to date and will continue to be pivotal to the CCAA Parties' ability to pursue a successful restructuring going forward, including the Investment Banker's involvement in the completion of the Proposed Transaction;

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

c. there is no unwarranted duplication of roles;

d. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings; and

e. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Administration Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 188, 190; Application Record, Tab 2.

(C) Directors' Charge

86. The Applicants seek a Directors' Charge in an amount of CAD$13 over the Charged Property to secure their respective indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed on the Applicants' trustees, directors and officers (the "Directors and Officers"). The Directors' Charge is to be subordinate to the Administration Charge and the DIP Lenders' Charge but in priority to the KERP Charge and the Consent Consideration Charge.

87. Section 11.51 of the CCAA affords the Court the jurisdiction to grant a charge relating to directors' and officers' indemnification on a priority basis:

> 11.51(1) *Security or charge relating to director's indemnification*
> On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.
>
> 11.51(2) *Priority*
> The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditors of the company
>
> 11.51(3) *Restriction* -- indemnification insurance
> The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.
>
> 11.51(4) *Negligence, misconduct or fault*
> The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

> does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.
>
> CCAA, Section 11.51.

88. The Court has granted director and officer charges pursuant to Section 11.51 in a number of cases. In *Canwest Global*, the Court outlined the test for granting such a charge:

> I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.
>
> *Canwest Global, supra* at paras 46-48; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.
> *Canwest Publishing, supra* at paras. 56-57; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.
> *Timminco, supra* at paras. 30-36; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

89. The Applicants submit that the D&O Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the D&O Charge in the amount of CAD$13 million, given:

a. the Directors and Officers of the Applicants may be subject to potential liabilities in connection with these CCAA proceedings with respect to which the Directors and Officers have expressed their desire for certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities;

b. renewal of coverage to protect the Directors and Officers is at a significantly increased cost due to the imminent commencement of these CCAA proceedings;

c. the Directors' Charge would cover obligations and liabilities that the Directors and Officers, as applicable, may incur after the commencement of these CCAA Proceedings and is not intended to cover wilful misconduct or gross negligence;

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

d. the Applicants require the continued support and involvement of their Directors and Officers who have been instrumental in the restructuring efforts of the CCAA Parties to date;

e. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and

f. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Directors' Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 249, 250, 254-257 ; Application Record, Tab 2.

(D) KERP Charge

90. The Applicants seek a KERP Charge in an amount of CAD$3 million over the Charged Property to secure the KERP Retention Payments, KERP Transaction Payments and Aurora KERP Payments payable to certain key employees of the CCAA Parties crucial for the CCAA Parties' successful restructuring.

91. The CCAA is silent with respect to the granting of KERP charges. Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters within the discretion of the Court. The Court in *Re Grant Forest Products Inc.* considered a number of factors in determining whether to grant a KERP and a KERP charge, including:

a. whether the Monitor supports the KERP agreement and charge (to which great weight was attributed);

b. whether the employees to which the KERP applies would consider other employment options if the KERP agreement were not secured by the KERP charge;

c. whether the continued employment of the employees to which the KERP applies is important for the stability of the business and to enhance the effectiveness of the marketing process;

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

d. the employees' history with and knowledge of the debtor;

e. the difficulty in finding a replacement to fulfill the responsibilities of the employees to which the KERP applies;

f. whether the KERP agreement and charge were approved by the board of directors, including the independent directors, as the business judgment of the board should not be ignored;

g. whether the KERP agreement and charge are supported or consented to by secured creditors of the debtor; and

h. whether the payments under the KERP are payable upon the completion of the restructuring process.

Re Grant Forest Products Inc. (2009), 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J [Commercial List]) at para. 8-24 [*Grant Forest*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 21.
Canwest Publishing supra, at paras 59; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.
Canwest Global supra, at para. 49; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.
Re Timminco Ltd. (2012), 95 C.C.P.B. 48 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J [Commercial List]) at paras. 72-75; Book of Authorities, Tab 22.

92. The purpose of a KERP arrangement is to retain key personnel for the duration of the debtor's restructuring process and it is logical for compensation under a KERP arrangement to be deferred until after the restructuring process has been completed, with "staged bonuses" being acceptable. KERP arrangements that do not defer retention payments to completion of the restructuring may also be just and fair in the circumstances.

Grant Forest, *supra* at para. 22-23; Book of Authorities, Tab 21.

93. The Applicants submit that the KERP Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the KERP Charge in the amount of CAD$3 million, given:

a. the KERP was developed by Cinram with the principal purpose of providing an incentive to the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers, and the Aurora

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

Employees to remain with the Cinram Group while the company pursued its restructuring efforts;

b. the Eligible Employees and the Eligible Officers are essential for a restructuring of the Cinram Group and the preservation of Cinram's value during the restructuring process;

c. the Aurora Employees are essential for an orderly transition of Cinram Distribution's business operations from the Aurora facility to its Nashville facility;

d. it would be detrimental to the restructuring process if Cinram were required to find replacements for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and/or the Aurora Employees during this critical period;

e. the KERP, including the KERP Retention Payments, the KERP Transaction Payments and the Aurora KERP Payments payable thereunder, not only provides appropriate incentives for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and the Aurora Employees to remain in their current positions, but also ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in Cinram's restructuring process;

f. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and

g. the KERP has been reviewed and approved by the board of trustees of Cinram Fund and is supported by the Monitor.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 236-239, 245-247; Application Record, Tab 2.

(E) Consent Consideration Charge

94. The Applicants request the Consent Consideration Charge over the Charged Property to secure the Early Consent Consideration. The Consent Consideration Charge is to be subordinate

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

in priority to the Administration Charge, the DIP Lenders' Charge, the Directors' Charge and the KERP Charge.

95. The Courts have permitted the opportunity to receive consideration for early consent to a restructuring transaction in the context of CCAA proceedings payable upon implementation of such restructuring transaction. In *Sino-Forest*, the Court ordered that any noteholder wishing to become a consenting noteholder under the support agreement and entitled to early consent consideration was required to execute a joinder agreement to the support agreement prior to the applicable consent deadline. Similarly, in these proceedings, lenders under the First Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement (or a joinder thereto) and thereby agree to support the Proposed Transaction on or before July 10, 2012, are entitled to Early Consent Consideration earned on consummation of the Proposed Transaction to be paid from the net sale proceeds.

> *Sino-Forest, supra*, Initial Order granted on March 30, 2012, Court File No. CV-12-9667-00CL at para. 15; Book of Authorities, Tab 23. Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

96. The Applicants submit it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Consent Consideration Charge, given:

a. the Proposed Transaction will enable the Cinram Business to continue as a going concern and return to a market leader in the industry;

b. Consenting Lenders are only entitled to the Early Consent Consideration if the Proposed Transaction is consummated; and

c. the Early Consent Consideration is to be paid from the net sale proceeds upon distribution of same in these proceedings.

> Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII)

TAB 7

CITATION: Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc. (Re), 2018 ONSC 6980
COURT FILE NO.: CV-18-603054-00CL
DATE: 20181121

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c.c-36, AS AMENDED

RE: IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS INC. AND ARALEZ PHARMACEUTICALS CANADA INC., Applicants

BEFORE: S.F. Dunphy J.

COUNSEL: *Maria Konyukhova and Kathryn Esaw* for Applicants

Jeffrey Levine, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

David Bish, for Richter Advisory Group, Monitor

Danish Afroz, for Deerfield Management Company, L.P.

HEARD at Toronto: November 16, 2018

REASONS FOR DECISION

[1] This case raises for determination the always-troubling question of Key Employee Retention Plans (or "KERPs") and Key Employee Incentive Plans (or "KEIPs"). At the conclusion of the hearing. I indicated that I would be approving the proposed KERP involving three employees with reasons to follow and would take under reserve the matter of the proposed KEIP.

[2] For the reasons that follow, I have determined to approve the KEIP as well. My reasons that follow apply to both programs.

Background facts

[3] The applicants Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. brought this application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1990, c. C.-36 and an initial order was granted by me on August 10, 2018 with Richter Advisory Group Inc. appointed as Monitor. A number of affiliated entities in the

same corporate group sought relief pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on the same day. The Chapter 11 case is being managed by Justice Glenn in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. Both courts have adopted a cross-border protocol.

[4] As their names suggest, the Aralez group of companies are in the pharmaceutical industry. The debtor companies have operated in an integrated manner and have 41 employees at the Canadian entities and 23 in the Chapter 11 entities.

[5] In addition to being operationally integrated, Aralez has an integrated capital structure as well. The secured credit facility is secured by substantially all of the assets of the debtor companies on both sides of the border. The secured creditors – Deerfield Partners L.P. and Deerfield Private Design Fund III, L.P. – possess security on substantially all of the assets of the debtor companies on both sides of the border. The security in Canada has been subjected to independent review by the Monitor and its counsel and no issues have arisen nor have any creditors objected to their claims.

[6] These cases have been targeting a managed liquidation from the start. On September 18, 2018, the Canadian and US entities entered into three stalking horse agreements and, pursuant to a court-ordered sales process order, are in the process of completing a bid process in the coming days. The three stalking horse bids place a "floor" under sale proceeds of approximately $240 million subject to possible adjustments. This compares to the secured claim of Deerfield that is approximately $275 million.

[7] I understand that a motion may be brought in the United States to challenge some aspects of Deerfield's security in that jurisdiction (no such motion has been suggested in Canada to date). However, as things currently stand, the bid process underway would have to yield a fairly significant improvement from the existing stalking horse offers in order to result in surplus being available for junior creditor groups. The point of this analysis is merely to establish that Deerfield's input into the process of design of the KEIP and KERP programs before me is a material factor. Any funds diverted to KEIP or KERP programs have a substantial likelihood of coming out of Deerfield's pocket in the final analysis and any improvements or de-risking to either cash flow or sales proceeds will enure very substantially to Deerfield's benefit.

[8] Stated differently – Deerfield has significant "skin in the game" when it comes to a KERP or KEIP.

[9] Deerfield's interest acquires somewhat greater weight when one considers that one of the stalking horse bids (in the United States) is a credit bid whereas the Canadian stalking horse bid involves a sale of the assets of Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc., resulting in the unsecured creditors of subsidiary Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. being granted effective priority over Deerfield despite Deerfield's secured claims.

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

Deerfield is thus very likely to be one of the only Canadian creditors substantially impacted by the KEIP or KERP.

[10] This does not imply that the Court is a rubber stamp as to whatever Deerfield may have approved nor does it imply that other voices have no weight. It does imply that some comfort can be taken that this process has been subject to arm's length market discipline. Deerfield has an interest in getting as much as possible in the way of value-added effort out of the employee group and they have an interest in getting that effort at as low a cost as they can bargain for.

[11] The KERP program involved only three employees, was reported upon extensively by the Monitor and was not opposed by any stakeholder. I approved it at the hearing with reasons to follow (these are those reasons). The KEIP program affects nine senior management employees whose services are provided to both the Canadian and United States debtors and was accordingly presented to both courts for approval. I am advised that Justice Glenn approved the KEIP program for purposes of the United States debtors on November 19, 2018.

[12] While the KERP and KEIP programs were presented to me separately, they have many features in common. Were this not a transnational proceeding, it is quite likely that I should have had but a single combined KERP-KEIP program before me since these are not commonly differentiated in this jurisdiction. Different considerations obtain in the United States where KERP programs for some categories of employees are not allowed and KEIP programs are subject to specific rules one of which is that the predominant purpose of a KEIP must be *incentive* and not *retention*. Both are appropriate criteria in our process. In approving the KEIP program for the United States debtors, Justice Glenn indicated that he was satisfied that the KEIP program was designed primarily to incent the beneficiaries of the program.

[13] The Canadian KERP impacts three employee of Aralez Pharmaceuticals Canada Inc. The KERP would provide these three with a retention bonuses of between 25% and 50% of salary. The total amount payable under the proposed program would be $256,710 and payment is to be made on the earlier of termination without cause, death or permanent disability and the closing of a sale of the Canadian assets.

[14] The KEIP impacts nine senior management employees of the Canadian debtors who provide services (in all but one case) that benefit both estates. None of the KEIP participants are expected to have on-going roles once the bankruptcy sales process is completed. The program is designed to incent participants to assist in achieving the highest possible cash flow during the bankruptcy process (thereby reducing the need to rely upon DIP financing) and to achieve the highest level of sales proceeds. Cash flow is measured relative to the DIP budget and nothing is payable until sales are completed.

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

[15] The affected individuals are members of the senior management team that can be expected to be in a position to achieve a positive impact upon both criteria (cash flow and sales proceeds), but their roles are such that the level and value of the contributions of each towards those targets are difficult to measure with precision. Total payouts under the “super-stretch” targets could rise to as much as $4,058,360. This figure may be compared to the stalking horse bids that establish a floor price of $240 million.

[16] Since all but one of the participants in the KEIP program are providing services for the benefit of both United States and Canadian debtors, the KEIP program has been designed such that costs will be shared by the two estates regardless of residence.

[17] The design of the two programs was supervised by Alvarez & Marsal Inc, the financial advisor to the United States and Canadian debtors. The Compensation Committee of the parent company’s Board was involved as was the debtor’s counsel. The Monitor was consulted at every step in the process and provided significant input that was taken into account. The Board of Directors of each affected entity has approved the plans.

[18] The programs were disclosed to the proposed beneficiaries at or near the outset of the bankruptcy process. At the request of the DIP Lender, court approval of these programs was not sought at that time as is relatively common. The stalking horse bids were several weeks away from being finalized and significant effort from the affected employees would be needed to but those transactions to bed. The sales process that followed also needed to be put on the rails and the all hands were needed to ensure that the business passed through the initial stages of the bankruptcy filing without undue adversity. In short, the affected employees were asked to acquiesce in the deferral of approval of these programs with the understanding that the employer would pursue their approval in good faith.

[19] With only a few weeks remaining until the expected end of the sales process, it is fair to observe the employees have more than delivered on their end of the bargain. Cash flow has held up very well and the stalking horse bids have been firmed up at a favourable level.

[20] The motion for approval of the KEIP (not the KERP) was opposed by the Official Committee of the Unsecured Creditors appointed pursuant to the United States Chapter 11 process. I shall not review here the nature of their standing claim – and the dispute of that claim. Their intervention has been focused, their arguments precise and the prospect of harm in the form of unnecessary delay or expense is minimal. Without prejudice to the position of everyone on the status of this committee in other contexts, I agreed to hear them and receive their written arguments. The cross-border protocol that both courts have approved affords me discretion to allow the Official Committee standing on a case-specific or *ad hoc* basis.

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

[21] In the view of the Official Committee, the KEIP program bonuses are too high and too easily earned. I shall address both of these arguments below.

Issues to be determined

[22] Ought this court to exercise its discretion to approve the KERP or KEIP programs as proposed by the applicants?

Analysis and discussion

[23] KERP/KEIP programs throw up a number of thorny issues that must be grappled with because there are a number of potentially conflicting policy considerations to balance.

[24] The early stages of an insolvency filing are chaotic enough without having added pressures of trying stem the hemorrhage of key employees. “Key” is of course an elastic concept. Everyone is key to someone. Employees are not hired to amuse management but to perform necessary functions. Sorting out “key” in the context of the organized chaos that is the early days of an insolvency filing requires a weathered eye to be cast in multiple directions at once:

- restructuring businesses often have inefficiencies that need identifying and resolving that may impact some otherwise “key” employees;

- with the levers of traditional shareholder oversight blunted in insolvency, the risks of management resolving conflicts in favour of self-interest are acute;

- it is easy to overstate the risk of loss of key employees if a “bunker mentality” causes management to take counsel of their fears rather than objective evidence, such evidence to be informed by a recognition that *some* degree of instability is inevitable; and

- “business as usual” is a goal, but never a perfectly achievable one and small amounts of stability acquired at high cost may be a bad investment.

[25] While the risks of abuse or wasted effort are easily conjured, the legitimate use of an appropriately-calibrated incentive plan are equally obvious:

- Employees in newly-insecure positions are easy prey to competitors able to offer the prospect of more stable employment, sometimes even at lower salary levels, to people whose natural first priority is looking after their families;

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

- There is a risk that the most employable and valuable employees will be cherry-picked while the debtor company may find itself substantially handicapped in trying to compete for replacement employees;

- Whether by reason of internal restructuring or a court-supervised sales process, employees may often find themselves being asked to bring all of their skills and devotion to the task of putting themselves out of work; and

- Since many employers use a mix of base salary and profit-based incentives, employees of an insolvent business in restructuring may find themselves being asked to do more – sometimes covering for colleagues who have being laid off or who have left for greener pastures - while earning a fraction of their former income.

[26] What is wanting to sort out these competing interests is one thing that the court – on its own at least – is singularly ill-equipped to provide. It is here that the essential role of the Monitor as the proverbial “eyes and ears of the court” comes to the fore. The court cannot shed its robe and wade into the debate in a substantive way. The Monitor on the other hand can shape the manner in which the debate is conducted and in which the decisions presented to the court for approval are made.

[27] What the court is unable to supply on its own can be summed up in the phrase “business judgment”. Outside of bankruptcy, the debtor company is entitled to exercise its own business judgment in designing such programs subject to the oversight of shareholders and the directors they appoint. Inside bankruptcy, the oversight of the court is required to assess the reasonableness of the exercise of the debtor company’s business judgment. In my view, the court’s role in assessing a request to approve a KERP or KEIP program is to assess the totality of circumstances to determine whether the process has provided a reasonable means for *objective* business judgment to be brought to bear and whether the end result is objectively reasonable.

[28] Perfect objectivity, like the Holy Grail, is unattainable. However, where business judgment is applied in a process that has taken appropriate account of as many of the opposing interests as can reasonably be brought into the equation, the result will adhere most closely to that unattainable ideal.

[29] My review of the limited case law on the subject of KERP (or KEIP) approvals suggests that there are no hard and fast rules that can be applied in undertaking this task. However the principles to be applied do emerge. Morawetz J. suggested a number of considerations in *Cinram International Inc. (Re),* 2012 ONSC 3767 (CanLII),

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

relying on the earlier decision of Newbould J. in *Grant Forest Products Inc. (Re)*, 2009 CanLII 42046 (ON SC)[1]. I reproduce here the synthesis of Morawetz J. (*Cinram*, para. 91):

a. whether the Monitor supports the KERP agreement and charge (to which great weight was attributed);
b. whether the employees to which the KERP applies would consider other employment options if the KERP agreement were not secured by the KERP charge;
c. whether the continued employment of the employees to which the KERP applies is important for the stability of the business and to enhance the effectiveness of the marketing process;
d. the employees' history with and knowledge of the debtor;
e. the difficulty in finding a replacement to fulfill the responsibilities of the employees to which the KERP applies;
f. whether the KERP agreement and charge were approved by the board of directors, including the independent directors, as the business judgment of the board should not be ignored;
g. whether the KERP agreement and charge are supported or consented to by secured creditors of the debtor; and
h. whether the payments under the KERP are payable upon the completion of the restructuring process.

[30] I have conducted my examination of the facts of this case having regard to the following three criteria which I think sweep in all of the considerations underlying *Grant* and *Cinram* and which provide a framework to consider the degree to which appropriately objective business judgment underlies the proposal:

(a) Arm's length safeguards: The court can justifiably repose significant confidence in the objectivity of the business judgment of parties with a legitimate interest in the matter who are independent of or at arm's length from the beneficiaries of the program. The greater the arm's length input to the design, scope and implementation, the better. Given the obvious conflicts management find themselves in, it is important that the Monitor be actively involved in all phases of the process – from assessing the need and scope to designing the targets and metrics and the rewards. Creditors who may fairly be considered to be the ones indirectly

[1] See also Pepall J. (as she then was) in *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)*, 2009 CanLII 55114 (ON SC) at para. 49-52.

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

benefitting from the proposed program and indirectly paying for it also provide valuable arm's length vetting input.

(b) Necessity: Incentive programs, be they in the form of KERP or KEIP or some variant are by no means an automatic or matter of course evolution in an insolvency file. They need to be justified on a case-by-case basis on the basis of necessity. Necessity itself must be examined critically. Employees working to help protect their own long-term job security are already well-aligned with creditor interests and might generally be considered as being near one end of the necessity spectrum while those upon whom great responsibility lies but with little realistic chance of having an on-going role in the business are the least aligned with stakeholder interests and thus may generally be viewed as being near the other end of the necessity spectrum when it comes to incentive programs. Employees in a sector that is in demand pose a greater retention risk while employees with relatively easily replaced skills in a well-supplied market pose a lesser degree of risk and thus necessity. Overbroad programs are prone to the criticism of overreaching.

(c) Reasonableness of Design: Incentive programs are meant to align the interests of the beneficiaries with those of the stakeholders and not to reward counter-productive behavior nor provide an incentive to insiders to disrupt the process at the least opportune moment. The targets and incentives created must be reasonably related to the goals pursued and those goals must be of demonstrable benefit to the objects of the restructuring process. Payments made before the desired results are achieved are generally less defensible.

(a) Arm's length safeguards

[31] In my view, there is substantial evidence that the process of negotiating and designing both programs has benefitted from significant arm's length and objective oversight in the negotiation, design and implementation phases of these two programs.

[32] The process leading to both programs began prior to the insolvency filings on August 10, 2018. Aralez had engaged A&M as its financial advisor for the restructuring process and asked A&M to help formulate both the key employee incentive and retention programs. A&M worked on program design in consultation with the debtor's legal counsel and with input from the compensation committee of the Aralez Pharmaceuticals Inc. Board of Directors, none of whom are beneficiaries of either program.

[33] The Monitor has been consulted extensively. The Monitor has inquired into the design and objects of the proposed plans and has verified the levels of the proposed

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

incentives relative to the objectives of the programs and other historical data. The Monitor's input has resulted in a number of alterations to the proposals as these have evolved. As the programs have emerged from the process, the Monitor's conclusion is that the KERP is comparable to other KERP plans this court has approved and is reasonable in the circumstances. The Monitor has concluded that the KEIP addresses the concerns raised by the Monitor, protects the interest of Canadian stakeholders and these would not be materially prejudiced by approval of the KEIP. Both recommendations are entitled to very significant weight from this court.

[34] The U.S. Trustee raised a number of concerns with the proposed KEIP which have also resulted in revisions.

[35] Finally, Deerfield has been consulted and has indicated that they take no objection to either program as they have emerged from this process. For the reasons discussed above, Deerfield's *imprimatur* carries a particularly significant degree of weight in these circumstances in terms of establishing the arm's length and market-tested nature of the two programs before me.

[36] The business judgment of Deerfield and the Board of Directors of API are entitled to significant weight. The independent and very significant input of the Monitor, A&M and the U.S. Trustee afford significant comfort that objective viewpoints have played a significant role in designing and vetting the proposals. Finally, the recommendation of the Monitor is entitled to significant weight given the unique role the Monitor plays in the Canadian restructuring process.

[37] In summary, the process followed provides a high degree of comfort that a reasonable level of objective business judgment has been brought to bear. Circumstances will not allow every case the luxury of such a thorough process. However, this process was professionally designed thoroughly run. It has appropriately generated a high level of confidence in the integrity of the outcome

(b) Necessity

[38] The design of the two programs demonstrates an appropriate regard for the criterion of necessity. They are not over-broad.

[39] Any analysis of whether a program is over-broad must take into account the nature of the business. In some respects, Aralez may be likened to a virtual pharmaceutical company in that it out-sources many functions of a traditional pharmaceutical company such as manufacturing. It thus has relatively few employees compared to its size.

[40] In designing the programs and assessing which employees to be included, an assessment was undertaken of each prospective beneficiary in terms of the ease with which they might be replaced, the degree to which they are critical to daily operations of

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

the debtor companies or completion of the sales process and – for the KERP program at least – the perceived level of retention risk. The Monitor's input was sought at each level of the design and finalization of the programs.

[41] The KERP program involves three employees in Canada and I am advised that their inclusion in the KERP is a condition of the purchaser under the stalking-horse bid. The loss of these three employees – critical to the Canadian business being sold – would endanger the stalking horse bid process at worst and disrupt the business being sold by requiring the debtor companies to deal with recruiting, transition and similar matters at a juncture where they are least able to deal with them at best. Their departure at this juncture would entail significant additional expenditures in terms of professional time at least if that event did not endanger the stalking horse bid.

[42] The KEIP program involves nine members of senior management. They are employees the nature of whose function defies precise description or measurement. They are employees who act in concert with each other as part of a team for whom neither the clock nor the calendar play more than a subsidiary role in dictating their hours of labour. These employees are essential to ensuring the business remains stable and performs well during the restructuring process. They play a key role in helping ensure the sales process achieves the highest level of return. They are also employees most of whom are laboring under the near certainty that the more efficient and successful they are in their efforts, the sooner they will be out of a job.

[43] At such a high level, personal reputation and professional pride remain as significant motivators to be sure. While a job well done may be its own reward, appropriate financial incentives are not without their place. This is a classic case for a well-designed incentive program.

[44] I am satisfied that the design of these programs satisfies the criterion of necessity.

(c) Reasonableness of design

[45] The KERP program provides for retention bonuses ranging from 25% to 50% of annual salary. The aggregate compensation available is $256,710, a figure that may be contrasted to the stalking horse bid for the Canadian assets of $62.5 million. Payment is made on the earlier of termination without cause by the company, death or permanent disability and the completion of the sales transaction.

[46] The timing of payments and the amount of the payments provided for, relative both to the salary of the individuals and to the value of the company, are both well in-line with precedent.

[47] The KEIP program provides for incentive payments to participants based on the debtors' performance relative to target established for cash flow targets during the

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

bankruptcy proceedings and relative to the achieved asset sale proceeds. Failure to reach targets results in no bonus, while four levels of bonus are possible (Threshold[2], Target, Stretch and Super Stretch).

[48] The real controversy on the motion was in respect of the KEIP.

[49] It is true that the cash flow performance of the debtors to date plus the projections of cash flow over the coming weeks put the KEIP participants well on track to achieving the highest "super-stretch" level of incentive. It is also true that if *no* bids are received in the sales process now underway and only the stalking horse bids are completed, the participants will be comfortably within the "target" level of incentive for asset sales. Combined, this means that that total incentives of approximately 81.25% of salary appears to be all but assured to KEIP participants. In the circumstances, the Official Committee objects that these incentives are simply too easily earned.

[50] They also object to the level of incentives relative to salary as being unacceptably high.

[51] The answer to both of these objections lies in the peculiar facts of this case.

[52] The KERP and KEIP programs were both conceived of and designed primarily in the period leading up to the initial filings made in August 2018, although alterations have been made following the input of, among others, the United States trustee. The employees selected for inclusion in both programs have been operating in the expectation that the employer would proceed in good faith to seek court approval as soon as practicable. At the request of the DIP Lender, the process of seeking court approval was deferred to put priority on the process of securing and finalizing the stalking horse bids and getting the sales process underway. At the time these plans were first offered to employees, forecasting cash flow in bankruptcy and sales proceeds was looking through a glass darkly. It is only hindsight – and the past efforts of the employees – that has made the targets appear to be such an easy goal.

[53] Of course, the employer could not promise and the employee could not expect that court approval of these plans would be a rubber stamp. That does not mean that this court should not take into account the circumstances prevailing when the plans were first offered to employees and the good faith of the employees in continuing to apply their shoulders to the wheel without causing disruption to the process when it could least afford it. It would be fundamentally unfair to penalize the affected employees for their good faith and constructive behavior in this case. It would also be counter-productive as such a precedent would not fail to alter behavior in future cases.

---

[2] The threshold incentive based on cash flow was removed after discussions with the United States Trustee.

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

[54] I am satisfied that the targets were realistic and appropriate at the time they were set and served to align the interests of employees with stakeholders in an appropriate manner.

[55] The level of incentive is also less than meets the eye when the facts are examined more closely. While the combined cash flow plus asset sale incentives could result in incentives of up to 125% of salary, that figure is premised on base salary. In the case of the employees within the proposed KEIP program, base salary has been but one portion of their total compensation. When historical compensation is taken into account, the incentive payments recede to levels significantly below the 80% level calculated by the Official Committee to something closer to 50%.

[56] I am satisfied that the incentive amounts are reasonable in all of the circumstances.

Disposition

[57] In the result, I confirmed the KERP program at the hearing of the motion on December 16, 2018 and am granting the motion in respect of the KEIP program at this time. My approval extends to the requested priority charges securing the KEIP payments.

[58] Order accordingly.

_____

S.F. Dunphy J.

Date: November 21, 2018

2018 ONSC 6980 (CanLII)

TAB 8

CITATION: Re Essar Steel Algoma Inc. et al, 2015 ONSC 7656
COURT FILE NO.: CV-15-11169-00CL
DATE: 20151207

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ESSAR STEEL ALGOMA INC., ESSAR TECH ALGOMA INC., ALGOMA HOLDINGS B.V., ESSAR STEEL ALGOMA (ALBERTA) ULC, CANNELTON IRON ORE COMPANY AND ESSAR STEEL ALGOMA INC. USA

Applicants

BEFORE: Newbould J.

COUNSEL: *Ashley Taylor*, for the Applicants

Derrick Tay and Clifton P. Prophet, for the Monitor Ernst & Young, Inc.

Marc Wasserman and Andrea Lockhart, for Deutsche Bank

Massimo Starnino and Debra McKenna, for USW and Local 2724

Lou Brzezinski, for USW Local 2251

Karen Ensslen, representative counsel for the Applicants' retirees

L. Joseph Latham, for the Ad Hoc Committee of Essar Algoma Noteholders

Shayne Kukulowicz and Ryan C. Jacobs, for the Ad Hoc Committee of Junior Secured Noteholders

Sara-Ann Van Allen and John J. Salmas, for Wilmington Trust, National Association

HEARD: December 3, 2015

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

KERP ENDORSEMENT

[1] The applicants were granted protection under the CCAA in an Initial Order on November 9, 2015. On November 16, 2015 a DIP loan was approved, with the order settled on November 19, 2015, which provided tight timelines for the entire process, including strict timelines for a SISP process.

[2] The applicants have now moved for the approval of a a key employee retention plan ("KERP") offered to certain management employees of Essar Steel Algoma Inc. ("Algoma") said to be deemed critical to a successful restructuring and a charge on the current and future assets, undertakings and properties of the applicants to secure the obligations under the KERP. The KERP is supported by all those who appeared at the hearing save for the unions who opposed it.

The KERP

[3] The KERP covers 23 management personnel. The maximum aggregate amount which may become payable under the KERP is $3,468,027. This includes a $250,000 reserve for additional cash retention payments in the discretion of the board of directors, subject to approval of the Monitor.

[4] Under the KERP, a cash retention payment will be paid to the KERP participants upon the earliest of the following events: (a) implementation of a plan of compromise or arrangement sanctioned by the Court; (b) completion of a sale (or liquidation) of all or substantially all of the assets and operations of Algoma approved by the Court; (c) termination of a KERP participant's employment by Algoma without cause; and (d) December 31, 2016.

[5] In order to receive payments under the KERP, a KERP participant cannot have resigned, been terminated with cause or failed to perform his or her duties and responsibilities diligently, faithfully and honestly in the opinion of his or her direct supervisor and the special committee of the board of directors.

[6] The cash retention payment will be an amount equal to a percentage of the KERP participant's annual salary. The KERP participants are categorized in four tiers, with the retention payment corresponding to 100%, 75%, 50% or 25% of annual salary respectively for each of the four tiers.

[7] The list of KERP participants and the amounts of the cash retention payments offered to them were formulated by Algoma's management with the assistance of the applicants' legal counsel and other professional advisors, and with the assistance of a report prepared by a third party human resources firm, and in consultation with the Monitor. The KERP has been recommended by the special committee of the board of directors and approved by the board of directors of Algoma.

Analysis

[8] At the outset, the unions appearing requested an adjournment of the motion to further consider the requested relief. I declined the adjournment. The motion was served on November 26, 2015 and the confidential information regarding the persons and the amounts to be promised to them under the KERP was provided to counsel for the unions on November 30 after a confidentiality agreement was signed. That information is straightforward and easily understood.

[9] I understand the anxiety in Sault Ste. Marie caused by the difficulties being experienced by Algoma and the importance to the employees of the survival of Algoma. It would be preferable to have the luxury of considering all of the many issues in this CCAA proceeding in a relaxed atmosphere without time pressures. However that is not possible. The difficulty in this case is that the timelines are tight and the risk of senior management leaving the applicants,

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

which I will discuss further, requires a quick decision on the KERP. Notice that the KERP would be sought was disclosed at the outset but deferred, and to delay this matter any further increases the risks that the KERP is intended to address. Moreover, taking into account the process that was followed by the applicants, it is questionable whether more that is relevant could be said on behalf of the unions than has been said on their behalf in their affidavit and factum filed at the hearing of the motion.

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

[10] There is no express statutory jurisdiction in the CCAA for a court to approve a KERP. However, the courts have routinely held that the general power under section 11 of the CCAA gives jurisdiction to authorize a KERP and grant a charge to secure the applicants' obligations under the KERP. In *Grant Forest Products Inc., (Re)*, (2009), 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128, I considered the factors to be considered in determining whether a KERP should be approved. These were summarized by Morawetz J. (as he then was) in *Cinram International Inc., (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 3767 at para. 91 as follows:

> 91….The Court in *Re Grant Forest Products Inc.* considered a number of factors in determining whether to grant a KERP and a KERP charge, including:
>
> a. whether the Monitor supports the KERP agreement and charge;
>
> b. whether the employees to which the KERP applies would consider other employment options if the KERP agreement were not secured by the KERP charge;
>
> c. whether the continued employment of the employees to which the KERP applies is important for the stability of the business and to enhance the effectiveness of the marketing process;
>
> d. the employees' history with and knowledge of the debtor;
>
> e. the difficulty in finding a replacement to fulfill the responsibilities of the employees to which the KERP applies;

f. whether the KERP agreement and charge were approved by the board of directors, including the independent directors, as the business judgment of the board should not be ignored;

g. whether the KERP agreement and charge are supported or consented to by secured creditors of the debtor; and

h. whether the payments under the KERP are payable upon the completion of the restructuring process.

[11] In my view, the KERP should be approved for the following reasons:

(i) The evidence is that the KERP participants are critical to a successful restructuring of the applicants. Their institutional knowledge and experience would be very difficult, if not impossible, to be replaced during the relative short time in which the restructuring is contemplated. Without the KERP and the security provided by the KERP charge, there is concern that the KERP participants are likely to consider other employment options prior to the completion of the applicants' restructuring proceedings.

(ii) The unions contend that there is no evidence that any of the KERP participants have been approached by any other potential employers. Regardless of whether that is the case, it is no reason not to approve a KERP. The issue is whether there is a sufficient risk that persons may leave their employ, not whether there has been an approach by some other employer. See *Grant*, *supra*, at para. 14.

(iii) In this case, many of the management covered by the KERP are not from Sault Ste. Marie. They are obviously mobile and understandably would be concerned about their future in that city with a steel company that is under CCAA protection and not for the first time. The risk of their leaving for some other more certain future cannot be ignored, and it would be in no one's interest for them to leave Algoma at this critical time in which efforts are being made to restructure the business.

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

(iv) Management of Algoma took into account the difficulty of replacing the KERP participants during the stay period, taking into account the remoteness of Sault Ste. Marie. Algoma has been trying to recruit for some of these positions for the past year without success.

(v) The process to establish the KERP and those who should be covered by it was a thorough process. Outside HR personnel were consulted, legal counsel provided advice and the special committee of the board of directors as well as the board itself considered and approved the KERP. The Monitor provided input to Algoma in formulating the KERP and was invited to the meetings of the special committee and the board when the KERP was considered in detail, including whether the entitlements of certain participants should be changed from what management had proposed.

(vi) The business acumen of the board of directors, including the special committee of the board, should not be ignored unless there is good reason in the record to disregard it. See *Grant, supra*, at para. 18.

(vii) The KERP is not opposed by the various classes of noteholders, who will become junior to the KERP charge. They have worked with the applicants and have agreed to certain terms that will give them protection from their main concerns. While their concerns have not been completely answered, they are satisfied that it is in the best interests of Algoma that the KERP be approved.

(viii) The KERP is not opposed by the DIP lenders who are satisfied with the settled terms.

(ix) The Monitor supports the KERP.

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

[12] Counsel for the USW contends that the terms of the individual contracts of employment of each of the KERP participants should be disclosed to them as there may be non-competition provisions that would prevent the executives from leaving Algoma. Disclosure of all of the terms of employment is not required to deal with this issue. Of the 23 employees covered by the KERP, only eight have an employment agreement. The template for this agreement has been provided in confidence. There is a non-competition clause but it is questionable whether it would be enforceable and it clearly does not prevent all possible jobs that might be available elsewhere. Six of the eight employees in question are not from Sault Ste. Marie. To run the risk that the eight management employees in question would not leave Algoma because of this clause and to ignore the business judgment of the board and the special committee to the board because of this clause would be foolhardy.

[13] It is also said that the terms of the employment agreements should be reviewed to determine whether these employees would be entitled in any event to the amounts provided for in the KERP. This is completely answered by the terms to be agreed by the KERP participants that any amounts paid under the KERP will result in a corresponding reduction in any non-KERP claim that the participants may be entitled to.

[14] It is contended by the USW that the KERP was planned and approved without any input from the unions. I would not on that basis refuse to approve the KERP. Whether a particular person in a management role is important enough to be covered by a KERP agreement in an insolvency, or what the size of the KERP payment should be, is something that is the purview of management and the board of directors of a company. What useful input could be provided by the unionized employees is not apparent on the record, and no case provided to me suggested that the unionized employees should be consulted on such a decision.

[15] It was contended on behalf of local 2251 that the collective agreement provides for a steering committee on which the union has an important role and that the steering committee will work with the President and CEO and senior management towards achievement of the company's business goals and in particular how they relate to the facilities, manning objectives

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

including attrition and other matters which impact the company's employees. It is contended that this is broad enough to require the steering committee to have been involved in the implementation of the KERP for the senior executives of the company.

[16] I doubt that this provision of the collective agreement goes so far as contended to require union input into the terms of employment of the company's executives, which is what the contention of the union amounts to. However, if it is thought that the collective agreement was breached by the process leading to the KERP, a grievance could presumably be taken under the collective agreement. That is independent of the considerations to be given by a CCAA court in deciding whether to approve a KERP. A CCAA proceeding is not the place for grievances under collective agreements.

[17] It was also contended by the USW that the total amount of the KERP, being $3.4 million was excessive, taking into account the amount of the special pension shortfall payments that were deferred for the month of November. Counsel declined to say what a reasonable amount would be, saying it was a matter of discretion for the Court. In my view, the tying together these two separate issues is not appropriate. Whether the special pension payments should be deferred is a different issue and one that will be dealt with at a future date. The judgment of the board of directors and the special committee of the board should not be disregarded because of this issue.

[18] It was contended on behalf of the retirees the that the terms of the KERP provide for payment when there has been a completion of a sale or liquidation of the assets of Algoma and that the KERP should not pay out in the event of a liquidation as it is in the interests of all stakeholders that the company or its business be reorganized rather than liquidated. I would not change this provision. The management to be protected by the KERP are being incentivized to stay in Sault Ste. Marie to assist in the SISP and it would only be after that process that a liquidation might take place if a SISP were not successful. It is in the interests of the KERP participants, along with all stakeholders, that Algoma survive and not be liquidated, and to deny them their KERP payment after they stayed to attempt to save Algoma from liquidation would not be appropriate.

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

[19] In accordance with terms worked out by the applicant with the secured lenders, the applicants will not make or distribute any payments in respect of any claim of a KERP participant against the applicants (including any claims for termination, severance and change of control entitlements, but not including claims for payment pursuant to the KERP, claims for wages and vacation pay, or claims in respect of pension plans administered by the applicants) without first obtaining court approval of such payments on notice to the Service List. The KERP letters will have complimentary provisions worked out by the parties.

Sealing order requested.

[20] The applicants requested that the list of KERP participants and the information regarding their income and amounts of their proposed KERP payments be sealed. This information was contained in a confidential supplement to the third report of the Monitor. This request is supported by the Monitor. The unions oppose the request.

[21] In *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, 2002 SCC 41, Justice Iacobucci adopted the following test to determine when a sealing order should be made

> A confidentiality order … should only be granted when:
>
> (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
>
> (b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh the deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

[22] Sealing orders are routinely granted in KERP cases, and found to meet the *Sierra Club* tests. In *Canwest Global Communications Corp., (Re)*, (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72, Pepall J. (as she then was) stated the following, which is entirely apt to this case of Algoma:

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

> 52 In this case, the unredacted KERPs reveal individually identifiable information including compensation information. Protection of sensitive personal and compensation information the disclosure of which could cause harm to the individuals and to the CMI Entities is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The KERP participants have a reasonable expectation that their personal information would be kept confidential. As to the second branch of the test, the aggregate amount of the KERPs has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. It seems to me that this second branch of the test has been met. The relief requested is granted.

[23] See also *Canwest Publishing Inc., (Re),* (2012), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115.

[24] In this case, it is contended by the union that under Ontario law, disclosure is made of salary information for public servants who make in excess of $100,000 per annum. Thus as this is a very public restructuring process and there is significant public interest in the outcome of these proceedings, the salary information for individual KERP participants should be disclosed. I do not agree. Persons who choose to work as public servants understand the rules of disclosure relating to their employment. Persons who work in the private sector take employment with the expectation that their income is private information. There are exceptions under securities legislation requiring disclosure of the income of the top earning executives of companies whose shares are publicly traded. I would not extend these statutory requirements to the KERP participants.

[25] The union also contends that they may wish to test the necessity of including individuals in the list of KERP participants and need the particular financial information of each for that purpose. I agree with the Monitor that it would not be appropriate to consider each individual person. The process of selecting the participants and the amounts to be paid to them as incentives to stay and assist the restructuring was a robust process as discussed, and it is not in these circumstances helpful for public discussion about whether any particular person should be included. The impact of such disclosure in the workplace would not be helpful. I agree with Justice Pepall in *Canwest* that individual personal information adds nothing when the aggregate is disclosed.

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

[26] The sealing order requested by the applicants is granted.

Newbould J.

Date: December 7, 2015

2015 ONSC 7656 (CanLII)

TAB 9

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited *Appellant*

v.

Sierra Club of Canada *Respondent*

and

The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada *Respondents*

Énergie atomique du Canada Limitée *Appelante*

c.

Sierra Club du Canada *Intimé*

et

Le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada *Intimés*

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

INDEXED AS: SIERRA CLUB OF CANADA *v.* CANADA (MINISTER OF FINANCE)

Neutral citation: 2002 SCC 41.

File No.: 28020.

2001: November 6; 2002: April 26.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

RÉPERTORIÉ : SIERRA CLUB DU CANADA *c.* CANADA (MINISTRE DES FINANCES)

Référence neutre : 2002 CSC 41.

Nº du greffe : 28020.

2001 : 6 novembre; 2002 : 26 avril.

Présents : Le juge en chef McLachlin et les juges Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour et LeBel.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

Practice — Federal Court of Canada — Filing of confidential material — Environmental organization seeking judicial review of federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Crown corporation for construction and sale of nuclear reactors — Crown corporation requesting confidentiality order in respect of certain documents — Proper analytical approach to be applied to exercise of judicial discretion where litigant seeks confidentiality order — Whether confidentiality order should be granted — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 151.

Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), a Crown corporation, for the construction and sale to China of two CANDU reactors. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where AECL is the main contractor and project manager. Sierra Club maintains that the authorization of financial assistance

EN APPEL DE LA COUR D'APPEL FÉDÉRALE

Pratique — Cour fédérale du Canada — Production de documents confidentiels — Contrôle judiciaire demandé par un organisme environnemental de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de donner une aide financière à une société d'État pour la construction et la vente de réacteurs nucléaires — Ordonnance de confidentialité demandée par la société d'État pour certains documents — Analyse applicable à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité — Faut-il accorder l'ordonnance? — Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106, règle 151.

Un organisme environnemental, Sierra Club, demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière à Énergie atomique du Canada Ltée (« ÉACL »), une société de la Couronne, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs CANDU. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où ÉACL est l'entrepreneur principal et le gestionnaire de projet. Sierra Club soutient que

by the government triggered s. 5(1)(*b*) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* ("*CEAA*"), requiring an environmental assessment as a condition of the financial assistance, and that the failure to comply compels a cancellation of the financial arrangements. AECL filed an affidavit in the proceedings which summarized confidential documents containing thousands of pages of technical information concerning the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities. AECL resisted Sierra Club's application for production of the confidential documents on the ground, *inter alia*, that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have the authority to disclose them. The Chinese authorities authorized disclosure of the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, under which they would only be made available to the parties and the court, but with no restriction on public access to the judicial proceedings. AECL's application for a confidentiality order was rejected by the Federal Court, Trial Division. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

Held: The appeal should be allowed and the confidentiality order granted on the terms requested by AECL.

In light of the established link between open courts and freedom of expression, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a confidentiality order is whether the right to freedom of expression should be compromised in the circumstances. The court must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles because a confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the s. 2(*b*) right to freedom of expression. A confidentiality order should only be granted when (1) such an order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings. Three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of the test. First, the risk must be real and substantial, well grounded in evidence, posing a serious threat to the commercial interest in question. Second, the important commercial interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality, where there is a general principle at stake. Finally, the judge is required to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available to such an order but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

l'autorisation d'aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l'application de l'al. 5(1)*b*) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale* (« *LCÉE* ») exigeant une évaluation environnementale comme condition de l'aide financière, et que le défaut d'évaluation entraîne l'annulation des ententes financières. ÉACL dépose un affidavit qui résume des documents confidentiels contenant des milliers de pages d'information technique concernant l'évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises. ÉACL s'oppose à la communication des documents demandée par Sierra Club pour la raison notamment qu'ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu'elle n'est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Les autorités chinoises donnent l'autorisation de les communiquer à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité n'y donnant accès qu'aux parties et à la cour, mais n'imposant aucune restriction à l'accès du public aux débats. La demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité est rejetée par la Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale. La Cour d'appel fédérale confirme cette décision.

Arrêt : L'appel est accueilli et l'ordonnance demandée par ÉACL est accordée.

Vu le lien existant entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression, la question fondamentale pour la cour saisie d'une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d'expression. La cour doit s'assurer que l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l'accorder est conforme aux principes de la *Charte* parce qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité a des effets préjudiciables sur la liberté d'expression garantie à l'al. 2*b*). On ne doit l'accorder que (1) lorsqu'elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque, et (2) lorsque ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires. Trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. Premièrement, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, être bien étayé par la preuve et menacer gravement l'intérêt commercial en question. Deuxièmement, l'intérêt doit pouvoir se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité, mettant en jeu un principe général. Enfin le juge doit non seulement déterminer s'il existe d'autres options raisonnables, il doit aussi restreindre l'ordonnance autant qu'il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l'intérêt commercial en question.

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

Applying the test to the present circumstances, the commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality, which is sufficiently important to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met. The information must have been treated as confidential at all relevant times; on a balance of probabilities, proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by disclosure of the information; and the information must have been accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential. These requirements have been met in this case. Disclosure of the confidential documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of AECL, and there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

Under the second branch of the test, the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial. Disclosure of the confidential documents would cause AECL to breach its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. If a confidentiality order is denied, AECL will be forced to withhold the documents in order to protect its commercial interests, and since that information is relevant to defences available under the *CEAA*, the inability to present this information hinders AECL's capacity to make full answer and defence. Although in the context of a civil proceeding, this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental principle of justice. Further, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the confidential documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents, assisting in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression. Finally, given the technical nature of the information, there may be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

The deleterious effects of granting a confidentiality order include a negative effect on the open court principle, and therefore on the right to freedom of expression. The more detrimental the confidentiality order would be to the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons, the harder it will be to justify the confidentiality order. In the hands of the parties and their experts, the confidential documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the highly technical nature of the documents, the important value of the search for the truth which underlies

En l'espèce, l'intérêt commercial en jeu, la préservation d'obligations contractuelles de confidentialité, est suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l'analyse, pourvu que certaines conditions soient remplies : les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels; il est raisonnable de penser que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation compromettrait des droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques; et les renseignements ont été recueillis dans l'expectative raisonnable qu'ils resteraient confidentiels. Ces conditions sont réunies en l'espèce. La divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de ÉACL et il n'existe pas d'options raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

À la deuxième étape de l'analyse, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable. Si ÉACL divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Le refus de l'ordonnance obligerait ÉACL à retenir les documents pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et comme ils sont pertinents pour l'exercice des moyens de défense prévus par la *LCÉE*, l'impossibilité de les produire empêcherait ÉACL de présenter une défense pleine et entière. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la *Charte*, le droit à un procès équitable est un principe de justice fondamentale. L'ordonnance permettrait aux parties et au tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu, favorisant ainsi la recherche de la vérité, une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression. Il peut enfin y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ce type de renseignements techniques.

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et donc sur la liberté d'expression. Plus l'ordonnance porte atteinte aux valeurs fondamentales que sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun, (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique, plus il est difficile de justifier l'ordonnance. Dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, et donc pour aider la cour à parvenir à des conclusions de fait exactes. Compte tenu de leur nature hautement technique, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance demandée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the confidential documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order.

Under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions relate to the public distribution of the documents, which is a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, the second core value of promoting individual self-fulfilment would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order. The third core value figures prominently in this appeal as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. By their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection, so that the public interest is engaged here more than if this were an action between private parties involving private interests. However, the narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the confidential documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts. The core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. The salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects and the order should be granted. A balancing of the various rights and obligations engaged indicates that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, while the deleterious effects on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal.

Cases Cited

Applied: *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; *R. v. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76; *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; **referred to:** *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and*

sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le refus de l'ordonnance.

Aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions ont trait à la distribution publique des documents, une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Même si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, la deuxième valeur fondamentale, l'épanouissement personnel, ne serait pas touchée de manière significative. La troisième valeur joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection, de sorte que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés. Toutefois la portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. Ses effets bénéfiques l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et il y a lieu de l'accorder. Selon la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de ÉACL à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression, et ses effets préjudiciables sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes.

Jurisprudence

Arrêts appliqués : *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326; *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480; *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835; *R. c. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76; *M. (A.) c. Ryan*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157; *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927; *R. c. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 R.C.S. 697; **arrêts mentionnés :** *AB Hassle c.*

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

Welfare), [2000] 3 F.C. 360, aff'g (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428; *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(*b*).
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, ss. 5(1)(*b*), 8, 54, 54(2)(*b*).
Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, rr. 151, 312.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (QL), affirming a decision of the Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (QL). Appeal allowed.

J. Brett Ledger and *Peter Chapin*, for the appellant.

Timothy J. Howard and *Franklin S. Gertler*, for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada.

Graham Garton, *Q.C.*, and *J. Sanderson Graham*, for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

IACOBUCCI J. —

I. Introduction

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important

Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social), [2000] 3 C.F. 360, conf. [1998] A.C.F. nº 1850 (QL); *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103; *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77; *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35; *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

Lois et règlements cités

Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, art. 1, 2*b*).
Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, ch. 37, art. 5(1)*b*), 8, 54, 54(2) [abr. & rempl. 1993, ch. 34, art. 37].
Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998), DORS/98-106, règles 151, 312.

POURVOI contre un arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, [2000] 4 C.F. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] A.C.F. nº 732 (QL), qui a confirmé une décision de la Section de première instance, [2000] 2 C.F. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] A.C.F. nº 1633 (QL). Pourvoi accueilli.

J. Brett Ledger et *Peter Chapin*, pour l'appelante.

Timothy J. Howard et *Franklin S. Gertler*, pour l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada.

Graham Garton, *c.r.*, et *J. Sanderson Graham*, pour les intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada.

Version française du jugement de la Cour rendu par

LE JUGE IACOBUCCI —

I. Introduction

Dans notre pays, les tribunaux sont les institutions généralement choisies pour résoudre au mieux les différends juridiques par l'application de principes juridiques aux faits de chaque espèce. Un des principes sous-jacents au processus judiciaire est la transparence, tant dans la procédure suivie que dans les éléments pertinents à la solution du litige. Certains de ces éléments peuvent toutefois faire l'objet d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Le

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and accordingly would allow the appeal.

II. Facts

The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited ("AECL") is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervener with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada ("Sierra Club"). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a $1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(*b*) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37 ("*CEAA*"), which requires that an environmental assessment be undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the *CEAA* does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(*b*) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the *CEAA*.

In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant

pourvoi soulève les importantes questions de savoir à quel moment et dans quelles circonstances il y a lieu de rendre une ordonnance de confidentialité.

2 Pour les motifs qui suivent, je suis d'avis de rendre l'ordonnance de confidentialité demandée et par conséquent d'accueillir le pourvoi.

II. Les faits

3 L'appelante, Énergie atomique du Canada Limitée (« ÉACL »), société d'État propriétaire et vendeuse de la technologie nucléaire CANDU, est une intervenante ayant reçu les droits de partie dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire présentée par l'intimé, Sierra Club du Canada (« Sierra Club »), un organisme environnemental. Sierra Club demande le contrôle judiciaire de la décision du gouvernement fédéral de fournir une aide financière, sous forme de garantie d'emprunt de 1,5 milliard de dollars, pour la construction et la vente à la Chine de deux réacteurs nucléaires CANDU par l'appelante. Les réacteurs sont actuellement en construction en Chine, où l'appelante est entrepreneur principal et gestionnaire de projet.

4 L'intimé soutient que l'autorisation d'aide financière du gouvernement déclenche l'application de l'al. 5(1)*b*) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*, L.C. 1992, ch. 37 (« *LCÉE* »), qui exige une évaluation environnementale avant qu'une autorité fédérale puisse fournir une aide financière à un projet. Le défaut d'évaluation entraîne l'annulation des ententes financières.

5 Selon l'appelante et les ministres intimés, la *LCÉE* ne s'applique pas à la convention de prêt et si elle s'y applique, ils peuvent invoquer les défenses prévues aux art. 8 et 54 de cette loi. L'article 8 prévoit les circonstances dans lesquelles les sociétés d'État sont tenues de procéder à des évaluations environnementales. Le paragraphe 54(2) reconnaît la validité des évaluations environnementales effectuées par des autorités étrangères pourvu qu'elles soient compatibles avec les dispositions de la *LCÉE*.

6 Dans le cadre de la requête de Sierra Club en annulation des ententes financières, l'appelante a

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

filed an affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the "Confidential Documents"). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Mr. Feng, one of AECL's experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang's evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the appellant sought to introduce the Confidential Documents under Rule 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

déposé un affidavit de M. Simon Pang, un de ses cadres supérieurs. Dans l'affidavit, M. Pang mentionne et résume certains documents (les « documents confidentiels ») qui sont également mentionnés dans un affidavit de M. Feng, un expert d'ÉACL. Avant de contre-interroger M. Pang sur son affidavit, Sierra Club a demandé par requête la production des documents confidentiels, au motif qu'il ne pouvait vérifier la validité de sa déposition sans consulter les documents de base. L'appelante s'oppose pour plusieurs raisons à la production des documents, dont le fait qu'ils sont la propriété des autorités chinoises et qu'elle n'est pas autorisée à les divulguer. Après avoir obtenu des autorités chinoises l'autorisation de communiquer les documents à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante a cherché à les produire en invoquant la règle 312 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, DORS/98-106, et a demandé une ordonnance de confidentialité à leur égard.

7 Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

Aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, seules les parties et la cour auraient accès aux documents confidentiels. Aucune restriction ne serait imposée à l'accès du public aux débats. On demande essentiellement d'empêcher la diffusion des documents confidentiels au public.

8 The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the "EIRs"), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the "PSAR"), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

Les documents confidentiels comprennent deux Rapports d'impact environnemental (« RIE ») sur le site et la construction, un Rapport préliminaire d'analyse sur la sécurité (« RPAS ») ainsi que l'affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang qui résume le contenu des RIE et du RPAS. S'ils étaient admis, les rapports seraient joints en annexe de l'affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang. Les RIE ont été préparés en chinois par les autorités chinoises, et le RPAS a été préparé par l'appelante en collaboration avec les responsables chinois du projet. Les documents contiennent une quantité considérable de renseignements techniques et comprennent des milliers de pages. Ils décrivent l'évaluation environnementale du site de construction qui est faite par les autorités chinoises en vertu des lois chinoises.

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order, otherwise it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Mr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

III. Relevant Statutory Provisions

Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106

151. (1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.

(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

IV. Judgments Below

A. *Federal Court, Trial Division*, [2000] 2 F.C. 400

Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to Rule 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondent would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought

9 Comme je le note plus haut, l'appelante prétend ne pas pouvoir produire les documents confidentiels en preuve sans qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, parce que ce serait un manquement à ses obligations envers les autorités chinoises. L'intimé soutient pour sa part que son droit de contre-interroger M. Pang et M. Feng sur leurs affidavits serait pratiquement futile en l'absence des documents auxquels ils se réfèrent. Sierra Club entend soutenir que le juge saisi de la demande de contrôle judiciaire devrait donc leur accorder peu de poids.

10 La Section de première instance de la Cour fédérale du Canada a rejeté la demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité et la Cour d'appel fédérale, à la majorité, a rejeté l'appel. Le juge Robertson, dissident, était d'avis d'accorder l'ordonnance.

III. Dispositions législatives

11 *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, DORS/98-106

151. (1) La Cour peut, sur requête, ordonner que des documents ou éléments matériels qui seront déposés soient considérés comme confidentiels.

(2) Avant de rendre une ordonnance en application du paragraphe (1), la Cour doit être convaincue de la nécessité de considérer les documents ou éléments matériels comme confidentiels, étant donné l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires.

IV. Les décisions antérieures

A. *Cour fédérale, Section de première instance*, [2000] 2 C.F. 400

12 Le juge Pelletier examine d'abord s'il y a lieu, en vertu de la règle 312, d'autoriser la production de l'affidavit supplémentaire de M. Pang auquel sont annexés les documents confidentiels. À son avis, il s'agit d'une question de pertinence et il conclut que les documents se rapportent à la question de la réparation. En l'absence de préjudice pour l'intimé, il y a donc lieu d'autoriser la signification et le dépôt de l'affidavit. Il note que des retards seraient préjudiciables à l'intimé mais que, puisque les deux parties ont présenté des requêtes

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

14 Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the

interlocutoires qui ont entraîné les délais, les avantages de soumettre le dossier au complet à la cour compensent l'inconvénient du retard causé par la présentation de ces documents.

Sur la confidentialité, le juge Pelletier conclut qu'il doit être convaincu que la nécessité de protéger la confidentialité l'emporte sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires. Il note que les arguments en faveur de la publicité des débats judiciaires en l'espèce sont importants vu l'intérêt du public envers le rôle du Canada comme vendeur de technologie nucléaire. Il fait aussi remarquer que les ordonnances de confidentialité sont une exception au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et ne devraient être accordées que dans des cas de nécessité absolue.

Le juge Pelletier applique le même critère que pour une ordonnance conservatoire en matière de brevets, qui est essentiellement une ordonnance de confidentialité. Pour obtenir l'ordonnance, le requérant doit démontrer qu'il croit subjectivement que les renseignements sont confidentiels et que leur divulgation nuirait à ses intérêts. De plus, si l'ordonnance est contestée, le requérant doit démontrer objectivement qu'elle est nécessaire. Cet élément objectif l'oblige à démontrer que les renseignements ont toujours été traités comme étant confidentiels et qu'il est raisonnable de croire que leur divulgation risque de compromettre ses droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques.

Ayant conclu qu'il est satisfait à l'élément subjectif et aux deux volets de l'élément objectif du critère, il ajoute : « J'estime toutefois aussi que, dans les affaires de droit public, le critère objectif comporte, ou devrait comporter, un troisième volet, en l'occurrence la question de savoir si l'intérêt du public à l'égard de la divulgation l'emporte sur le préjudice que la divulgation risque de causer à une personne » (par. 23).

Il estime très important le fait qu'il ne s'agit pas en l'espèce de production obligatoire de documents. Le fait que la demande vise le dépôt volontaire de documents en vue d'étayer la thèse de l'appelante,

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

appellant's own cause as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

par opposition à une production obligatoire, joue contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

17 En soupesant l'intérêt du public dans la divulgation et le préjudice que la divulgation risque de causer à ÉACL, le juge Pelletier note que les documents que l'appelante veut soumettre à la cour ont été rédigés par d'autres personnes à d'autres fins, et il reconnaît que l'appelante est tenue de protéger la confidentialité des renseignements. À cette étape, il examine de nouveau la question de la pertinence. Si on réussit à démontrer que les documents sont très importants sur une question cruciale, « les exigences de la justice militent en faveur du prononcé d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Si les documents ne sont pertinents que d'une façon accessoire, le caractère facultatif de la production milite contre le prononcé de l'ordonnance de confidentialité » (par. 29). Il conclut alors que les documents sont importants pour résoudre la question de la réparation à accorder, elle-même un point important si l'appelante échoue sur la question principale.

18 Le juge Pelletier considère aussi le contexte de l'affaire et conclut que, puisque la question du rôle du Canada comme vendeur de technologies nucléaires est une importante question d'intérêt public, la charge de justifier une ordonnance de confidentialité est très onéreuse. Il conclut qu'ÉACL pourrait retrancher les éléments délicats des documents ou soumettre à la cour la même preuve sous une autre forme, et maintenir ainsi son droit à une défense complète tout en préservant la publicité des débats judiciaires.

19 Le juge Pelletier signale qu'il prononce l'ordonnance sans avoir examiné les documents confidentiels puisqu'ils n'ont pas été portés à sa connaissance. Bien qu'il mentionne la jurisprudence indiquant qu'un juge ne devrait pas se prononcer sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité sans avoir examiné les documents eux-mêmes, il estime qu'il n'aurait pas été utile d'examiner les documents, vu leur volume et leur caractère technique, et sans savoir quelle part d'information était déjà dans le domaine public.

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

20 Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

B. *Federal Court of Appeal*, [2000] 4 F.C. 426

(1) Evans J.A. (Sharlow J.A. concurring)

21 At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under Rule 312.

22 With respect to Rule 312, Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(*b*) which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(*b*) of the *CEAA* was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the *CEAA*. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under Rule 312.

23 On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered Rule 151, and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in

Dans son ordonnance, le juge Pelletier autorise l'appelante à déposer les documents sous leur forme actuelle ou sous une version révisée, à son gré. Il autorise aussi l'appelante à déposer des documents concernant le processus réglementaire chinois en général et son application au projet, à condition qu'elle le fasse sous 60 jours.

B. *Cour d'appel fédérale*, [2000] 4 C.F. 426

(1) Le juge Evans (avec l'appui du juge Sharlow)

ÉACL fait appel en Cour d'appel fédérale, en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*, et Sierra Club forme un appel incident en vertu de la règle 312.

Sur la règle 312, le juge Evans conclut que les documents en cause sont clairement pertinents dans une défense que l'appelante a l'intention d'invoquer en vertu du par. 54(2) si la cour conclut que l'al. 5(1)*b*) de la *LCÉE* doit s'appliquer, et pourraient l'être aussi pour l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire de la cour de refuser d'accorder une réparation dans le cas où les ministres auraient enfreint la *LCÉE*. Comme le juge Pelletier, le juge Evans est d'avis que l'avantage pour l'appelante et pour la cour d'une autorisation de déposer les documents l'emporte sur tout préjudice que le retard pourrait causer à l'intimé, et conclut par conséquent que le juge des requêtes a eu raison d'accorder l'autorisation en vertu de la règle 312.

Sur l'ordonnance de confidentialité, le juge Evans examine la règle 151 et tous les facteurs que le juge des requêtes a appréciés, y compris le secret commercial attaché aux documents, le fait que l'appelante les a reçus à titre confidentiel des autorités chinoises, et l'argument de l'appelante selon lequel, sans les documents, elle ne pourrait assurer effectivement sa défense. Ces facteurs doivent être pondérés avec le principe de la publicité des documents soumis aux tribunaux. Le juge Evans convient avec le juge Pelletier que le poids à accorder à l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats varie selon le contexte, et il conclut que lorsqu'une affaire soulève des questions de grande importance pour le public, le principe de la publicité des débats a plus de poids

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)*, [2000] 3 F.C. 360 (C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the *CEAA*, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the inclusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without

comme facteur à prendre en compte dans le processus de pondération. Le juge Evans note l'intérêt du public à l'égard de la question en litige ainsi que la couverture médiatique considérable qu'elle a suscitée.

24 À l'appui de sa conclusion que le poids accordé au principe de la publicité des débats peut varier selon le contexte, le juge Evans invoque les décisions *AB Hassle c. Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [2000] 3 C.F. 360 (C.A.), où la cour a tenu compte du peu d'intérêt du public, et *Ethyl Canada Inc. c. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (C. Ont. (Div. gén.)), p. 283, où la cour a ordonné la divulgation après avoir déterminé qu'il s'agissait d'une affaire constitutionnelle importante et qu'il importait que le public comprenne ce qui était en cause. Le juge Evans fait remarquer que la transparence du processus d'évaluation et la participation du public ont une importance fondamentale pour la *LCÉE*, et il conclut qu'on ne peut prétendre que le juge des requêtes a accordé trop de poids au principe de la publicité des débats, même si la confidentialité n'est demandée que pour un nombre relativement restreint de documents hautement techniques.

25 Le juge Evans conclut que le juge des requêtes a donné trop de poids au fait que la production des documents était volontaire mais qu'il ne s'ensuit pas que sa décision au sujet de la confidentialité doive être écartée. Le juge Evans est d'avis que l'erreur n'entâche pas sa conclusion finale, pour trois motifs. Premièrement, comme le juge des requêtes, il attache une grande importance à la publicité du débat judiciaire. Deuxièmement, il conclut que l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des rapports peut, dans une large mesure, compenser l'absence des rapports, si l'appelante décide de ne pas les déposer sans ordonnance de confidentialité. Enfin, si ÉACL déposait une version modifiée des documents, la demande de confidentialité reposerait sur un facteur relativement peu important, savoir l'argument que l'appelante perdrait des occasions d'affaires si elle violait son engagement envers les autorités chinoises.

26 Le juge Evans rejette l'argument selon lequel le juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en statuant

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

(2) Robertson J.A. (dissenting)

27 Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

28 In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence, or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

29 Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

30 To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

sans avoir examiné les documents réels, affirmant que cela n'était pas nécessaire puisqu'il y avait des précis et que la documentation était hautement technique et partiellement traduite. L'appel et l'appel incident sont donc rejetés.

(2) Le juge Robertson (dissident)

Le juge Robertson se dissocie de la majorité pour trois raisons. En premier lieu, il estime que le degré d'intérêt du public dans une affaire, l'importance de la couverture médiatique et l'identité des parties ne devraient pas être pris en considération pour statuer sur une demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon lui, il faut plutôt examiner la nature de la preuve que protégerait l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

Il estime aussi qu'à défaut d'ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante doit choisir entre deux options inacceptables : subir un préjudice financier irréparable si les renseignements confidentiels sont produits en preuve, ou être privée de son droit à un procès équitable parce qu'elle ne peut se défendre pleinement si la preuve n'est pas produite.

Finalement, il dit que le cadre analytique utilisé par les juges majoritaires pour arriver à leur décision est fondamentalement défectueux en ce qu'il est fondé en grande partie sur le point de vue subjectif du juge des requêtes. Il rejette l'approche contextuelle sur la question de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, soulignant la nécessité d'un cadre d'analyse objectif pour combattre la perception que la justice est un concept relatif et pour promouvoir la cohérence et la certitude en droit.

Pour établir ce cadre plus objectif appelé à régir la délivrance d'ordonnances de confidentialité en matière de renseignements commerciaux et scientifiques, il examine le fondement juridique du principe de la publicité du processus judiciaire, en citant l'arrêt de notre Cour, *Edmonton Journal c. Alberta (Procureur général)*, [1989] 2 R.C.S. 1326, qui conclut que la publicité des débats favorise la recherche de la vérité et témoigne de l'importance de soumettre le travail des tribunaux à l'examen public.

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

Robertson J.A. stated that although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made to rules or principles.

He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns "trade secrets", this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner's proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

(1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) correlatively, the information is "necessary" to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a *prima facie* right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

Selon le juge Robertson, même si le principe de la publicité du processus judiciaire reflète la valeur fondamentale que constitue dans une démocratie l'imputabilité dans l'exercice du pouvoir judiciaire, le principe selon lequel il faut que justice soit faite doit, à son avis, l'emporter. Il conclut que la justice vue comme principe universel signifie que les règles ou les principes doivent parfois souffrir des exceptions.

Il fait observer qu'en droit commercial, lorsque les renseignements qu'on cherche à protéger ont trait à des « secrets industriels », ils ne sont pas divulgués au procès lorsque cela aurait pour effet d'annihiler les droits du propriétaire et l'exposerait à un préjudice financier irréparable. Il conclut que, même si l'espèce ne porte pas sur des secrets industriels, on peut traiter de la même façon des renseignements commerciaux et scientifiques acquis sur une base confidentielle, et il établit les critères suivants comme conditions à la délivrance d'une ordonnance de confidentialité (au par. 13) :

1) les renseignements sont de nature confidentielle et non seulement des faits qu'une personne désire ne pas divulguer; 2) les renseignements qu'on veut protéger ne sont pas du domaine public; 3) selon la prépondérance des probabilités, la partie qui veut obtenir une ordonnance de confidentialité subirait un préjudice irréparable si les renseignements étaient rendus publics; 4) les renseignements sont pertinents dans le cadre de la résolution des questions juridiques soulevées dans le litige; 5) en même temps, les renseignements sont « nécessaires » à la résolution de ces questions; 6) l'octroi d'une ordonnance de confidentialité ne cause pas un préjudice grave à la partie adverse; 7) l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires ne prime pas les intérêts privés de la partie qui sollicite l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Le fardeau de démontrer que les critères un à six sont respectés incombe à la partie qui cherche à obtenir l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Pour le septième critère, c'est la partie adverse qui doit démontrer que le droit *prima facie* à une ordonnance de non-divulgation doit céder le pas au besoin de maintenir la publicité des débats judiciaires. En utilisant ces critères, il y a lieu de tenir compte de deux des fils conducteurs qui sous-tendent le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires : la recherche de la vérité et la sauvegarde de la primauté du droit. Comme je l'ai dit au tout début, je ne crois pas que le degré d'importance qu'on croit que le public accorde à une affaire soit une considération pertinente.

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

33 In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

34 Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a Web site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

V. Issues

35 A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*?

B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

VI. Analysis

A. *The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order*

(1) The General Framework: Herein the *Dagenais* Principles

36 The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

> The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(*b*). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the

Appliquant ces critères aux circonstances de l'espèce, le juge Robertson conclut qu'il y a lieu de rendre l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon lui, l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires ne prime pas l'intérêt de ÉACL à préserver le caractère confidentiel de ces documents hautement techniques.

Le juge Robertson traite aussi de l'intérêt du public à ce qu'il soit garanti que les plans de site d'installations nucléaires ne seront pas, par exemple, affichés sur un site Web. Il conclut qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait aucun impact négatif sur les deux objectifs primordiaux du principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, savoir la vérité et la primauté du droit. Il aurait par conséquent accueilli l'appel et rejeté l'appel incident.

V. Questions en litige

A. Quelle méthode d'analyse faut-il appliquer à l'exercice du pouvoir judiciaire discrétionnaire lorsqu'une partie demande une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*?

B. Y a-t-il lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité en l'espèce?

VI. Analyse

A. *Méthode d'analyse applicable aux ordonnances de confidentialité*

(1) Le cadre général : les principes de l'arrêt *Dagenais*

Le lien entre la publicité des procédures judiciaires et la liberté d'expression est solidement établi dans *Société Radio-Canada c. Nouveau-Brunswick (Procureur général)*, [1996] 3 R.C.S. 480. Le juge La Forest l'exprime en ces termes au par. 23 :

> Le principe de la publicité des débats en justice est inextricablement lié aux droits garantis à l'al. 2*b*). Grâce à ce principe, le public a accès à l'information concernant les tribunaux, ce qui lui permet ensuite de discuter des pratiques des tribunaux et des procédures qui s'y déroulent, et d'émettre des opinions et des critiques à cet égard. La liberté d'exprimer des idées et des opinions sur

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

freedom guaranteed by s. 2(*b*), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under Rule 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

Dagenais dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at

le fonctionnement des tribunaux relève clairement de la liberté garantie à l'al. 2*b*), mais en relève également le droit du public d'obtenir au préalable de l'information sur les tribunaux.

L'ordonnance sollicitée aurait pour effet de limiter l'accès du public aux documents confidentiels et leur examen public; cela porterait clairement atteinte à la garantie de la liberté d'expression du public.

37 L'examen de la méthode générale à suivre dans l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'accorder une ordonnance de confidentialité devrait commencer par les principes établis par la Cour dans *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835. Cette affaire portait sur le pouvoir discrétionnaire judiciaire, issu de la common law, de rendre des ordonnances de non-publication dans le cadre de procédures criminelles, mais il y a de fortes ressemblances entre les interdictions de publication et les ordonnances de confidentialité dans le contexte des procédures judiciaires. Dans les deux cas, on cherche à restreindre la liberté d'expression afin de préserver ou de promouvoir un intérêt en jeu dans les procédures. En ce sens, la question fondamentale que doit résoudre le tribunal auquel on demande une interdiction de publication ou une ordonnance de confidentialité est de savoir si, dans les circonstances, il y a lieu de restreindre le droit à la liberté d'expression.

38 Même si, dans chaque cas, la liberté d'expression entre en jeu dans un contexte différent, le cadre établi dans *Dagenais* fait appel aux principes déterminants de la *Charte canadienne des droits et libertés* afin de pondérer la liberté d'expression avec d'autres droits et intérêts, et peut donc être adapté et appliqué à diverses circonstances. L'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire sous le régime de la règle 151 devrait par conséquent refléter les principes sous-jacents établis par *Dagenais*, même s'il faut pour cela l'ajuster aux droits et intérêts précis qui sont en jeu en l'espèce.

39 L'affaire *Dagenais* porte sur une requête par laquelle quatre accusés demandaient à la cour de rendre, en vertu de sa compétence de common law, une ordonnance interdisant la diffusion d'une émission de télévision décrivant des abus physiques et

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accuseds' right to a fair trial.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

> A publication ban should only be ordered when:
>
> (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
>
> (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41 In *New Brunswick*, *supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(*b*) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick*, at para. 33;

sexuels infligés à de jeunes garçons dans des établissements religieux. Les requérants soutenaient que l'interdiction était nécessaire pour préserver leur droit à un procès équitable, parce que les faits racontés dans l'émission ressemblaient beaucoup aux faits en cause dans leurs procès.

Le juge en chef Lamer conclut que le pouvoir discrétionnaire de common law d'ordonner l'interdiction de publication doit être exercé dans les limites prescrites par les principes de la *Charte*. Puisque les ordonnances de non-publication restreignent nécessairement la liberté d'expression de tiers, il adapte la règle de common law qui s'appliquait avant l'entrée en vigueur de la *Charte* de façon à établir un juste équilibre entre le droit à la liberté d'expression et le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, d'une façon qui reflète l'essence du critère énoncé dans *R. c. Oakes*, [1986] 1 R.C.S. 103. À la page 878 de *Dagenais*, le juge en chef Lamer énonce le critère reformulé :

> Une ordonnance de non-publication ne doit être rendue que si :
>
> a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter le risque réel et important que le procès soit inéquitable, vu l'absence d'autres mesures raisonnables pouvant écarter ce risque;
>
> b) ses effets bénéfiques sont plus importants que ses effets préjudiciables sur la libre expression de ceux qui sont touchés par l'ordonnance. [Souligné dans l'original.]

Dans *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, la Cour modifie le critère de l'arrêt *Dagenais* dans le contexte de la question voisine de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire d'ordonner l'exclusion du public d'un procès en vertu du par. 486(1) du *Code criminel*, L.R.C. 1985, ch. C-46. Il s'agissait d'un appel d'une décision du juge du procès d'ordonner l'exclusion du public de la partie des procédures de détermination de la peine pour agression sexuelle et contacts sexuels portant sur les actes précis commis par l'accusé, au motif que cela éviterait un « préjudice indu » aux victimes et à l'accusé.

Le juge La Forest conclut que le par. 486(1) limite la liberté d'expression garantie à l'al. 2*b*) en créant un « pouvoir discrétionnaire permettant d'interdire au public et aux médias l'accès aux

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

however he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with the *Charter*. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

(a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;

(b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and

(c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in *R. v. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76, and its companion case *R. v. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77. In *Mentuck*, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(*d*) of the *Charter*. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the

tribunaux » (*Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 33). Il considère toutefois que l'atteinte peut être justifiée en vertu de l'article premier pourvu que le pouvoir discrétionnaire soit exercé conformément à la *Charte*. Donc l'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire en vertu du par. 486(1) du *Code criminel*, décrite par le juge La Forest au par. 69, concorde étroitement avec le critère de common law établi par *Dagenais* :

a) le juge doit envisager les solutions disponibles et se demander s'il existe d'autres mesures de rechange raisonnables et efficaces;

b) il doit se demander si l'ordonnance a une portée aussi limitée que possible; et

c) il doit comparer l'importance des objectifs de l'ordonnance et de ses effets probables avec l'importance de la publicité des procédures et l'activité d'expression qui sera restreinte, afin de veiller à ce que les effets positifs et négatifs de l'ordonnance soient proportionnels.

Appliquant cette analyse aux faits de l'espèce, le juge La Forest conclut que la preuve du risque de préjudice indu consiste principalement en la prétention de l'avocat du ministère public quant à la « nature délicate » des faits relatifs aux infractions et que cela ne suffit pas pour justifier l'atteinte à la liberté d'expression.

43 La Cour a récemment réexaminé la question des interdictions de publication prononcées par un tribunal en vertu de sa compétence de common law dans *R. c. Mentuck*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 442, 2001 CSC 76, et l'arrêt connexe *R. c. O.N.E.*, [2001] 3 R.C.S. 478, 2001 CSC 77. Dans *Mentuck*, le ministère public demandait l'interdiction de publication en vue de protéger l'identité de policiers banalisés et leurs méthodes d'enquête. L'accusé s'opposait à la demande en soutenant que l'interdiction porterait atteinte à son droit à un procès public et équitable protégé par l'al. 11*d*) de la *Charte*. Deux journaux intervenants s'opposaient aussi à la requête, en faisant valoir qu'elle porterait atteinte à leur droit à la liberté d'expression.

44 La Cour fait remarquer que *Dagenais* traite de la pondération de la liberté d'expression, d'une part, et du droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, d'autre part, tandis que dans l'affaire dont elle est saisie, le

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve any important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to

droit de l'accusé à un procès public et équitable tout autant que la liberté d'expression militent en faveur du rejet de la requête en interdiction de publication. Ces droits ont été soupesés avec l'intérêt de la bonne administration de la justice, en particulier la protection de la sécurité des policiers et le maintien de l'efficacité des opérations policières secrètes.

Malgré cette distinction, la Cour note que la méthode retenue dans *Dagenais* et *Nouveau-Brunswick* a pour objectif de garantir que le pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux d'ordonner des interdictions de publication n'est pas assujetti à une norme de conformité à la *Charte* moins exigeante que la norme applicable aux dispositions législatives. Elle vise cet objectif en incorporant l'essence de l'article premier de la *Charte* et le critère *Oakes* dans l'analyse applicable aux interdictions de publication. Comme le même objectif s'applique à l'affaire dont elle est saisie, la Cour adopte une méthode semblable à celle de *Dagenais*, mais en élargissant le critère énoncé dans cet arrêt (qui portait spécifiquement sur le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable) de manière à fournir un guide à l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire des tribunaux dans les requêtes en interdiction de publication, afin de protéger tout aspect important de la bonne administration de la justice. La Cour reformule le critère en ces termes (au par. 32) :

Une ordonnance de non-publication ne doit être rendue que si :

a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter le risque sérieux pour la bonne administration de la justice, vu l'absence d'autres mesures raisonnables pouvant écarter ce risque;

b) ses effets bénéfiques sont plus importants que ses effets préjudiciables sur les droits et les intérêts des parties et du public, notamment ses effets sur le droit à la libre expression, sur le droit de l'accusé à un procès public et équitable, et sur l'efficacité de l'administration de la justice.

La Cour souligne que dans le premier volet de l'analyse, trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous la notion de « nécessité ». En premier lieu, le risque en question doit être sérieux et bien étayé par la preuve. En deuxième lieu, l'expression « bonne administration de la justice » doit être interprétée

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

> The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to "reflec[t] the substance of the *Oakes* test", we cannot require that *Charter* rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the *Charter* be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another *Charter* right. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

Mentuck is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais*, *New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles.

judicieusement de façon à ne pas empêcher la divulgation d'un nombre excessif de renseignements. En troisième lieu, le critère exige non seulement que le juge qui prononce l'ordonnance détermine s'il existe des mesures de rechange raisonnables, mais aussi qu'il limite l'ordonnance autant que possible sans pour autant sacrifier la prévention du risque.

47 Au paragraphe 31, la Cour fait aussi l'importante observation que la bonne administration de la justice n'implique pas nécessairement des droits protégés par la *Charte*, et que la possibilité d'invoquer la *Charte* n'est pas une condition nécessaire à l'obtention d'une interdiction de publication :

> Elle [la règle de common law] peut s'appliquer aux ordonnances qui doivent parfois être rendues dans l'intérêt de l'administration de la justice, qui englobe davantage que le droit à un procès équitable. Comme on veut que le critère « reflète [. . .] l'essence du critère énoncé dans l'arrêt *Oakes* », nous ne pouvons pas exiger que ces ordonnances aient pour seul objectif légitime les droits garantis par la *Charte*, pas plus que nous exigeons que les actes gouvernementaux et les dispositions législatives contrevenant à la *Charte* soient justifiés exclusivement par la recherche d'un autre droit garanti par la *Charte*. [Je souligne.]

La Cour prévoit aussi que, dans les cas voulus, le critère de *Dagenais* pourrait être élargi encore davantage pour régir des requêtes en interdiction de publication mettant en jeu des questions autres que l'administration de la justice.

48 *Mentuck* illustre bien la souplesse de la méthode *Dagenais*. Comme elle a pour objet fondamental de garantir que le pouvoir discrétionnaire d'interdire l'accès du public aux tribunaux est exercé conformément aux principes de la *Charte*, à mon avis, le modèle *Dagenais* peut et devrait être adapté à la situation de la présente espèce, où la question centrale est l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal d'exclure des renseignements confidentiels au cours d'une procédure publique. Comme dans *Dagenais*, *Nouveau-Brunswick* et *Mentuck*, une ordonnance de confidentialité aura un effet négatif sur le droit à la liberté d'expression garanti par la *Charte*, de même que sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et, comme dans ces affaires, les tribunaux doivent veiller à ce que le

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

(2) The Rights and Interests of the Parties

49 The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

50 Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the *CEAA*, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence, or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: *M. (A.) v. Ryan*, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para. 84, *per* L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone

pouvoir discrétionnaire d'accorder l'ordonnance soit exercé conformément aux principes de la *Charte*. Toutefois, pour adapter le critère au contexte de la présente espèce, il faut d'abord définir les droits et intérêts particuliers qui entrent en jeu.

(2) Les droits et les intérêts des parties

L'objet immédiat de la demande d'ordonnance de confidentialité d'ÉACL a trait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Les renseignements en question appartiennent aux autorités chinoises. Si l'appelante divulguait les documents confidentiels, elle manquerait à ses obligations contractuelles et s'exposerait à une détérioration de sa position concurrentielle. Il ressort clairement des conclusions de fait du juge des requêtes qu'ÉACL est tenue, par ses intérêts commerciaux et par les droits de propriété de son client, de ne pas divulguer ces renseignements (par. 27), et que leur divulgation risque de nuire aux intérêts commerciaux de l'appelante (par. 23).

Indépendamment de cet intérêt commercial direct, en cas de refus de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, l'appelante devra, pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux, s'abstenir de produire les documents. Cela soulève l'importante question du contexte de la présentation de la demande. Comme le juge des requêtes et la Cour d'appel fédérale concluent tous deux que l'information contenue dans les documents confidentiels est pertinente pour les moyens de défense prévus par la *LCÉE*, le fait de ne pouvoir la produire nuit à la capacité de l'appelante de présenter une défense pleine et entière ou, plus généralement, au droit de l'appelante, en sa qualité de justiciable civile, de défendre sa cause. En ce sens, empêcher l'appelante de divulguer ces documents pour des raisons de confidentialité porte atteinte à son droit à un procès équitable. Même si en matière civile cela n'engage pas de droit protégé par la *Charte*, le droit à un procès équitable peut généralement être considéré comme un principe de justice fondamentale : *M. (A.) c. Ryan*, [1997] 1 R.C.S. 157, par. 84, le juge L'Heureux-Dubé (dissidente, mais non sur ce point). Le droit à un procès équitable intéresse directement l'appelante, mais le public a aussi un intérêt général à la protection du droit à un procès équitable. À vrai dire, le principe

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(*b*) of the *Charter*: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is seen to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice", guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick*, at para. 22.

(3) Adapting the *Dagenais* Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

général est que tout litige porté devant les tribunaux doit être tranché selon la norme du procès équitable. La légitimité du processus judiciaire n'exige pas moins. De même, les tribunaux ont intérêt à ce que toutes les preuves pertinentes leur soient présentées pour veiller à ce que justice soit faite.

51 Ainsi, les intérêts que favoriserait l'ordonnance de confidentialité seraient le maintien de relations commerciales et contractuelles, de même que le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable. Est lié à ce dernier droit l'intérêt du public et du judiciaire dans la recherche de la vérité et la solution juste des litiges civils.

52 Milite contre l'ordonnance de confidentialité le principe fondamental de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Ce principe est inextricablement lié à la liberté d'expression constitutionnalisée à l'al. 2*b*) de la *Charte* : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, par. 23. L'importance de l'accès du public et des médias aux tribunaux ne peut être sous-estimée puisque l'accès est le moyen grâce auquel le processus judiciaire est soumis à l'examen et à la critique. Comme il est essentiel à l'administration de la justice que justice soit faite et soit perçue comme l'étant, cet examen public est fondamental. Le principe de la publicité des procédures judiciaires a été décrit comme le « souffle même de la justice », la garantie de l'absence d'arbitraire dans l'administration de la justice : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, par. 22.

(3) Adaptation de l'analyse de *Dagenais* aux droits et intérêts des parties

53 Pour appliquer aux droits et intérêts en jeu en l'espèce l'analyse de *Dagenais* et des arrêts subséquents précités, il convient d'énoncer de la façon suivante les conditions applicables à une ordonnance de confidentialité dans un cas comme l'espèce :

Une ordonnance de confidentialité en vertu de la règle 151 ne doit être rendue que si :

a) elle est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le contexte d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres options raisonnables pour écarter ce risque;

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

b) ses effets bénéfiques, y compris ses effets sur le droit des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur la liberté d'expression qui, dans ce contexte, comprend l'intérêt du public dans la publicité des débats judiciaires.

54 As in *Mentuck*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well grounded in the evidence, and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

Comme dans *Mentuck*, j'ajouterais que trois éléments importants sont subsumés sous le premier volet de l'analyse. En premier lieu, le risque en cause doit être réel et important, en ce qu'il est bien étayé par la preuve et menace gravement l'intérêt commercial en question.

55 In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest", the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35, at para. 10, the open court rule only yields "where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

De plus, l'expression « intérêt commercial important » exige une clarification. Pour être qualifié d'« intérêt commercial important », l'intérêt en question ne doit pas se rapporter uniquement et spécifiquement à la partie qui demande l'ordonnance de confidentialité; il doit s'agir d'un intérêt qui peut se définir en termes d'intérêt public à la confidentialité. Par exemple, une entreprise privée ne pourrait simplement prétendre que l'existence d'un contrat donné ne devrait pas être divulguée parce que cela lui ferait perdre des occasions d'affaires, et que cela nuirait à ses intérêts commerciaux. Si toutefois, comme en l'espèce, la divulgation de renseignements doit entraîner un manquement à une entente de non-divulgation, on peut alors parler plus largement de l'intérêt commercial général dans la protection des renseignements confidentiels. Simplement, si aucun principe général n'entre en jeu, il ne peut y avoir d'« intérêt commercial important » pour les besoins de l'analyse. Ou, pour citer le juge Binnie dans *F.N. (Re)*, [2000] 1 R.C.S. 880, 2000 CSC 35, par. 10, la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne cède le pas que « dans les cas où le droit du public à la confidentialité l'emporte sur le droit du public à l'accessibilité » (je souligne).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest". It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second

Outre l'exigence susmentionnée, les tribunaux doivent déterminer avec prudence ce qui constitue un « intérêt commercial important ». Il faut rappeler qu'une ordonnance de confidentialité implique une atteinte à la liberté d'expression. Même si la pondération de l'intérêt commercial et de la liberté d'expression intervient à la deuxième étape

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 439.

Finally, the phrase "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

B. *Application of the Test to this Appeal*

(1) Necessity

At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself, or to its terms.

The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the Confidential Documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed

de l'analyse, les tribunaux doivent avoir pleinement conscience de l'importance fondamentale de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Voir généralement *Eli Lilly and Co. c. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (C.F. 1re inst.), p. 439, le juge Muldoon.

57 Enfin, l'expression « autres options raisonnables » oblige le juge non seulement à se demander s'il existe des mesures raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité, mais aussi à restreindre l'ordonnance autant qu'il est raisonnablement possible de le faire tout en préservant l'intérêt commercial en question.

B. *Application de l'analyse en l'espèce*

(1) Nécessité

58 À cette étape, il faut déterminer si la divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de l'appelante, et s'il existe d'autres solutions raisonnables que l'ordonnance elle-même, ou ses modalités.

59 L'intérêt commercial en jeu en l'espèce a trait à la préservation d'obligations contractuelles de confidentialité. L'appelante fait valoir qu'un préjudice irréparable sera causé à ses intérêts commerciaux si les documents confidentiels sont divulgués. À mon avis, la préservation de renseignements confidentiels est un intérêt commercial suffisamment important pour satisfaire au premier volet de l'analyse dès lors que certaines conditions relatives aux renseignements sont réunies.

60 Le juge Pelletier souligne que l'ordonnance sollicitée en l'espèce s'apparente à une ordonnance conservatoire en matière de brevets. Pour l'obtenir, le requérant doit démontrer que les renseignements en question ont toujours été traités comme des renseignements confidentiels et que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, il est raisonnable de penser que leur divulgation risquerait de compromettre ses droits exclusifs, commerciaux et scientifiques : *AB Hassle c. Canada (Ministre de la Santé nationale et du Bien-être social)*, [1998] A.C.F. nº 1850 (QL) (C.F. 1re inst.), par. 29-30. J'ajouterais à cela

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a "confidential nature" in that it has been "accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential" as opposed to "facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed" (para. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL's competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

62 The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the *CEAA* and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal's assertion (at para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant's case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

63 Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunged of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be

l'exigence proposée par le juge Robertson que les renseignements soient « de nature confidentielle » en ce qu'ils ont été « recueillis dans l'expectative raisonnable qu'ils resteront confidentiels », par opposition à « des faits qu'une partie à un litige voudrait garder confidentiels en obtenant le huis clos » (par. 14).

Le juge Pelletier constate que le critère établi dans *AB Hassle* est respecté puisque tant l'appelante que les autorités chinoises ont toujours considéré les renseignements comme confidentiels et que, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, leur divulgation risque de nuire aux intérêts commerciaux de l'appelante (par. 23). Le juge Robertson conclut lui aussi que les renseignements en question sont clairement confidentiels puisqu'il s'agit de renseignements commerciaux, uniformément reconnus comme étant confidentiels, qui présentent un intérêt pour les concurrents d'ÉACL (par. 16). Par conséquent, l'ordonnance est demandée afin de prévenir un risque sérieux de préjudice à un intérêt commercial important.

Le premier volet de l'analyse exige aussi l'examen d'options raisonnables autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité, et de la portée de l'ordonnance pour s'assurer qu'elle n'est pas trop vaste. Les deux jugements antérieurs en l'espèce concluent que les renseignements figurant dans les documents confidentiels sont pertinents pour les moyens de défense offerts à l'appelante en vertu de la *LCÉE*, et cette conclusion n'est pas portée en appel devant notre Cour. De plus, je suis d'accord avec la Cour d'appel lorsqu'elle affirme (au par. 99) que vu l'importance des documents pour le droit de présenter une défense pleine et entière, l'appelante est pratiquement forcée de les produire. Comme les renseignements sont nécessaires à la cause de l'appelante, il ne reste qu'à déterminer s'il existe d'autres options raisonnables pour communiquer les renseignements nécessaires sans divulguer de renseignements confidentiels.

Deux options autres que l'ordonnance de confidentialité sont mentionnées dans les décisions antérieures. Le juge des requêtes suggère de retrancher des documents les passages commercialement délicats et de produire les versions ainsi modifiées.

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expungement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary, and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal, in the sense that, at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese

La majorité en Cour d'appel estime que, outre cette possibilité d'épuration des documents, l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des documents confidentiels pourrait, dans une large mesure, compenser l'absence des originaux. Si l'une ou l'autre de ces deux options peut raisonnablement se substituer au dépôt des documents confidentiels aux termes d'une ordonnance de confidentialité, alors l'ordonnance n'est pas nécessaire et la requête ne franchit pas la première étape de l'analyse.

64 Il existe deux possibilités pour l'épuration des documents et, selon moi, elles comportent toutes deux des problèmes. La première serait que ÉACL retranche les renseignements confidentiels sans divulguer les éléments retranchés ni aux parties ni au tribunal. Toutefois, dans cette situation, la documentation déposée serait encore différente de celle utilisée pour les affidavits. Il ne faut pas perdre de vue que la requête découle de l'argument de Sierra Club selon lequel le tribunal ne devrait accorder que peu ou pas de poids aux résumés sans la présence des documents de base. Même si on pouvait totalement séparer les renseignements pertinents et les renseignements confidentiels, ce qui permettrait la divulgation de tous les renseignements sur lesquels se fondent les affidavits, l'appréciation de leur pertinence ne pourrait pas être mise à l'épreuve en contre-interrogatoire puisque la documentation retranchée ne serait pas disponible. Par conséquent, même dans le meilleur cas de figure, où l'on n'aurait qu'à retrancher les renseignements non pertinents, les parties se retrouveraient essentiellement dans la même situation que celle qui a donné lieu au pourvoi, en ce sens qu'au moins une partie des documents ayant servi à la préparation des affidavits en question ne serait pas mise à la disposition de Sierra Club.

65 De plus, je partage l'opinion du juge Robertson que ce meilleur cas de figure, où les renseignements pertinents et les renseignements confidentiels ne se recoupent pas, est une hypothèse non confirmée (par. 28). Même si les documents eux-mêmes n'ont pas été produits devant les tribunaux dans le cadre de la présente requête, parce qu'ils comprennent des milliers de pages de renseignements détaillés, cette hypothèse est au mieux optimiste. L'option de

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

66 The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are reasonably alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

67 A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits "may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

68 With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

(2) The Proportionality Stage

69 As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free

l'épuration serait en outre compliquée par le fait que les autorités chinoises exigent l'approbation préalable de toute demande de divulgation de renseignements de la part d'ÉACL.

La deuxième possibilité serait de mettre les documents supprimés à la disposition du tribunal et des parties en vertu d'une ordonnance de confidentialité plus restreinte. Bien que cela permettrait un accès public un peu plus large que ne le ferait l'ordonnance de confidentialité sollicitée, selon moi, cette restriction mineure à la requête n'est pas une option viable étant donné les difficultés liées à l'épuration dans les circonstances. Il s'agit de savoir s'il y a d'autres options raisonnables et non d'adopter l'option qui soit absolument la moins restrictive. Avec égards, j'estime que l'épuration des documents confidentiels serait une solution virtuellement impraticable et inefficace qui n'est pas raisonnable dans les circonstances.

Une deuxième option autre que l'ordonnance de confidentialité serait, selon le juge Evans, l'inclusion dans les affidavits d'un résumé des documents confidentiels pour « dans une large mesure, compenser [leur] absence » (par. 103). Il ne semble toutefois envisager ce fait qu'à titre de facteur à considérer dans la pondération des divers intérêts en cause. Je conviens qu'à cette étape liminaire, se fonder uniquement sur les résumés en connaissant l'intention de Sierra Club de plaider leur faiblesse ou l'absence de valeur probante, ne semble pas être une « autre option raisonnable » à la communication aux parties des documents de base.

Vu les facteurs susmentionnés, je conclus que l'ordonnance de confidentialité est nécessaire en ce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels ferait courir un risque sérieux à un intérêt commercial important de l'appelante, et qu'il n'existe pas d'autres options raisonnables.

(2) L'étape de la proportionnalité

Comme on le mentionne plus haut, à cette étape, les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, y compris ses effets sur le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable, doivent être pondérés avec ses effets préjudiciables, y compris ses effets sur le droit

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

expression, which in turn is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

(a) *Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order*

As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case, or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a *Charter* right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: *Ryan*, *supra*, at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected *Charter* right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: *Mentuck*, *supra*, at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the *CEAA* is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and

à la liberté d'expression, qui à son tour est lié au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires. Cette pondération déterminera finalement s'il y a lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

a) *Les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité*

70 Comme nous l'avons vu, le principal intérêt qui serait promu par l'ordonnance de confidentialité est l'intérêt du public à la protection du droit du justiciable civil de faire valoir sa cause ou, de façon plus générale, du droit à un procès équitable. Puisque l'appelante l'invoque en l'espèce pour protéger ses intérêts commerciaux et non son droit à la liberté, le droit à un procès équitable dans ce contexte n'est pas un droit visé par la *Charte*; toutefois, le droit à un procès équitable pour tous les justiciables a été reconnu comme un principe de justice fondamentale : *Ryan*, précité, par. 84. Il y a lieu de rappeler qu'il y a des circonstances où, en l'absence de violation d'un droit garanti par la *Charte*, la bonne administration de la justice exige une ordonnance de confidentialité : *Mentuck*, précité, par. 31. En l'espèce, les effets bénéfiques d'une telle ordonnance sur l'administration de la justice tiennent à la capacité de l'appelante de soutenir sa cause, dans le cadre du droit plus large à un procès équitable.

71 Les documents confidentiels ont été jugés pertinents en ce qui a trait aux moyens de défense que l'appelante pourrait invoquer s'il est jugé que la *LCÉE* s'applique à l'opération attaquée et, comme nous l'avons vu, l'appelante ne peut communiquer les documents sans risque sérieux pour ses intérêts commerciaux. De ce fait, il existe un risque bien réel que, sans l'ordonnance de confidentialité, la capacité de l'appelante à mener à bien sa défense soit gravement réduite. Je conclus par conséquent que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait d'importants effets bénéfiques pour le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable.

72 En plus des effets bénéfiques pour le droit à un procès équitable, l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait aussi des incidences favorables sur d'autres droits et intérêts importants. En premier lieu, comme je l'exposerai plus en détail ci-après, l'ordonnance de confidentialité permettrait aux parties ainsi qu'au

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

73 Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

(b) *Deleterious Effects of the Confidentiality Order*

74 Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(*b*) *Charter* right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: *New Brunswick*, *supra*, at paras. 22-23. Although as a general principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the particular deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

75 Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good; (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit; and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R.

tribunal d'avoir accès aux documents confidentiels, et permettrait la tenue d'un contre-interrogatoire fondé sur leur contenu. En facilitant l'accès aux documents pertinents dans une procédure judiciaire, l'ordonnance sollicitée favoriserait la recherche de la vérité, qui est une valeur fondamentale sous-tendant la liberté d'expression.

En deuxième lieu, je suis d'accord avec l'observation du juge Robertson selon laquelle puisque les documents confidentiels contiennent des renseignements techniques détaillés touchant la construction et la conception d'une installation nucléaire, il peut être nécessaire, dans l'intérêt public, d'empêcher que ces renseignements tombent dans le domaine public (par. 44). Même si le contenu exact des documents demeure un mystère, il est évident qu'ils comprennent des détails techniques d'une installation nucléaire et il peut bien y avoir un important intérêt de sécurité publique à préserver la confidentialité de ces renseignements.

b) *Les effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité*

Une ordonnance de confidentialité aurait un effet préjudiciable sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, puisqu'elle priverait le public de l'accès au contenu des documents confidentiels. Comme on le dit plus haut, le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires est inextricablement lié au droit à la liberté d'expression protégé par l'al. 2*b*) de la *Charte*, et la vigilance du public envers les tribunaux est un aspect fondamental de l'administration de la justice : *Nouveau-Brunswick*, précité, par. 22-23. Même si, à titre de principe général, l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires ne peut être sous-estimée, il faut examiner, dans le contexte de l'espèce, les effets préjudiciables particuliers que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait sur la liberté d'expression.

Les valeurs fondamentales qui sous-tendent la liberté d'expression sont (1) la recherche de la vérité et du bien commun; (2) l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement des pensées et des idées; et (3) la participation de tous au processus politique : *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 R.C.S. 927, p. 976; *R. c. Keegstra*, [1990]

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

927, at p. 976; *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at pp. 762-64, *per* Dickson C.J. *Charter* jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(*b*) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the *Charter*: *Keegstra*, at pp. 760-61. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to *Charter* principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at pp. 1357-58, *per* Wilson J. Clearly the confidentiality order, by denying public and media access to documents relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be promoted by the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination. In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or

3 R.C.S. 697, p. 762-764, le juge en chef Dickson. La jurisprudence de la *Charte* établit que plus l'expression en cause est au cœur de ces valeurs fondamentales, plus il est difficile de justifier, en vertu de l'article premier de la *Charte*, une atteinte à l'al. 2*b*) à son égard : *Keegstra*, p. 760-761. Comme l'objectif principal en l'espèce est d'exercer un pouvoir discrétionnaire dans le respect des principes de la *Charte*, l'examen des effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur la liberté d'expression devrait comprendre une appréciation des effets qu'elle aurait sur les trois valeurs fondamentales. Plus l'ordonnance de confidentialité porte préjudice à ces valeurs, plus il est difficile de la justifier. Inversement, des effets mineurs sur les valeurs fondamentales rendent l'ordonnance de confidentialité plus facile à justifier.

76 La recherche de la vérité est non seulement au cœur de la liberté d'expression, elle est aussi reconnue comme un objectif fondamental de la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires, puisque l'examen public des témoins favorise l'efficacité du processus de présentation de la preuve : *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1357-1358, le juge Wilson. À l'évidence, en enlevant au public et aux médias l'accès aux documents invoqués dans les procédures, l'ordonnance de confidentialité nuirait jusqu'à un certain point à la recherche de la vérité. L'ordonnance n'exclurait pas le public de la salle d'audience, mais le public et les médias n'auraient pas accès aux documents pertinents quant à la présentation de la preuve.

77 Toutefois, comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, la recherche de la vérité peut jusqu'à un certain point être favorisée par l'ordonnance de confidentialité. La présente requête résulte de l'argument de Sierra Club selon lequel il doit avoir accès aux documents confidentiels pour vérifier l'exactitude de la déposition de M. Pang. Si l'ordonnance est refusée, le scénario le plus probable est que l'appelante s'abstiendra de déposer les documents, avec la conséquence fâcheuse que des preuves qui peuvent être pertinentes ne seront pas portées à la connaissance de Sierra Club ou du tribunal. Par conséquent, Sierra Club ne sera pas en mesure de vérifier complètement l'exactitude de la preuve de M. Pang en contre-

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

78 As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would in turn assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

79 In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

80 The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focusses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would

interrogatoire. De plus, le tribunal ne bénéficiera pas du contre-interrogatoire ou de cette preuve documentaire, et il lui faudra tirer des conclusions fondées sur un dossier de preuve incomplet. Cela nuira manifestement à la recherche de la vérité en l'espèce.

De plus, il importe de rappeler que l'ordonnance de confidentialité ne restreindrait l'accès qu'à un nombre relativement peu élevé de documents hautement techniques. La nature de ces documents est telle que le public en général est peu susceptible d'en comprendre le contenu, de sorte qu'ils contribueraient peu à l'intérêt du public à la recherche de la vérité en l'espèce. Toutefois, dans les mains des parties et de leurs experts respectifs, les documents peuvent être très utiles pour apprécier la conformité du processus d'évaluation environnementale chinois, ce qui devrait aussi aider le tribunal à tirer des conclusions de fait exactes. À mon avis, compte tenu de leur nature, la production des documents confidentiels en vertu de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sollicitée favoriserait mieux l'importante valeur de la recherche de la vérité, qui sous-tend à la fois la liberté d'expression et la publicité des débats judiciaires, que ne le ferait le rejet de la demande qui aurait pour effet d'empêcher les parties et le tribunal de se fonder sur les documents au cours de l'instance.

De plus, aux termes de l'ordonnance demandée, les seules restrictions imposées à l'égard de ces documents ont trait à leur distribution publique. Les documents confidentiels seraient mis à la disposition du tribunal et des parties, et il n'y aurait pas d'entrave à l'accès du public aux procédures. À ce titre, l'ordonnance représente une atteinte relativement minime à la règle de la publicité des débats judiciaires et elle n'aurait donc pas d'effets préjudiciables importants sur ce principe.

La deuxième valeur fondamentale sous-jacente à la liberté d'expression, la promotion de l'épanouissement personnel par le libre développement de la pensée et des idées, est centrée sur l'expression individuelle et n'est donc pas étroitement liée au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires qui concerne l'expression institutionnelle. Même

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

si l'ordonnance de confidentialité devait restreindre l'accès individuel à certains renseignements susceptibles d'intéresser quelqu'un, j'estime que cette valeur ne serait pas touchée de manière significative.

The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at p. 1339:

> It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

81 La troisième valeur fondamentale, la libre participation au processus politique, joue un rôle primordial dans le pourvoi puisque la publicité des débats judiciaires est un aspect fondamental de la société démocratique. Ce lien est souligné par le juge Cory dans *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1339 :

> On voit que la liberté d'expression est d'une importance fondamentale dans une société démocratique. Il est également essentiel dans une démocratie et fondamental pour la primauté du droit que la transparence du fonctionnement des tribunaux soit perçue comme telle. La presse doit être libre de commenter les procédures judiciaires pour que, dans les faits, chacun puisse constater que les tribunaux fonctionnent publiquement sous les regards pénétrants du public.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

Même si on ne peut douter de l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires dans une société démocratique, les décisions antérieures divergent sur la question de savoir si le poids à accorder au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires devrait varier en fonction de la nature de la procédure.

On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

82 Sur ce point, le juge Robertson estime que la nature de l'affaire et le degré d'intérêt des médias sont des considérations dénuées de pertinence. Le juge Evans estime quant à lui que le juge des requêtes a eu raison de tenir compte du fait que la demande de contrôle judiciaire suscite beaucoup d'intérêt de la part du public et des médias. À mon avis, même si la nature publique de l'affaire peut être un facteur susceptible de renforcer l'importance de la publicité des débats judiciaires dans une espèce particulière, le degré d'intérêt des médias ne devrait pas être considéré comme facteur indépendant.

Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will always be engaged where the open court

83 Puisque les affaires concernant des institutions publiques ont généralement un lien plus étroit avec la valeur fondamentale de la participation du public au processus politique, la nature publique d'une instance devrait être prise en considération dans l'évaluation du bien-fondé d'une ordonnance de confidentialité. Il importe de noter que cette valeur

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the substance of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below where he stated, at para. 87:

> While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

84 This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nuclear energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the *CEAA*. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

85 However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish public interest, from media interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public nature of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case.

fondamentale sera toujours engagée lorsque sera mis en cause le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, vu l'importance de la transparence judiciaire dans une société démocratique. Toutefois, le lien entre la publicité des débats judiciaires et la participation du public dans le processus politique s'accentue lorsque le processus politique est également engagé par la substance de la procédure. Sous ce rapport, je suis d'accord avec ce que dit le juge Evans (au par. 87) :

> Bien que tous les litiges soient importants pour les parties, et qu'il en va de l'intérêt du public que les affaires soumises aux tribunaux soient traitées de façon équitable et appropriée, certaines affaires soulèvent des questions qui transcendent les intérêts immédiats des parties ainsi que l'intérêt du public en général dans la bonne administration de la justice, et qui ont une signification beaucoup plus grande pour le public.

La requête est liée à une demande de contrôle judiciaire d'une décision du gouvernement de financer un projet d'énergie nucléaire. La demande est clairement de nature publique, puisqu'elle a trait à la distribution de fonds publics en rapport avec une question dont l'intérêt public a été démontré. De plus, comme le souligne le juge Evans, la transparence du processus et la participation du public ont une importance fondamentale sous le régime de la *LCÉE*. En effet, par leur nature même, les questions environnementales ont une portée publique considérable, et la transparence des débats judiciaires sur les questions environnementales mérite généralement un degré élevé de protection. À cet égard, je suis d'accord avec le juge Evans pour conclure que l'intérêt public est en l'espèce plus engagé que s'il s'agissait d'un litige entre personnes privées à l'égard d'intérêts purement privés.

J'estime toutefois avec égards que, dans la mesure où il se fonde sur l'intérêt des médias comme indice de l'intérêt du public, le juge Evans fait erreur. À mon avis, il est important d'établir une distinction entre l'intérêt du public et l'intérêt des médias et, comme le juge Robertson, je note que la couverture médiatique ne peut être considérée comme une mesure impartiale de l'intérêt public. C'est la nature publique de l'instance qui accentue le besoin de transparence, et cette nature publique ne se reflète

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in *Keegstra*, *supra*, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values, "we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity".

Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application as a whole is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

> Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at pp. 1353-54:

> One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to pre-judge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

pas nécessairement dans le désir des médias d'examiner les faits de l'affaire. Je réitère l'avertissement donné par le juge en chef Dickson dans *Keegstra*, précité, p. 760, où il dit que même si l'expression en cause doit être examinée dans ses rapports avec les valeurs fondamentales, « nous devons veiller à ne pas juger l'expression en fonction de sa popularité ».

86

Même si l'intérêt du public à la publicité de la demande de contrôle judiciaire dans son ensemble est important, à mon avis, il importe tout autant de prendre en compte la nature et la portée des renseignements visés par l'ordonnance demandée, lorsqu'il s'agit d'apprécier le poids de l'intérêt public. Avec égards, le juge des requêtes a commis une erreur en ne tenant pas compte de la portée limitée de l'ordonnance dans son appréciation de l'intérêt du public à la communication et en accordant donc un poids excessif à ce facteur. Sous ce rapport, je ne partage pas la conclusion suivante du juge Evans (au par. 97) :

> Par conséquent, on ne peut dire qu'après que le juge des requêtes eut examiné la nature de ce litige et évalué l'importance de l'intérêt du public à la publicité des procédures, il aurait dans les circonstances accordé trop d'importance à ce facteur, même si la confidentialité n'est demandée que pour trois documents parmi la montagne de documents déposés en l'instance et que leur contenu dépasse probablement les connaissances de ceux qui n'ont pas l'expertise technique nécessaire.

La publicité des débats judiciaires est un principe fondamentalement important, surtout lorsque la substance de la procédure est de nature publique. Cela ne libère toutefois aucunement de l'obligation d'apprécier le poids à accorder à ce principe en fonction des limites particulières qu'imposerait l'ordonnance de confidentialité à la publicité des débats. Comme le dit le juge Wilson dans *Edmonton Journal*, précité, p. 1353-1354 :

> Une chose semble claire et c'est qu'il ne faut pas évaluer une valeur selon la méthode générale et l'autre valeur en conflit avec elle selon la méthode contextuelle. Agir ainsi pourrait fort bien revenir à préjuger de l'issue du litige en donnant à la valeur examinée de manière générale plus d'importance que ne l'exige le contexte de l'affaire.

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

87 In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

88 In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the *CEAA*, in which case the Confidential Documents would be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations, or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the *CEAA*, or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the *CEAA* are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive information released into the public domain, with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

89 In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the *CEAA*, it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on either the public interest in freedom of expression or the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the

À mon avis, il importe de reconnaître que, malgré l'intérêt significatif que porte le public à ces procédures, l'ordonnance demandée n'entraverait que légèrement la publicité de la demande de contrôle judiciaire. La portée étroite de l'ordonnance associée à la nature hautement technique des documents confidentiels tempère considérablement les effets préjudiciables que l'ordonnance de confidentialité pourrait avoir sur l'intérêt du public à la publicité des débats judiciaires.

Pour traiter des effets qu'aurait l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur la liberté d'expression, il faut aussi se rappeler qu'il se peut que l'appelante n'ait pas à soulever de moyens de défense visés par la *LCÉE*, auquel cas les documents confidentiels perdraient leur pertinence et la liberté d'expression ne serait pas touchée par l'ordonnance. Toutefois, puisque l'utilité des documents confidentiels ne sera pas déterminée avant un certain temps, l'appelante n'aurait plus, en l'absence d'ordonnance de confidentialité, que le choix entre soit produire les documents en violation de ses obligations, soit les retenir dans l'espoir de ne pas avoir à présenter de défense en vertu de la *LCÉE* ou de pouvoir assurer effectivement sa défense sans les documents pertinents. Si elle opte pour le premier choix et que le tribunal conclut par la suite que les moyens de défense visés par la *LCÉE* ne sont pas applicables, l'appelante aura subi le préjudice de voir ses renseignements confidentiels et délicats tomber dans le domaine public sans que le public n'en tire d'avantage correspondant. Même si sa réalisation est loin d'être certaine, la possibilité d'un tel scénario milite également en faveur de l'ordonnance sollicitée.

En arrivant à cette conclusion, je note que si l'appelante n'a pas à invoquer les moyens de défense pertinents en vertu de la *LCÉE*, il est également vrai que son droit à un procès équitable ne sera pas entravé même en cas de refus de l'ordonnance de confidentialité. Je ne retiens toutefois pas cela comme facteur militant contre l'ordonnance parce que, si elle est accordée et que les documents confidentiels ne sont pas nécessaires, il n'y aura alors aucun effet préjudiciable ni sur l'intérêt du public à la liberté d'expression ni sur les droits commerciaux ou le droit de l'appelante à un procès

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

VII. Conclusion

In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the *CEAA*, there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under Rule 151 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*.

équitable. Cette issue neutre contraste avec le scénario susmentionné où il y a refus de l'ordonnance et possibilité d'atteinte aux droits commerciaux de l'appelante sans avantage correspondant pour le public. Par conséquent, le fait que les documents confidentiels puissent ne pas être nécessaires est un facteur en faveur de l'ordonnance de confidentialité.

90 En résumé, les valeurs centrales de la liberté d'expression que sont la recherche de la vérité et la promotion d'un processus politique ouvert sont très étroitement liées au principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires, et sont les plus touchées par une ordonnance limitant cette publicité. Toutefois, dans le contexte en l'espèce, l'ordonnance de confidentialité n'entraverait que légèrement la poursuite de ces valeurs, et pourrait même les favoriser à certains égards. À ce titre, l'ordonnance n'aurait pas d'effets préjudiciables importants sur la liberté d'expression.

VII. Conclusion

91 Dans la pondération des divers droits et intérêts en jeu, je note que l'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques importants sur le droit de l'appelante à un procès équitable et sur la liberté d'expression. D'autre part, les effets préjudiciables de l'ordonnance de confidentialité sur le principe de la publicité des débats judiciaires et la liberté d'expression seraient minimes. En outre, si l'ordonnance est refusée et qu'au cours du contrôle judiciaire l'appelante n'est pas amenée à invoquer les moyens de défense prévus dans la *LCÉE*, il se peut qu'elle subisse le préjudice d'avoir communiqué des renseignements confidentiels en violation de ses obligations sans avantage correspondant pour le droit du public à la liberté d'expression. Je conclus donc que les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, et qu'il y a lieu d'accorder l'ordonnance.

92 Je suis donc d'avis d'accueillir le pourvoi avec dépens devant toutes les cours, d'annuler l'arrêt de la Cour d'appel fédérale, et d'accorder l'ordonnance de confidentialité selon les modalités demandées par l'appelante en vertu de la règle 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale (1998)*.

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

Appeal allowed with costs.

Solicitors for the appellant: Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.

Solicitors for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada: Timothy J. Howard, Vancouver; Franklin S. Gertler, Montréal.

Solicitor for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada: The Deputy Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.

Pourvoi accueilli avec dépens.

Procureurs de l'appelante : Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.

Procureurs de l'intimé Sierra Club du Canada : Timothy J. Howard, Vancouver; Franklin S. Gertler, Montréal.

Procureur des intimés le ministre des Finances du Canada, le ministre des Affaires étrangères du Canada, le ministre du Commerce international du Canada et le procureur général du Canada : Le sous-procureur général du Canada, Ottawa.

2002 SCC 41 (CanLII)

TAB 10

CITATION: Index Energy Mills Road Corporation (Re), 2017 ONSC 4944
COURT FILE NO.: CV-17-580840-00CL
DATE: 2017-08-23

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT INDEX ENERGY MILLS ROAD CORPORATION

BEFORE: Regional Senior Justice G.B. Morawetz

COUNSEL: *Shane Kukulowicz,* for the Index Energy Mills Road Corporation

Brian Empey and *Melaney Wagner,* for Grant Thornton Ltd., Proposed Monitor

Grant Moffat, for the National Bank of Canada, as Agent for a Syndicate of Lenders

David Bish, for DIP Lender (Index Equity US LLC), Index Equity Sweden AB and Index Residence AB

HEARD and ENDORSED: August 16, 2017
TYPED REASONS RELEASED: August 23, 2017

ENDORSEMENT

Overview

[1] This application is brought by Index Energy Mills Road Corporation ("Index Energy Ajax" or the "Applicant") for an order (the "Initial Order") pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA").

[2] In addition to requesting a stay of proceedings and authorization to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of its property, the Applicant also requests that Grant Thornton Ltd. ("GTL") be appointed as monitor (the "Monitor"); authorization for the Applicant to borrow $5 million pursuant to a credit facility (the "DIP Facility") as interim financing from Index Equity US LLC ("Index US"), in such capacity, (the "DIP Lender") with a maximum amount of $1.6 million being advanced by the DIP Lender prior to the CCAA comeback hearing (the "Comeback Hearing"); and a sealing order with respect to certain confidential information described in the pre-filing report of the Monitor (the "Pre-Filing Report").

2017 ONSC 4944 (CanLII)

[3] Index Energy Ajax owns and operates an electrical co-generation facility located in Ajax, Ontario that generates electricity by burning wood waste from the construction industry to produce steam to drive turbine generators (the "Biomass Facility").

[4] Index Energy Ajax has encountered difficulties in retrofitting the Biomass Facility and energy output has been lower and operational costs higher than anticipated. Index Energy Ajax has also been engaged in litigation with its former engineering, procurement and construction contractor, HMI Construction Inc. ("HMI"), and has also been forced to deal with numerous liens arising from the construction associated with the Biomass Facility, including a lien claim of approximately $31.3 million registered by HMI (the "HMI Lien Claim"). The sum of $7,053,890 plus HST has been paid into court as an agreed upon holdback (the "Holdback Funds").

[5] Index Energy Ajax is in default on various obligations to a syndicate of lenders comprised of National Bank of Canada, Canadian Western Bank, Laurentian Bank of Canada and Business Development Bank of Canada (collectively, the "Syndicate"). National Bank of Canada is the agent of the Syndicate (in that capacity, the "Agent"). The Syndicate has made demand for payment of amounts in excess of $45 million. Mr. Rickard Haraldsson, a Director of Index Energy Ajax has stated in his affidavit that Index Energy Ajax is insolvent.

[6] The Applicant is of the view that its underlying business remains strong, but that it ultimately requires a restructuring to inject new funds into its operations to address the various deficiencies in the Biomass Facility. Accordingly, Index Energy Ajax states that it requires protection under the CCAA to allow it a period of time to develop and implement a sales and investment solicitation process ("SISP") and to access interim financing on a priority basis to preserve value for all stakeholders and ensure its viability as a going concern.

[7] The Applicant has advised that it is currently in negotiations with Index US and the Syndicate to reach agreement on terms of a mutually acceptable SISP, which would include a stalking-horse bid, and to allow further advances under the DIP Facility beyond the initial permitted draw amount.

The Facts

[8] The facts have been set out in detail in the affidavit of Rickard Haraldsson (the "Haraldsson Affidavit").

[9] Index Energy Ajax was incorporated pursuant to the laws of Ontario on November 7, 2006. Its registered office is located at 170 Mills Road, Ajax, Ontario.

[10] Index Energy Ajax is owned by three shareholders. Index Energy Sweden is the owner of 70% of the common shares, R. Andrews Investment Company, LLC ("R. Andrews") is the owner of 10% of the common shares and Jacqueline Kerr ("J. Kerr") is the owner of 20% of the common shares.

2017 ONSC 4944 (CanLII)

[11] Index Energy Ajax was incorporated to retrofit the existing energy plant located in Ajax (the "Property") to become the Biomass Facility.

[12] Index Energy Ajax entered into a feed-in-tariff with the Ontario Power Authority in 2010 (the "FIT Contract"). In order to retrofit the Biomass Facility, Index Energy Ajax entered into a construction contract with HMI in 2012 (the "EPC Contract"). Since 2015, there has been substantial litigation between Index Energy Ajax and HMI with regard to the HMI Lien Claim.

[13] In March 2017 Index Energy Ajax paid an agreed holdback amount of $7,053,890 plus HST (the "Holdback Funds") into court and all subcontractor lien claims were vacated from title to the Property

Index Energy Ajax's Creditors

[14] In 2013, Index Energy Ajax entered into a credit agreement (the "Syndicate Credit Agreement") with the Syndicate. Pursuant to the Syndicate Credit Agreement, the Syndicate agreed to provide a non-revolving construction facility in the maximum sum of $60 million and a non-revolving term facility once the retrofit was satisfactorily completed (collectively, the "Syndicate Facilities").

[15] Index Energy Ajax has been in default of the Syndicate Agreement since at least May 2015.

[16] On January 18, 2017, the Agent sent Index Energy Ajax a demand letter (the "Demand Letter") demanding full payment of all amounts owing to the Syndicate under the Syndicate Facilities, which at that date totaled $49,427,871.94, with interest.

[17] Other creditors include Index Residence for an amount in excess of $102 million and trade creditors for an amount in excess of $4 million.

[18] The proposed monitor has filed a pre-filing report which details the efforts Index Energy Ajax has taken, with the assistance of the Monitor, to solicit an appropriate DIP financier. After consulting with Index Sweden and Index Residence, one party was selected as a potential DIP lender, however, after protracted negotiations, the parties were not able to come to terms. As an alternative, Index US has agreed to act as DIP Lender with the consent of the Syndicate, on terms more favourable to Index Energy Ajax than those offered by this potential lender. Details are provided in the Pre-Filing Report at paragraphs 46-53 and in the Haraldsson Affidavit at paragraph 94.

[19] The DIP Lender has agreed to provide Index Energy Ajax with a DIP Facility in order for Index Energy Ajax to meet its immediate funding requirements.

[20] The DIP Facility, extended by the DIP Lender is the maximum amount of $5 million (the "Principal Amount") with a maximum amount of $1.6 million being advanced by the DIP Lender prior to the CCAA Comeback Hearing pursuant to the DIP Credit Agreement.

2017 ONSC 4944 (CanLII)

[21] The DIP Facility requires that the DIP Lender receive a court ordered priority charge over the assets of Index Energy Ajax (the "DIP Lender's Charge") which Charge will attach to all of the Index Energy Ajax Property other than the Holdback Funds, to rank ahead of all secured and unsecured creditors of Index Energy Ajax other than Caterpillar Financial Services Limited, who has a specific security interest over a construction loader (the "Loader").

2017 ONSC 4944 (CanLII)

The Law

[22] The CCAA applies to a "debtor company" with total claims against it for more than $5 million. I am satisfied that Index Energy Ajax is such a "debtor company" and is entitled to relief under the CCAA.

[23] I am also satisfied that Index Energy Ajax is insolvent. Index Energy Ajax's liabilities exceed the current value of its assets and Index Energy Ajax has insufficient funds to pay its debts and has ceased to meet its obligations as they become due.

[24] I am also satisfied that Index Energy Ajax has met the other threshold requirements include the filing of cash-flow statements required by Section 10 of the CCAA. Further, since the chief place of business of Index Energy Ajax is Ajax, Ontario, this court has jurisdiction to hear this application.

[25] I am also satisfied that it is both necessary and appropriate to grant a stay of proceedings to Index Energy Ajax. The stay is crucial as it preserves the status quo among the stakeholders while Index Energy Ajax stabilizes operations and considers its alternatives. Index Energy Ajax has indicated that it wishes to embark on a SISP and a stay is necessary to allow the time for the SISP to unfold.

[26] Index Energy Ajax also seeks authorization to pay pre-filing expenses up to the amount of $450,000 if it is determined, in consultation with the Monitor, to be necessary for the continued operation of the business or preservation of the Property.

[27] Index Energy Ajax takes the position that the continued availability of supplies is necessary to ensure a successful SISP and ultimate emergence of a restructured business in some form. Mr. Haraldsson states that a number of the suppliers to Index Energy Ajax are vital to its ongoing operations and it may be necessary for them to be paid all or a portion of the obligations arising prior to the date of the Initial Oder to ensure their survival and their continued ability to provide supplies to Index Energy Ajax.

[28] Mr. Haraldsson states that the operation of the Biomass Facility, and the maximizing of value for the stakeholders would be materially prejudiced if the required suppliers ceased to carry on business and ceased to supply.

[29] Accordingly, Index Energy Ajax seeks authority to pay such amounts as they are required, including amounts owing prior to the date of the Initial Order, to ensure continued supply and successful restructuring.

[30] There is authority to authorize an applicant to pay certain amounts, including pre-filing amounts to suppliers where the applicant is not seeking a charge in respect of critical suppliers (see: *Cinram International Inc.*, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. SCJ [Comm. List]), at para. 68 of Schedule "C", ("Cinram") and *Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc.*, 2009 CanLII 2493 (Ont. SCJ [Comm. List], at para. 21 ("Smufit-Stone")).

[31] In granting this authority, the courts have considered a number of factors, including:

(a) whether the goods and services are integral to the business of the applicants;

(b) the applicants dependency on the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;

(c) the fact that no payments would be made with the consent of the monitor;

(d) the monitor's support and willingness to work with the applicant to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized;

(e) whether the applicant has sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet its needs; and

(f) the effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if it were unable to make pre-filing payments to their critical suppliers.

[32] In these circumstances, I have been persuaded that it is both necessary and appropriate to provide the requested authorization to Index Energy Ajax.

[33] Pursuant to section 11.7 of the CCAA, the court is required to appoint a monitor. GTL has consented to its appointment as Monitor in this case and I am satisfied that it is appropriate to appoint GTL as Monitor.

[34] The proposed Initial Order provides for the following charges, in the following priority:

(a) First - the Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of $1 million);

(b) Second – the DIP Lender's Charge; and

(c) Third – the Director's Charge (to the maximum amount of $250,000).

[35] The Applicant proposes that the Administration Charge rank in priority to the DIP Lender's Charge. The Applicant proposes that the Charge attach to all of its Property, other than the Holdback Funds, to the extent they are valid claims to rank in priority to all secured and unsecured creditors of the Applicant, other than Caterpillar in relation to the Loader or the proceeds thereof.

[36] With respect to the DIP Facility, Index Energy Ajax is seeking approval of a $5 million DIP Facility. The DIP Facility would be secured by a DIP Lender's Charge, which would attach

2017 ONSC 4944 (CanLII)

to all of the Applicant's Property, other than the Holdback Funds, to rank ahead of all secured and unsecured creditors of the Applicant, other than Caterpillar in relation to the Loader or the proceeds thereof and subject only to the Administration Charge.

[37] As previously noted, the granting of the DIP Lender's Charge is condition precedent under the DIP Credit Agreement and I am satisfied that it is an integral part of the negotiating consideration of the DIP Facility.

[38] The court has jurisdiction to grant a priority DIP financing charge pursuant to section 11.2 of the CCAA.

[39] Subsection 11.2(4) of the CCAA sets out the factors to be considered by the court in determining whether to grant a priority DIP financing charge. The factors are not exhaustive and in *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)*, [2009] O.J. No. 4286 (SCJ) ("Canwest"), Pepall J. (as she then was) stressed the importance of meeting the following three criteria:

(a) whether notice has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the security of the charge;

(b) whether the amount to be granted under the DIP financing is appropriate and required having regard to the debtor's cash-flow statement; and

(c) whether the DIP charge secures an obligation that existed before the order was made (which it should not).

[40] In this case, I have concluded that the proposed DIP Lender's Charge satisfies the relevant criteria and should be granted. In arriving at this conclusion, I have considered the following:

(i) The secured creditors who would be primed by the proposed DIP Lender's Charge, namely the Syndicate, Index Residence and HMI were given notice of the proposed DIP Lender's Charge. Caterpillar, the secured creditor who will not be primed, was not given notice;

(ii) The maximum amount of the DIP Facility is appropriate based on the anticipated cash requirements, as reflected in the cash-flow projections prepared with the assistance of GTL. The amount advanced under the DIP Facility is limited to $1.6 million until the Comeback Hearing, when more comprehensive service will have occurred;

(iii) Management of Index Energy Ajax's business and affairs will have the benefit of additional oversight and consultation provided by the Monitor;

(iv) It is conceivable that the DIP Facility will enhance the value expected to be available for all stakeholders.

2017 ONSC 4944 (CanLII)

[41] The Proposed Initial Order, contemplates the indemnification of the Applicant's directors and officers, the creation of a Directors' Charge and a related stay of proceedings in respect of claims against the directors and officers. The statutory authority for the granting of this relief is found in sections 11.03 and 11.51 of the CCAA.

[42] I am satisfied that it is appropriate to extend coverage to the directors and officers and that it is necessary to grant the requested Charge as Index Energy Ajax does not have any directors' and officers' insurance. This relief is accordingly granted.

[43] The Pre-Filing Report contains certain appendices which the Applicant regards as sensitive commercial information relating to the process undertaken to obtain DIP financing and the optimization plan of the Applicant. The Applicant is of the view that if publically available, this information could have a material detrimental effect on the Applicant's restructuring. Having considered the guidance provided by the Supreme Court of Canada in *Sierra Club of Canada* v. *Canada (Minister of Finance)*, (2002) 2 S.C.R. 522, I am satisfied that it is appropriate, in order to protect the integrity and fairness of the process, to grant an order sealing the confidential appendices.

Summary

[44] In the result, the Initial Order is granted in the form requested by Index Energy Ajax. The Comeback Hearing has been scheduled before me on Monday, September 11, 2017 at 8:30 a.m.

Regional Senior Justice G.B. Morawetz

Date: August 23, 2017

2017 ONSC 4944 (CanLII)

TAB 11

CITATION: Re TOYS "R" US (CANADA) LTD., 2017 ONSC 5571
COURT FILE NO.: CV-17-00582960-00CL
DATE: 20170920

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TOYS "R" US (CANADA) LTD. TOYS "R" US (CANADA) LTEE

BEFORE: F.L. Myers J.

COUNSEL: *Brian F. Empey, Melaney Wagner, Christopher Armstrong, counsel for* the applicant
R. Shayne Kukulowicz, Jane Dietrich, counsel for Grant Thornton Limited, the Proposed Monitor
Tony Reyes, counsel for the pre-filing ABL lenders
Alexander Cobb, counsel for the B4 lenders
Linc Rogers, Chris Burr counsel for JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA, the lead lender on behalf of the proposed DIP lenders

HEARD: September 19, 2017

ENDORSEMENT

[1] At the conclusion of the hearing I granted the relief sought by the applicant with minor revisions for reasons to be delivered shortly. These are my reasons for doing so.

[2] The applicant is Canada's leading retailer of toys and baby products. It operates from 82 stores across all ten provinces and over the internet. It employs nearly 4,000 people. This number increases to more than 6,000 during the peak holiday season. It is an important participant in the Canadian retail economy and a much beloved childhood icon in many Canadians' lives.

[3] The applicant is an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of TOYS "R" US INC. a US company. On September 18, 2017 the US parent, several affiliates, and the applicant filed for bankruptcy protection in the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. They did so in order to protect against stakeholder action that could adversely impact their businesses while they explore restructuring options. Publicity concerning the problems facing the companies has already led some suppliers to take steps to limit the credit terms that they are willing to extend to the retailer. As a result, the businesses found themselves in need of the stability of bankruptcy protection.

2017 ONSC 5571 (CanLII)

[4] The Canadian applicant's operations are generally autonomous from the parent's US operations. But, the applicant's pre-filing US$200 million secured revolving credit facility and its US$125 million secured term loan facility were both provided under a wider asset-backed lending facility provided by the pre-filing ABL lenders to the US and Canadian companies.

[5] When the applicant and its US affiliates filed for US bankruptcy protection, they committed defaults under their ABL facilities. Therefore, although the applicant is generally cash flow positive and has positive shareholder equity, it found itself without borrowing facilities and within two weeks of being unable to meet its obligations as they come due.

[6] As a result of its looming liquidity crisis, the applicant meets the definition of a "debtor company" to whom the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act,* RSC 1985, c C-36 applies. *Re Stelco Inc.*, 2004 CanLII 24933 (ON SC). It has liabilities of more than $5 million and otherwise meets the technical requirements of the statute.

[7] The applicant needs the protection of a general stay that is available under the *CCAA*. The stay is a court order that prevents people and companies with claims against the applicant from cancelling their contracts or taking steps to enforce their claims against the applicant during the period of the restructuring. All creditors and claimants are held at bay, together, to maintain a level playing field. At the same time, the stay protects the applicant's business in order to: create conditions under which a lender will advance fresh funds to the applicant to carry it through its restructuring efforts; help prevent suppliers from ceasing or tightening credit terms just prior to the vital holiday selling season; to prevent enforcement efforts by creditors that would deflect the company from its efforts to find a win-win restructuring for the general body of its creditors; and to enable the applicant to continue to operate on a "business as usual" basis to protect the value of its business and brand for all. I am satisfied that this is an appropriate case in which to grant a stay as sought under s. 11.02 of the *CCAA*.

[8] The applicant expresses concern that it might be required to pay some pre-filing claims to critical suppliers and others despite the general goal of a bankruptcy proceeding to freeze all claims at the filing date. For example, employees with wages accrued before today need to be paid in the ordinary course in order to keep the workforce engaged. Customers holding gift cards and similar pre-paid rights need to be able to enforce those pre-filing claims in order to protect the company's public customers. There is good reason to allow these types of claims to protect the goodwill of the business in the interests of all creditors even though most others are being prevented from enforcing their claims while these claims are recognized.

[9] In addition, a small number of critical suppliers of goods and services may have the ability to avoid the stay order under the CCAA and the US automatic stay. Sometimes those suppliers will threaten to refuse to continue to supply a *CCAA* debtor unless they are paid their pre-filing claims in priority to others. In some circumstances this could imperil the applicant's business. Under s. 11.4 of the *CCAA*, the court may declare a person to be a "critical supplier." A critical supplier can be compelled to supply the applicant with goods and, in return, it can be provided with court-ordered security to protect its right to payment. That situation is quite different than the order sought in this case. Here, the applicant is not seeking to compel anyone

2017 ONSC 5571 (CanLII)

to supply on credit against its will. The suppliers of concern in this case may claim to be beyond the reach of the court's orders. Rather, here, the applicant is recognizing that in some specific and limited cases, it may face an inordinate risk of interruption of its operations if it does not agree to pay to a supplier of goods or services the amounts of its claims that would otherwise be frozen at the filing date. Providing such a payment is a form of preference that is contrary to the goal of universal sharing among creditors of equal priority that is the underpinning of our bankruptcy system. Accordingly, circumstances where payment of pre-filing claims will be allowed to suppliers of goods and services will be few. They will be carefully scrutinized by the applicant and the Monitor. The initial order granted by the court in this proceeding empowers the Monitor to exercise discretion to approve a payment to a critical supplier on its pre-filing claims. The Monitor will do so only in truly critical situations. It will be guided by the factors set out in para. 55 of the applicant's factum as drawn from the discussion by Morawetz J. (as he then was) in *Re Cinram International Inc*., 2012 ONSC 3767.

[10] The applicant asks for the approval of a debtor in possession (DIP) lending facility to repay its pre-filing ABL indebtedness and to fund its cash flow needs as it bulks up its inventory for holiday sales and then throughout its restructuring. Section 11.2 of the *CCAA* provides for the court to grant security to DIP loans ahead of existing unsecured and secured claims upon a balancing of listed factors. Granting DIP security is a fairly standard and often necessary practice in *CCAA* cases. The section also makes it clear however, that security cannot be granted for pre-filing claims. Here, while it is proposed for DIP funding to be used to pay out pre-filing lenders (a "takeout DIP") all of the loans that will be secured are fresh advances by the DIP lenders. Moreover, the Monitor has obtained an independent legal opinion that the pre-filing ABL security is valid and prior to all claims that will be primed by the court-ordered DIP security. The DIP funds are replacing existing secured collateral. The court-ordered charge is not being used to improve the security of the pre-filing ABL lenders or to fill any gaps in their security coverage. In my view therefore, the takeout DIP is not prohibited by s. 11.2.

[11] The DIP terms are lengthy and complex. The court has had limited time to scan and parse the documents and has relied heavily on the Monitor's and the applicant's assessments and submissions. Based on my review and the submissions made, I am satisfied that the DIP terms are generally limited to standard lending terms. With one exception discussed below, I was not drawn to any terms that might be thought to create unusual powers in the DIP lenders to control the applicant or the process. There do not appear to be any terms that provide incentives for the DIP lenders to try to execute loan-to-own or other strategies to somehow extract more value than is made available in fees and interest on the face of the DIP loan documents. Scrutinizing complicated, lengthy DIP terms on an urgent initial hearing is a dangerous pursuit. The court relies on the integrity of the parties to disclose unusual terms and otherwise to protect the stakeholders from terms that may be buried in thick documents that could later create skewed outcomes or incentives that are contrary to the interests of the stakeholders generally. If a DIP lender wants extraordinary rights or powers beyond standard, plain vanilla lending terms, they should be disclosed expressly and subject to transparent scrutiny at minimum.

[12] In this case, the DIP lenders ask for the right to enforce their security in the event that they claim that the applicant has committed a default under the terms of its new borrowing. The

2017 ONSC 5571 (CanLII)

stay provisions that I have approved above generally prevent creditors from enforcing their claims without leave of the court. In some cases the stay may prevent a supplier from unilaterally discontinuing supply. The parties are able to come to court very quickly on the Commercial List. Therefore, a party who has good cause to be released from a stay can usually get to court to ask for an order lifting the stay before it has suffered much, if any, prejudice. But the leave requirement ensures that suppliers or others cannot claim that an applicant is in default and take unilateral, destabilizing steps without scrutiny of the alleged default by stakeholders, the Monitor, and ultimately, the court.

[13] The DIP lender and the applicant agreed that the DIP lender could give five days' notice of default to the applicant and then take a number of unilateral enforcement steps. This reverses the burden and requires the applicant to come to court during the five day period to have the DIP lenders' claims reviewed. But there are terms of the DIP documents that limit the applicant's entitlement to oppose the DIP lenders. This could create a complex and ambiguous situation.

[14] In my view, the stay provisions protect the stakeholders, creditors, and the public interest as much as the applicant. The court process provides assurances of transparency and accountability to which all interested parties are entitled as a *quid pro quo* for the protections offered by the statute. The DIP lenders are well protected without an extraordinary power to enforce their claims without court scrutiny. The DIP lenders in this case are replacing first secured lenders. It is not clear why they need special DIP priority when the DIP lenders are likely entitled to step into the priority position of the pre-filing ABL lenders under the doctrine of equitable subrogation. The applicant is paying the DIP lenders more than $20 million in fees plus enhanced interest for a loan that is protected not only by equitable priority but by court-ordered security. DIP loans have not proven to be that risky in Canada generally. I know of only one case where a DIP lender has not been repaid in full and that was a very specific instance where the DIP lender was the principle purchaser of the CCAA debtor's goods and needed to keep funding the debtor at a loss in order to keep its own business afloat.

[15] In this case, the applicant seems to be solvent on a balance sheet basis. The B4 lenders have advised the court that they expect to realize substantial value from their security against the shares of the applicant. I see no valid reason for the DIP lenders to require any significantly enhanced enforcement rights when their position is protected already. Given the applicant's consent and the importance of the DIP loan to the restructuring process generally, I accept that the DIP lenders will be entitled to take minimal steps to give notice of default and to withhold further advances while the parties come to court. Otherwise, the DIP lenders require leave of the court on notice before they may accelerate their loans or to take any other enforcement steps.

[16] The fees and disbursements of the Monitor, counsel, and the financial advisors to the debtor will be protected by a court ordered charges as well under s. 11.52 of the *CCAA*. The members of the board of directors and officers of the applicant will also be protected against the risk of incurring uninsured, post-filing liabilities. I am satisfied that the applicant and the Monitor have calculated the limits of this charge to reflect realistic, potential statutory D & O liability. I am less sanguine that these liabilities cannot be insured at a reasonable cost under s. 11.51 (3) of the *CCAA*. One can always postulate that an insurer might decline coverage or that

2017 ONSC 5571 (CanLII)

the insurance limits might prove to be insufficient. However, creating a charge can also provide an incentive to structure affairs so that others can access the available insurance precisely because the Ds & Os can access their charge and do not need their insurance. Moreover, the standard, *in terrorem* assertion that the Ds & Os are necessary to the restructuring and may resign unless they are granted a charge is rarely subjected to real scrutiny. However, absent concerns expressed by those being primed, I am satisfied that the applicants have met the statutory test for the purposes of this initial hearing.

[17] Toys "R" Us (Canada) Ltd. Toys "R" Us (Canada) Ltee is a strong performing business facing a liquidity crisis that causes it to suffer technical insolvency. It is fair, reasonable, and wholly appropriate for it to be supported by the protections of the *CCAA* so as to provide it with an opportunity to restructure its affairs to enable it to address its current circumstances.

[18] Order accordingly.

F.L. Myers J.

Date: September 20, 2017

2017 ONSC 5571 (CanLII)

TAB 12

Court File No. CV-17-11846-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR.	)	THURSDAY, THE 22ND
	)	
JUSTICE HAINEY	)	DAY OF JUNE, 2017

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SEARS CANADA INC., CORBEIL ÉLECTRIQUE INC., S.L.H. TRANSPORT INC., THE CUT INC., SEARS CONTACT SERVICES INC., INITIUM LOGISTICS SERVICES INC., INITIUM COMMERCE LABS INC., INITIUM TRADING AND SOURCING CORP., SEARS FLOOR COVERING CENTRES INC., 173470 CANADA INC., 2497089 ONTARIO INC., 6988741 CANADA INC., 10011711 CANADA INC., 1592580 ONTARIO LIMITED, 955041 ALBERTA LTD., 4201531 CANADA INC., 168886 CANADA INC., AND 3339611 CANADA INC.
(each, an "**Applicant**", and collectively, the "**Applicants**")

INITIAL ORDER

THIS APPLICATION, made by the Applicants, pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**"), was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of Billy Wong sworn June 22, 2017, and the Exhibits thereto (collectively, the "**Wong Affidavit**"), and the pre-filing report dated June 22, 2017 of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("**FTI**"), in its capacity as the proposed Monitor of the Applicants (the "**Pre-Filing Report**"), and on hearing the submissions of counsel to the Applicants and Sears Connect LP (the "**Partnership**", and collectively with the Applicants, the "**Sears Canada**

Entities"), counsel to the Board of Directors (the "**Board of Directors**") of Sears Canada Inc. ("**SCI**") and the Special Committee of the Board of Directors (the "**Special Committee**") of SCI, counsel to FTI, counsel to Wells Fargo Capital Finance Corporation Canada (the "**DIP ABL Agent**"), as administrative agent under the DIP ABL Credit Agreement (as defined herein), and counsel to GACP Finance Co., LLC (the "**DIP Term Agent**"), as administrative agent under the DIP Term Credit Agreement (as defined herein), Koskie Minsky LLP as counsel for Store Catalogue Retiree Group, counsel for the Financial Services Commission of Ontario, and on reading the consent of FTI to act as the Monitor.

SERVICE

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Application and the Application Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Application is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

APPLICATION

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicants are companies to which the CCAA applies. Although not an Applicant, the Partnership shall enjoy the benefits of the protections and authorizations provided by this Order.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants, individually or collectively, shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "**Plan**").

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities shall remain in possession and control of their respective current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "**Property**"). For greater certainty, the "Property" includes all inventory, assets, undertakings and property of the Sears Canada Entities in the possession or control of the Hometown Dealers (as defined in the Wong Affidavit) and all inventory, assets, undertakings and property of the Sears Canada

Entities in the possession or control of the Corbeil Franchisees (as defined in the Wong Affidavit). Subject to further Order of this Court, the Sears Canada Entities shall continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of the value of their business (the "**Business**") and Property. The Sears Canada Entities shall each be authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the employees, independent contractors, advisors, consultants, agents, experts, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively, "**Assistants**") currently retained or employed by them, with liberty, subject to the terms of the Definitive Documents (as defined herein) to retain such further Assistants, as they deem reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business or for the carrying out of the terms of this Order.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities shall be entitled to continue to utilize the central cash management services currently in place as described in the Wong Affidavit, or, with the consent of the Monitor, the DIP ABL Agent on behalf of the DIP ABL Lenders (as defined herein) and the DIP Term Agent on behalf of the DIP Term Lenders (as defined herein), replace it with another substantially similar central cash management services (the "**Cash Management System**") and that any present or future bank or other institution providing the Cash Management System shall not be under any obligation whatsoever to inquire into the propriety, validity or legality of any transfer, payment, collection or other action taken under the Cash Management System, or as to the use or application by the Sears Canada Entities of funds transferred, paid, collected or otherwise dealt with in the Cash Management System, shall be entitled to provide the Cash Management System without any liability in respect thereof to any Person (as hereinafter defined) other than the Sears Canada Entities, pursuant to the terms of the documentation applicable to the Cash Management System, and shall be, in its capacity as provider of the Cash Management System, an unaffected creditor under the Plan with regard to any claims or expenses it may suffer or incur in connection with the provision of the Cash Management System; provided, however, that no bank or other institution providing such Cash Management System shall be obliged to extend any overdraft credit, on an aggregate net basis, directly or indirectly in connection therewith and further provided that, to the extent any overdraft occurs, on an aggregate net basis, the Sears Canada Entities shall make arrangements to repay such overdraft forthwith.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities, subject to availability under, and in accordance with the terms of the DIP Facilities (as defined herein) and the Definitive Documents, and subject to further Order of this Court, shall be entitled but not required to pay the following expenses whether incurred prior to, on or after this Order to the extent that such expenses are incurred and payable by the Sears Canada Entities:

(a) all outstanding and future wages, salaries, commissions, employee and retiree benefits (including, without limitation, medical, dental, life insurance and similar benefit plans or arrangements), pension benefits or contributions, vacation pay, expenses, and director fees and expenses, payable on or after the date of this Order, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements (but not including termination or severance payments), and all other payroll, pension and benefits processing and servicing expenses;

(b) all outstanding and future amounts owing to or in respect of Persons working as independent contractors in connection with the Business;

(c) all outstanding or future amounts owing in respect of customer rebates, refunds, discounts or other amounts on account of similar customer programs or obligations;

(d) all outstanding or future amounts related to honouring customer obligations, whether existing before or after the date of this Order, including customer financing, product warranties, pre-payments, deposits, gift cards, Sears Club programs (including redemptions of Sears Club points) and other customer loyalty programs, offers and benefits, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing policies and procedures;

(e) the fees and disbursements of any Assistants retained or employed by the Sears Canada Entities at their standard rates and charges; and

(f) with the consent of the Monitor, amounts owing for goods or services actually supplied to the Sears Canada Entities prior to the date of this Order by:

(i) logistics or supply chain providers, including customs brokers and freight forwarders, fuel providers, repair, maintenance and parts providers, and security and armoured truck carriers, and including amounts payable in respect of customs and duties for goods;

(ii) providers of information, internet, and other technology, including e-commerce providers and related services;

(iii) providers of credit, debit and gift card processing related services; and

(iv) other third party suppliers up to a maximum aggregate amount of $25 million, if, in the opinion of the Sears Canada Entities, the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations of the Sears Canada Entities.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein and subject to the terms of the Definitive Documents, the Sears Canada Entities shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by them in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course after this Order, and in carrying out the provisions of this Order and any other Order of this Court, which expenses shall include, without limitation:

(a) all expenses and capital expenditures reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance (including directors' and officers' insurance), maintenance (including environmental remediation) and security services; and

(b) payment for goods or services actually supplied to the Sears Canada Entities following the date of this Order.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:

(a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be deducted from the Sears Canada Entities' employees' wages, including, without limitation, amounts in respect of (i) employment insurance, (ii) Canada Pension Plan, (iii) Quebec Pension Plan, and (iv) income taxes;

(b) all goods and services taxes, harmonized sales taxes or other applicable sales taxes (collectively, "**Sales Taxes**") required to be remitted by the Sears Canada Entities in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Sears Canada Entities, but only where such Sales Taxes are accrued or collected after the date of this Order, or where such Sales Taxes were accrued or collected prior to the date of this Order but not required to be remitted until on or after the date of this Order;

(c) any amount payable to the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any political subdivision thereof or any other taxation authority in respect of municipal realty, municipal business, workers' compensation or other taxes, assessments or levies of any nature or kind which are entitled at law to be paid in priority to claims of secured creditors and which are attributable to or in respect of the carrying on of the Business by the Sears Canada Entities; and

(d) taxes under the *Income Tax Act* (Canada) or other relevant taxing statutes to the extent that such taxing statutes give rise to statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or any Province thereof or any political subdivision thereof or any other taxation authority.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as specifically permitted herein, the Sears Canada Entities are hereby directed, until further Order of this Court: (a) to make no payments of principal, interest thereon or otherwise on account of amounts owing by any one of the Sears Canada Entities to any of their creditors as of this date; (b) to grant no security interests, trust, liens, charges or encumbrances upon or in respect of any of the Property; and (c) to not grant credit or incur liabilities except in the ordinary course of the Business or pursuant to this Order or any further Order of this Court.

RESTRUCTURING

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities shall, subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA, and subject to the terms of the Definitive Documents, have the right to:

(a) permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of their Business or operations, and to dispose of redundant or non-material assets not exceeding $2 million in any one transaction or $5 million in the aggregate in any series of related transactions, provided that, with respect to leased premises, the Sears Canada Entities may, subject to the requirements of the CCAA and paragraphs 11 to 13 herein, vacate, abandon or quit the whole (but not part of) and may permanently (but not temporarily) cease, downsize or shut down any of their Business or operations in respect of any leased premises;

(b) terminate the employment of such of its employees or temporarily lay off such of its employees as the relevant Sears Canada Entity deems appropriate; and

(c) pursue all avenues of refinancing, restructuring, selling and reorganizing the Business or Property, in whole or part, subject to prior approval of this Court being obtained before any material refinancing, restructuring, sale or reorganization,

all of the foregoing to permit the Sears Canada Entities to proceed with an orderly restructuring of the Sears Canada Entities and/or the Business (the "**Restructuring**").

REAL PROPERTY LEASES

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until a real property lease is disclaimed or resiliated in accordance with the CCAA, the Sears Canada Entities shall pay, without duplication, all amounts constituting rent or payable as rent under real property leases (including, for greater certainty, common area maintenance charges, utilities and realty taxes and any other amounts payable to the landlord under its lease, but for greater certainty, excluding accelerated rent or penalties, fees or other charges arising as a result of the insolvency of any or all of the Sears Canada Entities or the making of this Initial Order) or as otherwise may be negotiated between the applicable Sears Canada Entity and the landlord from time to time ("**Rent**"), for the period commencing from and including the date of this Order, twice-monthly in equal payments on the first and fifteenth day of each month, in advance (but not in arrears). On the date of the first of such payments, any Rent relating to the period commencing from and including the date of this Order shall also be paid.

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities shall provide each of the relevant landlords with notice of the relevant Sears Canada Entity's intention to remove any fixtures from any leased premises at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the intended removal. The relevant landlord shall be entitled to have a representative present in the leased premises to observe such removal and, if the landlord disputes the entitlement of a Sears Canada Entity to remove any such fixture under the provisions of the lease, such fixture shall remain on the premises and shall be dealt with as agreed between any applicable secured creditors, such landlord and the relevant Sears Canada Entity, or by further Order of this Court upon application by the Sears Canada Entities on at least two (2) days' notice to such landlord and any such secured creditors. If any of the Sears Canada Entities disclaims or resiliates the lease governing such leased premises in accordance with Section 32 of the CCAA, it shall not be required to pay Rent under such lease pending resolution of any such dispute (other than Rent payable for the notice period provided for in Section 32(5) of the CCAA), and the disclaimer or resiliation of the lease shall be without prejudice to the relevant Sears Canada Entity's claim to the fixtures in dispute.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if a notice of disclaimer or resiliation is delivered pursuant to Section 32 of the CCAA by any of the Sears Canada Entities, then: (a) during the notice period prior to the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the landlord may show the affected leased premises to prospective tenants during normal business hours, on giving the relevant Sears Canada Entity and the Monitor 24 hours' prior written notice; and (b) at the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the relevant landlord shall be entitled to take possession of any such leased premises without waiver of or prejudice to any claims or rights such landlord may have against the relevant Sears Canada Entity in respect of such lease or leased premises, provided that nothing herein shall relieve such landlord of its obligation to mitigate any damages claimed in connection therewith.

NO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE SEARS CANADA ENTITIES, THE BUSINESS OR THE PROPERTY

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until and including July 22, 2017, or such later date as this Court may order (the "**Stay Period**"), no proceeding or enforcement process in any court or tribunal (each, a "**Proceeding**") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the

Sears Canada Entities or the Monitor or their respective employees and representatives acting in such capacities, or affecting the Business or the Property, except with the written consent of the Sears Canada Entities and the Monitor, or with leave of this Court, and any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Sears Canada Entities or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further Order of this Court.

NO EXERCISE OF RIGHTS OR REMEDIES

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, no Person having any agreements or arrangements with the owners, operators, managers or landlords of commercial shopping centres or other commercial properties (including retail, office and industrial (warehouse) properties) in which there is located a store, office or warehouse owned or operated by the Sears Canada Entities shall take any Proceedings or exercise any rights or remedies under such agreements or arrangements that may arise upon and/or as a result of the making of this Order, the insolvency of, or declarations of insolvency by, any or all of the Sears Canada Entities, or as a result of any steps taken by the Sears Canada Entities pursuant to this Order and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, no Person shall terminate, accelerate, suspend, modify, determine or cancel any such arrangement or agreement or be entitled to exercise any rights or remedies in connection therewith.

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, no Person having any agreements or arrangements with the Hometown Dealers or the Corbeil Franchisees shall take any Proceedings or exercise any rights or remedies under such agreements or arrangements that may arise upon and/or as a result of the making of this Order, the insolvency of, or declarations of insolvency by, any or all of the Sears Canada Entities, or as a result of any steps taken by the Sears Canada Entities pursuant to this Order and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, no Person shall terminate, accelerate, suspend, modify, determine or cancel any such arrangement or agreement or be entitled to exercise any rights or remedies in connection therewith.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period all rights and remedies, of any individual, firm, corporation, governmental body or agency, or any other entities (all of the foregoing, collectively being "**Persons**" and each being a "**Person**") against or in respect of the Sears Canada Entities or the Monitor or their respective employees and representatives acting in

such capacities, or affecting the Business or the Property, are hereby stayed and suspended, except with the written consent of the Sears Canada Entities and the Monitor, or leave of this Court, provided that nothing in this Order shall: (a) empower the Sears Canada Entities to carry on any business that the Sears Canada Entities are not lawfully entitled to carry on; (b) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by Section 11.1 of the CCAA; (c) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest; or (d) prevent the registration of a claim for lien.

NO INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, no Person shall discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, lease, sublease, licence or permit in favour of or held by the Sears Canada Entities, except with the written consent of the Sears Canada Entities and the Monitor, or leave of this Court. Without limiting the foregoing, no right, option, remedy, and/or exemption in favour of the relevant Sears Canada Entity shall be or shall be deemed to be negated, suspended, waived and/or terminated as a result of this Order.

CONTINUATION OF SERVICES

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all Persons having oral or written agreements with the Sears Canada Entities or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods and/or services, including without limitation all trademark license and other intellectual property, computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll and benefit services, insurance, warranty services, transportation services, freight services, security and armoured truck carrier services, utility, customs clearing, warehouse and logistics services or other services to the Business or the Sears Canada Entities are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply or license of such goods, services, trademarks and other intellectual property as may be required by the Sears Canada Entities, and that the Sears Canada Entities shall be entitled to the continued use of the trademarks and other intellectual property currently licensed to, used or owned by the Sears Canada Entities, premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses and domain names, provided in each case that the normal prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the date of this Order are paid by

the Sears Canada Entities in accordance with normal payment practices of the Sears Canada Entities or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and each of the Sears Canada Entities and the Monitor, or as may be ordered by this Court.

NON-DEROGATION OF RIGHTS

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding anything else in this Order, no Person shall be prohibited from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided on or after the date of this Order, nor shall any Person be under any obligation on or after the date of this Order to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to the Sears Canada Entities. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the rights conferred and obligations imposed by the CCAA.

KEY EMPLOYEE RETENTION PLAN

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Key Employee Retention Plan (the "**KERP**"), as described in the Wong Affidavit, is hereby approved and the Sears Canada Entities are authorized to make payments contemplated thereunder in accordance with the terms and conditions of the KERP.

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the key employees referred to in the KERP (the "**Key Employees**") shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted the following charges on the Property, which charges shall not exceed: (a) an aggregate amount of $4.6 million (the "**KERP Priority Charge**") to secure the first $4.6 million payable to the Key Employees under the KERP; and (b) an aggregate amount of $4.6 million (the "**KERP Subordinated Charge**") to secure any other payments to the Key Employees under the KERP. The KERP Priority Charge and the KERP Subordinated Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 46, 47 and 49 hereof.

APPROVAL OF FINANCIAL ADVISOR AGREEMENT

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the agreement dated May 15, 2017 engaging BMO Nesbitt Burns Inc. (the "**Financial Advisor**") as financial advisor to SCI and attached as Confidential Appendix C to the Pre-Filing Report (the "**Financial Advisor Agreement**"), and the retention of the Financial Advisor under the terms thereof, is hereby ratified and approved

and SCI is authorized and directed *nunc pro tunc* to make the payments contemplated thereunder in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Financial Advisor Agreement.

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Financial Advisor shall be entitled to the benefit of and is hereby granted a charge (the "**FA Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $3.3 million, as security for the fees and disbursements payable under the Financial Advisor Agreement, both before and after the making of this Order in respect of these proceedings. The FA Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 46, 47 and 49 hereof.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, and except as permitted by subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA, no Proceeding may be commenced or continued against any of the former, current or future directors or officers of the Sears Canada Entities with respect to any claim against the directors or officers that arose before the date hereof and that relates to any obligations of the Sears Canada Entities whereby the directors or officers are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors or officers for the payment or performance of such obligations, until a compromise or arrangement in respect of the Sears Canada Entities, if one is filed, is sanctioned by this Court or is refused by the creditors of the Sears Canada Entities or this Court.

DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INDEMNIFICATION AND CHARGE

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities shall jointly and severally indemnify their directors and officers against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as directors or officers of the Sears Canada Entities after the commencement of the within proceedings, except to the extent that, with respect to any officer or director, the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the directors and officers of the Sears Canada Entities shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted the following charges on the Property, which charges shall not exceed: (a) an aggregate amount of $44 million (the "**Directors'**

Priority Charge"); and (b) an aggregate amount of $19.5 million (the "**Directors' Subordinated Charge**"), respectively, and in each case, as security for the indemnity provided in paragraph 26 of this Order. The Directors' Priority Charge and the Directors' Subordinated Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 46, 47 and 49 hereof.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any language in any applicable insurance policy to the contrary: (a) no insurer shall be entitled to be subrogated to or claim the benefit of the Directors' Priority Charge and the Directors' Subordinated Charge; and (b) the Sears Canada Entities' directors and officers shall only be entitled to the benefit of the Directors' Priority Charge and the Directors' Subordinated Charge to the extent that they do not have coverage under any directors' and officers' insurance policy, or to the extent that such coverage is insufficient to pay amounts indemnified in accordance with paragraph 26 of this Order.

APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that FTI is hereby appointed pursuant to the CCAA as the Monitor, an officer of this Court, to monitor the Business and financial affairs of the Sears Canada Entities with the powers and obligations set out in the CCAA or set forth herein and that the Sears Canada Entities and their shareholders, officers, directors, and Assistants shall advise the Monitor of all material steps taken by the Sears Canada Entities pursuant to this Order, and shall co-operate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and discharge of its obligations and provide the Monitor with the assistance that is necessary to enable the Monitor to adequately carry out the Monitor's functions.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is hereby directed and empowered to:

(a) monitor the Sears Canada Entities' receipts and disbursements;

(b) liaise with the Sears Canada Entities and the Assistants and, if determined by the Monitor to be necessary, the Hometown Dealers and Corbeil Franchisees, with respect to all matters relating to the Property, the Business, the Restructuring and such other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein;

(c) report to this Court at such times and intervals as the Monitor may deem appropriate with respect to matters relating to the Property, the Business, the Restructuring and such other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein;

(d) assist the Sears Canada Entities, to the extent required by the Sears Canada Entities, in their dissemination of financial and other information to the DIP ABL Agent, the DIP ABL Lenders, the DIP Term Agent, the DIP Term Lenders and each of their respective counsel and financial advisors, pursuant to and in accordance with the Definitive Documents;

(e) advise the Sears Canada Entities in their preparation of the Sears Canada Entities' cash flow statements and any reporting required by the Definitive Documents, which information shall be reviewed with the Monitor and delivered to the DIP ABL Agent, the DIP ABL Lenders, the DIP Term Agent, the DIP Term Lenders and each of their respective counsel and financial advisors, pursuant to and in accordance with the Definitive Documents;

(f) advise the Sears Canada Entities in their development of the Plan and any amendments to the Plan;

(g) assist the Sears Canada Entities, to the extent required by the Sears Canada Entities, with the holding and administering of creditors' or shareholders' meetings for voting on the Plan;

(h) have full and complete access to the Property (including any Property in the possession of the Hometown Dealers and the Corbeil Franchisees), including the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and other financial documents of the Sears Canada Entities, to the extent that is necessary to adequately assess the Business and the Sears Canada Entities' financial affairs or to perform its duties arising under this Order;

(i) be at liberty to engage independent legal counsel or such other persons as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under this Order;

(j) assist the Sears Canada Entities, to the extent required by the Sears Canada Entities, with any matters relating to any foreign proceeding commenced in relation to any of the Sears Canada Entities, including retaining independent legal counsel, agents, experts, accountants, or such other persons as the Monitor deems necessary or desirable respecting the exercise of this power; and

(k) perform such other duties as are required by this Order or by this Court from time to time.

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and shall take no part whatsoever in the management or supervision of the management of the Business and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder, be deemed to have taken or maintained possession or control of the Business or Property, or any part thereof.

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to occupy or to take control, care, charge, possession or management (separately and/or collectively, "**Possession**") of any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, might be a pollutant or a contaminant, or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to any federal, provincial or other law respecting the protection, conservation, enhancement, remediation or rehabilitation of the environment or relating to the disposal of waste or other contamination including, without limitation, the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*, the Ontario *Environmental Protection Act*, the *Ontario Water Resources Act*, or the Ontario *Occupational Health and Safety Act* and regulations thereunder (the "**Environmental Legislation**"), provided however that nothing herein shall exempt the Monitor from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by applicable Environmental Legislation. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order or anything done in pursuance of the Monitor's duties and powers under this Order, be deemed to be in Possession of any of the Property within the meaning of any Environmental Legislation, unless it is actually in possession.

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall provide any creditor of the Sears Canada Entities, the DIP ABL Agent, the DIP ABL Lenders, the DIP Term Agent and the DIP Term Lenders with information provided by the Sears Canada Entities in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by such creditor addressed to the Monitor. The Monitor

shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to the information disseminated by it pursuant to this paragraph. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Sears Canada Entities is confidential, the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by this Court or on such terms as the Monitor and the Sears Canada Entities may agree.

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the rights and protections afforded the Monitor under the CCAA or as an officer of this Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA or any applicable legislation.

35. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, counsel to the Sears Canada Entities and counsel to the Board of Directors and the Special Committee shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case at their standard rates and charges, whether incurred prior to or subsequent to the date of this Order, by the Sears Canada Entities as part of the costs of these proceedings. The Sears Canada Entities are hereby authorized and directed to pay the accounts of the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, counsel to the Sears Canada Entities and counsel to the Board of Directors and the Special Committee on a weekly basis and, in addition, the Sears Canada Entities are hereby authorized to pay to the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, counsel to the Sears Canada Entities and counsel to the Board of Directors and the Special Committee, retainers in the aggregate amount of $700,000, to be held by them as security for payment of their respective fees and disbursements outstanding from time to time.

36. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor and its legal counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time, and for this purpose the accounts of the Monitor and its legal counsel are hereby referred to a judge of the Commercial List of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

37. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, counsel to the Sears Canada Entities and counsel to the Board of Directors and the Special Committee shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**Administration Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $5 million, as security for their professional fees and disbursements incurred at their respective standard rates and charges, both

before and after the making of this Order in respect of these proceedings. The Administration Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 46, 47 and 49 hereof.

DIP FINANCING

38. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities are hereby authorized and empowered to obtain and borrow or guarantee, as applicable, on a joint and several basis, under:

(a) the Senior Secured Superpriority Debtor-in-Possession Amended and Restated Credit Agreement dated as of June 22, 2017 and attached to the Wong Affidavit as Exhibit K, among the Sears Canada Entities, the DIP ABL Agent and the lenders from time to time party thereto (the "**DIP ABL Lenders**") (as may be amended, restated, supplemented and/or modified, subject to approval of this Court in respect of any amendment that the Monitor determines to be material, the "**DIP ABL Credit Agreement**"), in order to finance the Sears Canada Entities' working capital requirements and other general corporate purposes and capital expenditures, all in accordance with the Definitive Documents, provided that borrowings under DIP ABL Credit Agreement shall not exceed $300 million unless permitted by further Order of this Court (the "**DIP ABL Credit Facility**"); and

(b) the Senior Secured, Superpriority Debtor-in-Possession Credit Agreement dated as of June 22, 2017 and attached to the Wong Affidavit as Exhibit K, among the Sears Canada Entities, the DIP Term Agent and the lenders from time to time party thereto (the "**DIP Term Lenders**") (as may be amended, restated, supplemented and/or modified, subject to approval of this Court in respect of any amendment that the Monitor determines to be material, the "**DIP Term Credit Agreement**"), in order to finance the Sears Canada Entities' working capital requirements and other general corporate purposes and capital expenditures, all in accordance with the Definitive Documents, provided that borrowings under the DIP Term Credit Agreement shall not exceed $150 million unless permitted by further Order of this Court (the "**DIP Term Credit Facility**", and together with the DIP ABL Credit Facility, the "**DIP Facilities**").

39. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the DIP Facilities shall be on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the DIP ABL Credit Agreement, the DIP Term Credit Agreement and the other Definitive Documents.

40. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities are hereby authorized and empowered to execute and deliver the DIP ABL Credit Agreement, the DIP Term Credit Agreement and such mortgages, charges, hypothecs and security documents, guarantees and other definitive documents (collectively, and including any schedules (as amended and updated from time to time) thereto, the "**Definitive Documents**"), as are contemplated by the DIP ABL Credit Agreement and the DIP Term Credit Agreement or as may be reasonably required by the DIP ABL Agent on behalf of the DIP ABL Lenders and the DIP Term Agent on behalf of the DIP Term Lenders pursuant to the terms thereof, as applicable, and the Sears Canada Entities are hereby authorized and directed to pay and perform all of its indebtedness, interest, fees, liabilities and obligations to the DIP ABL Agent, the DIP ABL Lenders, the DIP Term Agent and the DIP Term Lenders under and pursuant to the Definitive Documents as and when the same become due and are to be performed, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order.

41. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the DIP ABL Agent and the DIP ABL Lenders shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**DIP ABL Lenders' Charge**") on the Property as security for any and all Obligations (as defined in the DIP ABL Credit Agreement) other than the Prepetition Obligations (as defined in the DIP ABL Credit Agreement) (including on account of principal, interest, fees, expenses and other liabilities, and the aggregate of all such obligations, the "**DIP ABL Obligations**"), which DIP ABL Lenders' Charge shall be in the aggregate amount of the DIP ABL Obligations outstanding at any given time under the DIP ABL Credit Agreement. The DIP ABL Lenders' Charge shall not secure an obligation that exists before this Order is made. The DIP ABL Lenders' Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 46, 47 and 49 hereof.

42. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the DIP Term Agent and the DIP Term Lenders shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**DIP Term Lenders' Charge**") on the Property as security for any and all Obligations (as defined in DIP Term Credit Agreement) (including on account of principal, interest, fees, expenses and other liabilities, and the aggregate of all such obligations, the "**DIP Term Obligations**"), which DIP Term Lenders' Charge shall

be in the aggregate amount of the DIP Term Obligations outstanding at any given time under the DIP Term Credit Agreement. The DIP Term Lenders' Charge shall not secure an obligation that exists before this Order is made. The DIP Term Lenders' Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 46, 47 and 49 hereof.

43. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that SCI's reimbursement obligation with respect to the letters of credit outstanding under the Wells Fargo Credit Agreement (as defined in the Wong Affidavit) prior to the date of this Order and which are drawn upon on or after the date of this Order shall be deemed to form part of the DIP ABL Credit Facility and shall be included as DIP ABL Obligations for the purposes of determining the amount of the DIP ABL Lenders' Charge.

44. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order:

(a) the DIP ABL Agent on behalf of the DIP ABL Lenders, as applicable, may take such steps from time to time as they may deem necessary or appropriate to file, register, record or perfect the DIP ABL Lenders' Charge, the DIP ABL Credit Agreement or any of the other Definitive Documents;

(b) the DIP Term Agent on behalf of the DIP Term Lenders, as applicable, may take such steps from time to time as they may deem necessary or appropriate to file, register, record or perfect the DIP Term Lenders' Charge, the DIP Term Credit Agreement or any of the other Definitive Documents;

(c) upon the occurrence of an event of default under the DIP ABL Credit Agreement, the other related Definitive Documents or the DIP ABL Lenders' Charge, the DIP ABL Agent and the DIP ABL Lenders, as applicable, may, subject to the provisions of the DIP ABL Credit Agreement with respect to the giving of notice or otherwise, and in accordance with the DIP ABL Credit Agreement, the other related Definitive Documents and the DIP ABL Lenders' Charge, as applicable, cease making advances to the Sears Canada Entities, make demand, accelerate payment and give other notices; provided that, the DIP ABL Agent and the DIP ABL Lenders must apply to this Court on seven (7) days' prior written notice (which may include the service of materials in connection with such an application to this Court) to the Sears Canada Entities, the DIP Term Agent, the DIP Term Lenders and the Monitor, to enforce

against or exercise any other rights and remedies with respect to the Sears Canada Entities or any of the Property (including to set off and/or consolidate any amounts owing by the DIP ABL Agent and the DIP ABL Lenders to the Sears Canada Entities against the obligations of the Sears Canada Entities to the DIP ABL Agent and the DIP ABL Lenders under the DIP ABL Credit Agreement, the other related Definitive Documents or the DIP ABL Lenders' Charge), to appoint a receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver, or to seek a bankruptcy order against the Sears Canada Entities and to appoint a trustee in bankruptcy of the Sears Canada Entities;

(d) upon the occurrence of an event of default under the DIP Term Credit Agreement, the other related Definitive Documents or the DIP Term Lenders' Charge, the DIP Term Agent and the DIP Term Lenders, as applicable, may, subject to the provisions of the DIP Term Credit Agreement with respect to the giving of notice or otherwise, and in accordance with the DIP Term Credit Agreement, the other related Definitive Documents and the DIP Term Lenders' Charge, as applicable, cease making advances to the Sears Canada Entities, make demand, accelerate payment and give other notices; provided that, the DIP Term Agent and the DIP Term Lenders must apply to this Court on seven (7) days' prior written notice (which may include the service of materials in connection with such an application to this Court) to the Sears Canada Entities, the DIP ABL Agent, the DIP ABL Lenders and the Monitor, to enforce against or exercise any other rights and remedies with respect to the Sears Canada Entities or any of the Property (including to set off and/or consolidate any amounts owing by the DIP Term Agent and the DIP Term Lenders to the Sears Canada Entities against the obligations of the Sears Canada Entities to the DIP Term Agent and the DIP Term Lenders under the DIP Term Credit Agreement, the other related Definitive Documents or the DIP Term Lenders' Charge), to appoint a receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver, or to seek a bankruptcy order against the Sears Canada Entities and to appoint a trustee in bankruptcy of the Sears Canada Entities; and

(e) the foregoing rights and remedies of the DIP ABL Agent, the DIP ABL Lenders, the DIP Term Agent and the DIP Term Lenders shall be enforceable against any trustee

in bankruptcy, interim receiver, receiver or receiver and manager of the Sears Canada Entities or the Property.

45. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the DIP ABL Agent, the DIP ABL Lenders, the DIP Term Agent and the DIP Term Lenders shall be treated as unaffected in any plan of arrangement or compromise filed by the Sears Canada Entities or any of them under the CCAA, or any proposal filed by the Sears Canada Entities or any of them under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of Canada (the "**BIA**"), with respect to any advances made under the DIP ABL Credit Agreement, the DIP Term Credit Agreement and the other Definitive Documents.

VALIDITY AND PRIORITY OF CHARGES CREATED BY THIS ORDER

46. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the priorities of the Administration Charge, the FA Charge, the DIP ABL Lenders' Charge, the DIP Term Lenders' Charge, the Directors' Priority Charge, the Directors' Subordinated Charge, the KERP Priority Charge and the KERP Subordinated Charge (collectively, the "**Charges**"), as among them, with respect to ABL Priority Collateral (as defined in the Intercreditor Agreement dated March 20, 2017 and attached as Exhibit J to the Wong Affidavit) shall be as follows:

First – Administration Charge, to the maximum amount of $5 million, and the FA Charge, to the maximum amount of $3.3 million, on a *pari passu* basis;

Second – KERP Priority Charge, to the maximum amount of $4.6 million;

Third – Directors' Priority Charge, to the maximum amount of $44 million;

Fourth – DIP ABL Lenders' Charge, to the maximum amount of the quantum of the DIP ABL Obligations at the relevant time;

Fifth – the DIP Term Lenders' Charge, to the maximum amount of the quantum of the DIP Term Obligations at the relevant time;

Sixth – KERP Subordinated Charge, to the maximum amount of $4.6 million; and

Seventh – the Directors' Subordinated Charge, to the maximum amount of $19.5 million.

47. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the priorities of the Charges as among them, with respect to all Property other than the ABL Priority Collateral shall be as follows:

First – Administration Charge, to the maximum amount of $5 million, and the FA Charge, to the maximum amount of $3.3 million, on a *pari passu* basis;

Second – KERP Priority Charge, to the maximum amount of $4.6 million;

Third – Directors' Priority Charge, to the maximum amount of $44 million;

Fourth – DIP Term Lenders' Charge, to the maximum amount of the quantum of the DIP Term Obligations at the relevant time;

Fifth – DIP ABL Lenders' Charge, to the maximum amount of the quantum of the DIP ABL Obligations at the relevant time;

Sixth – KERP Subordinated Charge, to the maximum amount of $4.6 million; and

Seventh – the Directors' Subordinated Charge, to the maximum amount of $19.5 million.

48. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the filing, registration or perfection of the Charges shall not be required, and that the Charges shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected subsequent to the Charges coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.

49. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Charges shall constitute a charge on the Property, and such Charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts (including constructive trusts), liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (including without limitation any deemed trust that may be created under the Ontario *Pension Benefits Act*) (collectively, "**Encumbrances**") other than (a) any Person with a properly perfected purchase money security interest under the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario) or such other applicable provincial legislation that has not been served with notice of this Order; and (b) statutory super-priority deemed trusts and liens for unpaid employee source deductions.

50. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Sears Canada Entities shall not grant any Encumbrances over any of the Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, any of the Charges, unless the Sears Canada Entities also obtain the prior written consent of the Monitor, the DIP ABL Agent on behalf of the DIP ABL Lenders, the DIP Term Agent on behalf of the DIP Term Lenders and the other beneficiaries of affected Charges, or further Order of this Court.

51. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Charges, the DIP ABL Credit Agreement, the DIP Term Credit Agreement, and the other Definitive Documents shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the chargees entitled to the benefit of the Charges (collectively, the "**Chargees**") thereunder shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by: (a) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (b) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to BIA, or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications; (c) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA; (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other agreement (collectively, an "**Agreement**") that binds the Sears Canada Entities, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:

(i) neither the creation of the Charges nor the execution, delivery, perfection, registration or performance of the DIP ABL Credit Agreement, the DIP Term Credit Agreement or the other Definitive Documents shall create or be deemed to constitute a breach by the Sears Canada Entities of any Agreement to which it is a party;

(ii) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from the Sears Canada Entities entering into the DIP ABL Credit Agreement and the DIP Term Credit Agreement, the creation of the Charges, or the execution, delivery or performance of the other Definitive Documents; and

(iii) the payments made by the Sears Canada Entities pursuant to this Order, the DIP ABL Credit Agreement, the DIP Term Credit Agreement or the other Definitive Documents, and the granting of the Charges, do not and will not constitute preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers at undervalue, oppressive conduct, or other challengeable or voidable transactions under any applicable law.

52. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Charge created by this Order over leases of real property in Canada shall only be a Charge in the relevant Sears Canada Entity's interest in such real property leases.

53. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, the L/C Collateral Account (as defined in the DIP ABL Credit Agreement) shall be deemed to be subject to a lien, security, charge and security interest in favour of the DIP ABL Agent solely for the reimbursement obligation of SCI related to the letters of credit issued under the Wells Fargo Credit Agreement which remain undrawn from and after the Comeback Motion (as defined herein). The Charges as they may attach to the L/C Collateral Account, including by operation of law or otherwise: (a) shall rank junior in priority to the lien, security, charge and security interest in favour of the DIP ABL Agent in respect of the L/C Collateral Account; and (b) shall attach to the L/C Collateral Account only to the extent of the rights, if any, of any Sears Canada Entity to the return of any cash from the L/C Collateral Account in accordance with the DIP ABL Credit Agreement.

CORPORATE MATTERS

54. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that SCI be and is hereby relieved of any obligation to call and hold an annual meeting of its shareholders until further Order of this Court.

55. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that SCI be and is hereby relieved of any obligation to appoint any new directors until further Order of this Court.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

56. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall: (a) without delay, publish in The Globe and Mail (National Edition) and La Presse a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA; and (b) within five days after the date of this Order, (i) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (ii) send or cause to be sent, in the prescribed manner, a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the Sears Canada Entities of more than $1,000 (excluding individual employees, former employees with pension and/or retirement savings plan entitlements, and retirees and other beneficiaries who have entitlements under any pension or retirement savings plans), and (iii) prepare a list showing the

names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with Section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder, provided that the Monitor shall not make the claims, names and addresses of the individuals who are creditors publicly available.

57. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall create, maintain and update as necessary a list of all Persons appearing in person or by counsel in this proceeding (the "**Service List**"). The Monitor shall post the Service List, as may be updated from time to time, on the Monitor's Website (as defined herein) as part of the public materials to be made available thereon in relation to this proceeding. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Monitor shall have no liability in respect of the accuracy of or the timeliness of making any changes to the Service List.

58. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any employee of any of the Sears Canada Entities that receives a notice of termination from any of the Sears Canada Entities shall be deemed to have received such notice of termination by no more than the seventh day following the date such notice of termination is delivered, if such notice of termination is sent by ordinary mail, courier or registered mail.

59. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the E-Service Protocol of the Commercial List (the "**Protocol**") is approved and adopted by reference herein and, in this proceeding, the service of documents made in accordance with the Protocol (which can be found on the Commercial List website at http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practice-directions/toronto/eservice-commercial/) shall be valid and effective service. Subject to Rule 17.05, this Order shall constitute an order for substituted service pursuant to Rule 16.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Subject to Rule 3.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and paragraph 21 of the Protocol, service of documents in accordance with the Protocol will be effective on transmission. This Court further orders that a Case Website shall be established in accordance with the Protocol with the following URL: cfcanada.fticonsulting.com/searscanada (the "**Monitor's Website**").

60. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if the service or distribution of documents in accordance with the Protocol is not practicable, the Sears Canada Entities and the Monitor are at liberty to serve or distribute this Order, any other materials and orders in these proceedings, any notices or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or electronic transmission to the Sears Canada Entities' creditors or other

interested parties at their respective addresses as last shown on the records of the Sears Canada Entities and that any such service or distribution by courier, personal delivery or electronic transmission shall be deemed to be received on the next business day following the date of forwarding thereof, or if sent by ordinary mail, on the third business day after mailing.

61. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicants, the Monitor, the Financial Advisor, the DIP Term Agent on behalf of the DIP Term Lenders and the DIP ABL Agent on behalf of the DIP ABL Lenders, and their respective counsel are at liberty to serve or distribute this Order, any other materials and orders as may be reasonably required in these proceedings, including any notices, or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by electronic message to the Applicants' creditors or other interested parties and their advisors. For greater certainty, any such distribution or service shall be deemed to be in satisfaction of a legal or juridical obligation, and notice requirements within the meaning of clause 3(c) of the Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations, Reg. 81000-2-175 (SOR/DORS).

COMEBACK MOTION

62. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the comeback motion shall be heard on July 13, 2017 (the "**Comeback Motion**").

GENERAL

63. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Sears Canada Entities or the Monitor may from time to time apply to this Court for advice and directions in the discharge of its powers and duties hereunder.

64. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as an interim receiver, a receiver, a receiver and manager, or a trustee in bankruptcy of the Sears Canada Entities, the Business or the Property.

65. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Sears Canada Entities, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to

the Sears Canada Entities and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Sears Canada Entities and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

66. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that each of the Applicants and the Monitor be at liberty and are hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order, and that the Monitor is authorized and empowered to act as a representative in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada, including acting as the foreign representative of the Applicants to apply to the United States Bankruptcy Court for relief pursuant to Chapter 15 of the *United States Bankruptcy Code*, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1515, as amended, and to act as foreign representative in respect of any such proceedings and any ancillary relief in respect thereto, and to take such other steps as may be authorized by the Court.

67. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any interested party (including the Sears Canada Entities and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order at the Comeback Motion on not less than seven (7) calendar days' notice to any other party or parties likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order.

68. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Confidential Appendix B and Confidential Appendix C to the Pre-Filing Report shall be and are hereby sealed, kept confidential and shall not form part of the public record pending further Order of this Court.

69. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard/Daylight Time on the date of this Order.

C. Irwin
Registrar

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

JUN 22 2017

PER / PAR:

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF SEARS CANADA INC., CORBEIL ÉLECTRIQUE INC., S.L.H. TRANSPORT INC., THE CUT INC., SEARS CONTACT SERVICES INC., INITIUM LOGISTICS SERVICES INC., INITIUM COMMERCE LABS INC., INITIUM TRADING AND SOURCING CORP., SEARS FLOOR COVERING CENTRES INC., 173470 CANADA INC., 2497089 ONTARIO INC., 6988741 CANADA INC., 10011711 CANADA INC., 1592580 ONTARIO LIMITED, 955041 ALBERTA LTD., 4201531 CANADA INC., 168886 CANADA INC., AND 3339611 CANADA INC. (collectively, the "Applicants")

Court File No. CV-17-11846-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(Commercial List)

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

INITIAL ORDER

OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP
Box 50, 1 First Canadian Place
Toronto, Canada M5X 1B8

Marc Wasserman (LSUC #: 44066M)
Tel: 416.862.4908

Jeremy Dacks (LSUC #: 41851R)
Tel: 416.862.4923

Michael De Lellis (LSUC #: 48038U)
Tel: 416.862.5997

Lawyers for the Applicants

TAB 13

Court File No. CV-17-00582960-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE	)	**TUESDAY, THE 19TH**
	)	
JUSTICE MYERS	)	**DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2017**

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TOYS "R" US (CANADA) LTD. TOYS "R" US (CANADA) LTEE

Applicant

INITIAL ORDER

THIS APPLICATION, made by Toys "R" Us (Canada) Ltd. Toys "R" Us (Canada) Ltee (the "**Applicant**"), pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**") was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the affidavit of Melanie Teed-Murch sworn September 19, 2017 and the exhibits thereto (the "**Initial Affidavit**") and the pre-filing report dated September 19, 2017 of the proposed monitor, Grant Thornton Limited (the "**Monitor**") and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicant, the Monitor, the Pre-Filing Agent, the DIP Agent and such other counsel as were present and wished to be heard, and on reading the consent of Grant Thornton Limited to act as the Monitor:

SERVICE AND DEFINITIONS

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Application and the Application Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Application is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that capitalized terms used but not defined in this Order shall have the meanings given to them in the Initial Affidavit.

APPLICATION

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Applicant is a company to which the CCAA applies.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "**Plan**").

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall remain in possession and control of its current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "**Property**"). Subject to further Order of this Court, the Applicant shall continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of its business (the "**Business**") and Property. The Applicant is authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the employees, consultants, advisors, agents, experts, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively, "**Assistants**") currently retained or employed by it, with liberty to retain such further Assistants as it deems reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business or for the carrying out of the terms of this Order.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall be entitled to continue to utilize the cash management system currently in place as described in the Initial Affidavit or replace it with

another substantially similar central cash management system (the "**Cash Management System**") and that any present or future bank providing the Cash Management System shall not be under any obligation whatsoever to inquire into the propriety, validity or legality of any transfer, payment, collection or other action taken under the Cash Management System, or as to the use or application by the Applicant of funds transferred, paid, collected or otherwise dealt with in the Cash Management System, shall be entitled to provide the Cash Management System without any liability in respect thereof to any Person (as hereinafter defined) other than the Applicant, pursuant to the terms of the documentation applicable to the Cash Management System, and shall be, in its capacity as provider of the Cash Management System, an unaffected creditor under the Plan with regard to any claims or expenses it may suffer or incur in connection with the provision of the Cash Management System.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall be entitled but not required to pay the following expenses and satisfy the following obligations whether incurred prior to, on or after the date of this Order to the extent that such expenses are incurred and payable by the Applicant:

(a) all outstanding and future wages, salaries, commissions, compensation, incentive payments, employee benefits (including, without limitation, employee medical, dental, vision, insurance and similar benefit plans or arrangements), vacation pay, salary continuance, expenses and director fees and expenses, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements, and all other payroll and benefits processing and servicing expenses;

(b) all outstanding and future contributions to or payments in respect of the Group RRSP and the DPSP in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements and applicable law;

(c) the fees and disbursements of any Assistants retained or employed by the Applicant, in accordance with the terms of their respective engagements;

(d) all outstanding and future amounts related to honouring customer obligations, whether existing before or after the date of this Order, including customer financing,

deposits, layaways, product warranties, pre-payments, refunds, exchanges, customer loyalty and reward programs, incentives, offers and benefits, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing policies and procedures;

(e) all outstanding and future amounts related to honouring gift cards and merchandise credits issued before or after the date of this Order;

(f) all outstanding and future amounts related to the continuation and administration of the Applicant's charitable and community initiatives, consistent with existing arrangements;

(g) with the consent of the Monitor and subject to the DIP Definitive Documents, amounts owing for goods or services supplied to the Applicant prior to the date of this Order by:

(i) logistics or supply chain providers, including transportation providers, customs brokers and freight forwarders, fuel providers, repair, maintenance and parts providers, warehouse providers and security and armoured truck carriers, and including amounts payable in respect of customs and duties for goods;

(ii) providers of information, internet and other technology, including e-commerce providers and related services;

(iii) providers of credit, debit, gift card or other payment processing and related services; and

(iv) other third party suppliers if, in the opinion of the Applicant following consultation with the Monitor, such payment is necessary to maintain the uninterrupted operations of the Business.

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein, the Applicant shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Applicant in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course on or after the date of this Order,

and in carrying out the provisions of this Order and any other Order of this Court, which expenses shall include, without limitation:

(a) all expenses and capital expenditures reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance (including directors and officers insurance and directors and officers run-off insurance), maintenance and security services; and

(b) payment for goods or services supplied or to be supplied to the Applicant on or after the date of this Order or to obtain the release of goods contracted for prior to the date of this Order.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:

(a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including, without limitation, amounts in respect of (i) employment insurance, (ii) Canada Pension Plan, (iii) Quebec Pension Plan and (iv) income taxes;

(b) all goods and services taxes, harmonized sales taxes or other applicable sales taxes (collectively, "**Sales Taxes**") required to be remitted by the Applicant in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Applicant, but only where such Sales Taxes are accrued or collected after the date of this Order, or where such Sales Taxes were accrued or collected prior to the date of this Order but not remitted until on or after the date of this Order; and

(c) any amount payable to the Crown in right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any political subdivision thereof or any other taxation authority in respect of municipal realty, municipal business or other taxes, assessments or levies of any nature or kind which are entitled at law to be paid in priority to claims of secured creditors and which are attributable to or in respect of the carrying on of the Business by the Applicant.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as specifically permitted herein, the Applicant is hereby directed, until further Order of this Court to:

(a) make no payments of principal, interest thereon or otherwise on account of amounts owing by the Applicant to any of its creditors as of this date, provided however that the Applicant is authorized and directed to make all such payments as required pursuant to and in accordance with the DIP Agreement (as hereinafter defined), including, without limitation, as may be necessary to complete the repayment of the ABL Credit Facility;

(b) grant no security interests, trust, liens, charges or encumbrances upon or in respect of any of its Property; and

(c) not grant credit or incur liabilities except in the ordinary course of the Business or pursuant to this Order or any other Order of this Court.

RESTRUCTURING

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall, subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA and such covenants as may be contained in the DIP Definitive Documents (as hereinafter defined), have the right to:

(a) permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of its Business or operations, and to dispose of redundant or non-material assets not exceeding $2 million in any one transaction or $5 million in the aggregate in any series of related transactions;

(b) terminate the employment of such of its employees or temporarily or indefinitely lay off such of its employees as it deems appropriate;

(c) subject to the requirements of the CCAA and paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Order, vacate, abandon or quit any leased premises and disclaim or resiliate any real property lease and any ancillary agreements relating to any leased premises, provided that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this paragraph 11, the Applicant may permanently but not temporarily cease, downsize, or shut down their Business

operations in a leased premise and may disclaim the whole, but not part, of a lease agreement with respect to a leased premise;

(d) disclaim such of its arrangements or agreements of any nature whatsoever with whomsoever, whether oral or written, as the Applicant deems appropriate, in accordance with Section 32 of the CCAA; and

(e) pursue all avenues of refinancing or restructuring of its Business or Property, in whole or part, subject to prior approval of this Court being obtained before any material refinancing,

all of the foregoing to permit the Applicant to proceed with an orderly restructuring of the Business (the "**Restructuring**").

REAL PROPERTY LEASES

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until a real property lease is disclaimed or resiliated in accordance with the CCAA, the Applicant shall pay, without duplication, all amounts constituting rent or payable as rent under real property leases (including, for greater certainty, common area maintenance charges, utilities and realty taxes and any other amounts payable to the landlord under the lease but, for greater certainty, excluding accelerated rent or penalties, fees or other charges arising as a result of the insolvency of the Applicant or any affiliate thereof, the making of this Order, or the commencement of any insolvency proceeding (including, without limitation, the Chapter 11 Proceedings) in respect of the Applicant or any affiliate thereof in the United States or any other foreign jurisdiction (a "**Foreign Proceeding**")) or as otherwise may be negotiated between the Applicant and the landlord from time to time ("**Rent**"), for the period commencing from and including the date of this Order, monthly in advance, on the first day of each month. On the date of the first of such payments, any Rent relating to the period commencing from and including the date of this Order shall also be paid.

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall provide each of the relevant landlords with notice of the Applicant's intention to remove any fixtures from any leased premises at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the intended removal. The relevant landlord shall be entitled to have a representative present in the leased premises to observe such removal and, if the

landlord disputes the Applicant's entitlement to remove any such fixture under the provisions of the lease, such fixture shall remain on the premises and shall be dealt with as agreed between any applicable secured creditors, such landlord and the Applicant, or by further Order of this Court upon application by the Applicant on at least two (2) days' notice to such landlord and any such secured creditors. If the Applicant disclaims or resiliates the lease governing such leased premises in accordance with Section 32 of the CCAA, it shall not be required to pay Rent under such lease pending resolution of any such dispute (other than Rent payable for the notice period provided for in Section 32(5) of the CCAA), and the disclaimer or resiliation of the lease shall be without prejudice to the Applicant's claim to the fixtures in dispute.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if a notice of disclaimer or resiliation is delivered pursuant to Section 32 of the CCAA by the Applicant, then (a) during the notice period prior to the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the landlord may show the affected leased premises to prospective tenants during normal business hours, on giving the Applicant and the Monitor five (5) business days' prior written notice, and (b) at the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the relevant landlord shall be entitled to take possession of any such leased premises without waiver of or prejudice to any claims or rights such landlord may have against the Applicant in respect of such lease or leased premises, provided that nothing herein shall relieve such landlord of its obligation to mitigate any damages claimed in connection therewith.

STAY OF PROCEEDINGS

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that until and including October 19, 2017 or such later date as this Court may order (the "**Stay Period**"), no proceeding or enforcement process in any court or tribunal (each, a "**Proceeding**") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the Applicant or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, except with the written consent of the Applicant, the Monitor and DIP Agent, or with leave of this Court, and any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Applicant or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further Order of this Court.

NO EXERCISE OF RIGHTS OR REMEDIES

16. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all rights and remedies of any individual, firm, corporation, governmental body or agency or any other entities (all of the foregoing, collectively being "**Persons**" and each being a "**Person**") against or in respect of the Applicant or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, are hereby stayed and suspended except with the written consent of the Applicant, the Monitor and the DIP Agent, or leave of this Court, provided that nothing in this Order shall (a) empower the Applicant to carry on any business which the Applicant is not lawfully entitled to carry on, (b) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by Section 11.1 of the CCAA, (c) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest, or (d) prevent the registration of a claim for lien.

NO INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, no Person shall discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, lease, sublease, licence or permit in favour of or held by the Applicant except with the written consent of the Applicant, the Monitor and the DIP Agent, or leave of this Court.

CONTINUATION OF SERVICES

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, all Persons having oral or written agreements with the Applicant or statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods and/or services, including without limitation all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll and benefits services, insurance, warranty services, employment agency, transportation services, freight services, utility, customs clearing, warehouse and logistics services or other services, to the Business or the Applicant are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with or terminating the supply of such goods or services as may be required by the Applicant, and that the Applicant shall be entitled to the continued use of its current premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses and domain names, provided in each case that the normal

prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the date of this Order are paid by the Applicant in accordance with normal payment practices of the Applicant or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and each of the Applicant and the Monitor, or as may be ordered by this Court.

NON-DEROGATION OF RIGHTS

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding anything else in this Order, no Person shall be prohibited from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided on or after the date of this Order, nor shall any Person be under any obligation on or after the date of this Order to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to the Applicant. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the rights conferred and obligations imposed by the CCAA.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that during the Stay Period, and except as permitted by subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA, no Proceeding may be commenced or continued against any of the former, current or future directors or officers of the Applicant with respect to any claim against the directors or officers that arose before the date hereof and that relates to any obligation of the Applicant whereby the directors or officers are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors or officers for the payment or performance of such obligation.

DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INDEMNIFICATION AND CHARGE

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall indemnify its current and future directors and officers (the "**Directors and Officers**") against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as directors or officers of the Applicant after the commencement of the within proceedings, including, without limitation, in respect of any failure to pay wages and source deductions, vacation pay, or other payments of the nature referred to in paragraphs 7(a), 7(b) and 9 of this Order, except to the extent that, with respect to any director or officer, the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Directors and Officers shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**Directors' Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $41.5 million, as security for the indemnity provided in paragraph 21 of this Order. The Directors' Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 40 and 42 herein.

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any language in any applicable insurance policy to the contrary, (a) no insurer shall be entitled to be subrogated to or claim the benefit of the Directors' Charge, and (b) the Directors and Officers shall only be entitled to the benefit of the Directors' Charge to the extent that they do not have coverage under any directors' and officers' insurance policy, or to the extent that such coverage is insufficient to pay amounts indemnified in accordance with paragraph 21 of this Order.

APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Grant Thornton Limited is hereby appointed pursuant to the CCAA as the Monitor, an officer of this Court, to monitor the business and financial affairs of the Applicant with the powers and obligations set out in the CCAA and as set forth herein and that the Applicant and its shareholders, affiliates, officers, directors, advisors and Assistants shall advise the Monitor of all material steps taken by the Applicant pursuant to this Order, and shall co-operate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and the discharge of its obligations and shall provide the Monitor with the assistance that is necessary to enable the Monitor to adequately carry out the Monitor's functions.

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is hereby directed and empowered to:

(a) monitor the Applicant's receipts and disbursements;

(b) report to this Court at such times and intervals as the Monitor may deem appropriate with respect to matters relating to the Property, the Business and such other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein;

(c) advise and assist the Applicant in the development of the Plan and any amendments to the Plan;

(d) assist the Applicant, to the extent required by the Applicant, with the holding and administering of creditors' or shareholders' meetings for voting on the Plan;

(e) review, ~~to the extent required by the Applicant,~~ the Applicant's cash flow statements and other reporting to be delivered by the Applicant to the DIP Agent;

(f) have full and complete access to the Property, including the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form, and other financial documents of the Applicant, to the extent that is necessary to adequately assess the Applicant's business and financial affairs or to perform its duties arising under this Order;

(g) assist the Applicant, to the extent required by the Applicant, with respect to the consideration, development and implementation of any Restructuring initiatives;

(h) assist the Applicant with respect to any Foreign Proceeding and monitor and report to this Court, as it deems appropriate, on the Foreign Proceeding;

(i) be at liberty to engage independent legal counsel or such other persons as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable, including the services or employees of its affiliates, respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under this Order; and

(j) perform such other duties as are required by this Order or by this Court from time to time.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and shall take no part whatsoever in the management or supervision of the management of the Business and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder, be deemed to have taken or maintained possession or control of the Business or Property, or any part thereof.

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing herein contained shall require the Monitor to occupy or to take control, care, charge, possession or management (separately and/or

collectively, "**Possession**") of any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, might be a pollutant or a contaminant or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to any federal, provincial or other law respecting the protection, conservation, enhancement, remediation or rehabilitation of the environment or relating to the disposal of waste or other contamination including, without limitation, the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act*, the Ontario *Environmental Protection Act*, the *Ontario Water Resources Act*, or the Ontario *Occupational Health and Safety Act* and regulations thereunder (collectively, the "**Environmental Legislation**"), provided however that nothing herein shall exempt the Monitor from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by applicable Environmental Legislation. The Monitor shall not, as a result of this Order or anything done in pursuance of the Monitor's duties and powers under this Order, be deemed to be in Possession of any of the Property within the meaning of any Environmental Legislation, unless it is actually in possession.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall provide any creditor of the Applicant and the DIP Agent with information provided by the Applicant in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by such creditor addressed to the Monitor. The Monitor shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to the information disseminated by it pursuant to this paragraph. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Applicant is confidential, the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by this Court or on such terms as the Monitor and the Applicant may agree.

29. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, in addition to the rights and protections afforded the Monitor under the CCAA or as an officer of this Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA or any applicable legislation.

30. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, Alvarez & Marsal Canada ULC ("**A&M Canada**") and Canadian counsel to the Applicant and (collectively, the "**Administrative Parties**") shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case on the terms set forth in their respective engagement letters and at their standard rates and charges

and whether incurred prior to, on or after the date hereof, by the Applicant as part of the costs of these proceedings. The Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to pay the accounts of the Administrative Parties in accordance with the payment terms agreed between the Applicant and such parties and, in addition, the Applicant is hereby authorized to have paid the Administrative Parties retainers in the aggregate amount of $500,000 as has been agreed with such Administrative Parties to be held by them as security for payment of their respective fees and disbursements outstanding from time to time.

31. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor and its legal counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time, and for this purpose the accounts of the Monitor and its legal counsel are hereby referred to a judge of the Commercial List of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

32. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Administrative Parties shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "**Administration Charge**") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of $2 million, as security for the professional fees and disbursements of the Administrative Parties, incurred at their standard rates and charges and on the terms set forth in their respective engagement letters, both before and after the making of this Order in respect of these proceedings. The Administration Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 40 and 42 hereof.

DIP FINANCING

33. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant is hereby authorized and empowered to obtain and borrow under a credit facility (the "**DIP Credit Facility**") pursuant to the Superpriority Secured Debtor-in-Possession Credit Agreement dated September 19, 2017 substantially in the form attached as Exhibit "F" to the Initial Affidavit (as it may be amended, the "**DIP Agreement**") among, *inter alia*, the Applicant, the other credit parties thereto, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as administrative agent and collateral agent, and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Toronto Branch, as Canadian administrative agent (collectively and individually, the "**DIP Agent**") and the lenders party thereto, for the purposes set out in the DIP Agreement and the DIP Budget (as defined in the DIP Agreement), provided that borrowings by the Applicant under the DIP Credit Facility shall not exceed US$500 million unless permitted by further Order of this Court.

34. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the DIP Credit Facility shall be on the terms and subject to the conditions of the DIP Agreement.

35. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant is hereby authorized and empowered to execute and deliver the DIP Agreement and such other credit agreements, mortgages, charges, hypothecs and security documents, guarantees and other documents (collectively, and together with the DIP Agreement and any agreement entered into in connection with any transaction arising out of any Bank Products or Cash Management Services, the "**DIP Definitive Documents**") as may be reasonably required by the DIP Agent on behalf of each Secured Party (as defined in the DIP Agreement) (collectively, the "**DIP Secured Parties**") in connection with the DIP Credit Facility, and the Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to pay and perform all of its indebtedness, interest, fees, liabilities and obligations to the DIP Agent and the DIP Secured Parties under and pursuant to the DIP Credit Facility and the DIP Definitive Documents as and when the same become due and are to be performed, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order.

36. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the DIP Agent (for the benefit of the DIP Secured Parties) shall be entitled to the benefit of and is hereby granted a charge (the "**DIP Charge**") on the Property, subject to the Trademark Carve-Out, as security for the Applicant's obligations to the DIP Secured Parties pursuant to the DIP Definitive Documents, which DIP Charge shall not secure an obligation that exists before this Order is made. The DIP Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 40 and 42 hereof.

37. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order:

(a) the DIP Agent may take such steps from time to time as it may deem necessary or appropriate to file, register, record or perfect the DIP Charge or any of the DIP Definitive Documents;

(b) upon the occurrence of an event of default under the DIP Definitive Documents or the DIP Charge, the DIP Agent, on behalf of the DIP Secured Parties: (i) upon five (5) business days' written notice to the Applicant and the Monitor, may exercise any and all of the respective rights and remedies of the DIP Agent and the DIP Secured

Parties against the Applicant or the Property under or pursuant to the DIP Definitive Documents and the DIP Charge, including without limitation, to apply to this Court for the appointment of a receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver, or for a bankruptcy order against the Applicant and for the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicant, or to seize and retain proceeds from the sale of the Property and the cash flow of the Applicant to repay amounts owing to the DIP Secured Parties in accordance with the DIP Definitive Documents (subject in each case to the priorities set out in paragraph 40 of this Order) and; (ii) immediately upon providing written notice of the occurrence of an Event of Default to the Applicant and the Monitor, may cease making advances to the Applicant and set off and/or consolidate any amounts owing by the DIP Secured Parties to the Applicant against the obligations of the Applicant to the DIP Secured Parties under the DIP Definitive Documents or the DIP Charge, and make demand, accelerate payment and give other notices; and

(c) the foregoing rights and remedies of the DIP Agent on behalf of the DIP Secured Parties shall be enforceable against any trustee in bankruptcy, interim receiver, receiver or receiver and manager of any of the Applicant or the Property.

38. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that, unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the DIP Agent on behalf of the DIP Secured Parties, the DIP Agent and the DIP Secured Parties shall be treated as unaffected in any plan of arrangement or compromise filed by the Applicant under the CCAA, or any proposal filed by the Applicant under the BIA, with respect to any advances made pursuant to the DIP Credit Facility or the DIP Definitive Documents.

39. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order shall be construed as relieving the Applicant from its obligations to comply with the DIP Budget.

VALIDITY AND PRIORITY OF CHARGES CREATED BY THIS ORDER

40. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the priorities of the Administration Charge, the Directors' Charge and the DIP Charge (collectively, the "**Charges**") as among them, shall be as follows:

First – the Administration Charge;

Second – the Directors' Charge; and

Third – the DIP Charge.

41. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the filing, registration or perfection of the Charges shall not be required, and that the Charges shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected subsequent to the Charges coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.

42. **THIS COURT ORDERS that** each of the Charges shall constitute a charge on the Property (subject, solely in the case of the DIP Charge, to the Trademark Carve-Out) and such Charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges, encumbrances and claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (collectively, the "**Encumbrances**") in favour of any Person, notwithstanding the order of perfection or attachment, other than (a) any validly perfected security interest under the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario) or such other applicable provincial legislation that has not been served with notice of this Order; and (b) statutory super-priority deemed trusts and liens for unpaid employee source deductions. For the avoidance of doubt: (i) the Administration Charge and the Directors' Charge shall rank in priority to the security interest of the Pre-Filing Agent; and (ii) the DIP Charge shall rank in priority to the security interest of the Pre-Filing Agent immediately upon the DIP Credit Facility being used to repay in full all obligations and amounts owing to the Pre-Filing Agent under the ABL Credit Facility. The contractual security (including any hypothecary security) granted by the Applicant to the DIP Agent on behalf of the DIP Secured Parties shall have the same priority as the DIP Charge.

43. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant shall be entitled, on a subsequent motion on notice to those Persons likely to be affected thereby, to seek priority of the Charges ahead of any Encumbrance over which the Charges have not obtained priority.

44. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Applicant shall not grant any Encumbrances over any

Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, any of the Charges, unless the Applicant also obtains the prior written consent of the Monitor and any Persons entitled to the benefit of the Charges (the "**Chargees**") affected thereby or further Order of this Court.

45. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Charges and the DIP Definitive Documents shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the Chargees and the rights and remedies of the DIP Agent and the DIP Secured Parties under the DIP Definitive Documents shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by (a) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made herein; (b) any application(s) for bankruptcy or receivership order(s) issued pursuant to the BIA or otherwise, or any bankruptcy or receivership order made pursuant to such applications; (c) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA; (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other agreement (collectively, an "**Agreement**") which binds the Applicant, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:

(a) neither the creation of the Charges nor the execution, delivery, perfection, registration or performance of the DIP Definitive Documents shall create or be deemed to constitute a breach by the Applicant of any Agreement to which it is a party;

(b) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any obligation or Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the Charges or the execution, delivery or performance of the DIP Definitive Documents; and

(c) the payments made by the Applicant pursuant to this Order or the DIP Definitive Documents, and the granting of the Charges, do not and will not constitute preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers at undervalue, oppressive conduct or other challengeable or voidable transactions under any applicable law.

46. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any Charge created by this Order over leases of real property in Canada shall only be a Charge in the Applicant's interest in such real property leases.

CROSS-BORDER PROTOCOL

47. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the cross-border protocol in the form attached as Schedule "A" hereto (the "**Cross-Border Protocol**") is hereby approved and shall become effective upon its approval by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and the parties to these proceedings and any other Person shall be governed by and shall comply with the Cross-Border Protocol.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

48. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall (i) without delay, publish in the Globe and Mail and Le Devoir a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA, (ii) within five days after the date of this Order, (A) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (B) send, in the prescribed manner, a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the Applicant of more than $1,000 and (C) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with Section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder.

49. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the E-Service Protocol of the Commercial List (the "**Protocol**") is approved and adopted by reference herein and, in this proceeding, the service of documents made in accordance with the Protocol (which can be found on the Commercial List website at http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practice-directions/toronto/eservice-commercial/) shall be valid and effective service. Subject to Rule 17.05 this Order shall constitute an order for substituted service pursuant to Rule 16.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Subject to Rule 3.01(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and paragraph 21 of the Protocol, service of documents in accordance with the Protocol will be effective on transmission. This Court further orders that a case website shall be established in accordance with the Protocol with the following URL: www.grantthornton.ca/ToysRUs (the "**Website**").

50. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Monitor shall create, maintain and update as necessary a list of all Persons appearing in person or by counsel in this proceeding (the "**Service List**"). The Monitor shall post the Service List, as may be updated from time to time, on the

Website, provided that the Monitor shall have no liability in respect of the accuracy of, or the timeliness of making any changes to, the Service List.

51. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that if the service or distribution of documents in accordance with the Protocol is not practicable, the Applicant and the Monitor are at liberty to serve or distribute this Order, any other materials and orders in these proceedings, and any notices or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery or facsimile or other electronic transmission to the Applicant's creditors or other interested parties at their respective addresses as last shown on the records of the Applicant and that any such service or distribution shall be deemed to be received: (a) if sent by courier, on the next business day following the date of forwarding thereof, (b) if delivered by personal delivery or facsimile or other electronic transmission, on the day so delivered, and (c) if sent by ordinary mail, on the third business day after mailing.

52. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant and the Monitor and their counsel are at liberty to serve or distribute this Order, any other materials and orders as may be reasonably required in these proceedings, including any notices, or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by electronic message to the Applicant's creditors or other interested parties and their advisors. For greater certainty, any such distribution or service shall be deemed to be in satisfaction of a legal or judicial obligation, and notice requirements within the meaning of clause 3(c) of the *Electronic Commerce Protection Regulations*, Reg. 81000-2-175 (SOR/DORS).

53. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except with respect to any motion to be heard on the Comeback Date (as defined below), and subject to further Order of this Court in respect of urgent motions, any interested party wishing to object to the relief sought in a motion brought in these proceedings shall, subject to further Order of this Court, provide the Service List with responding motion materials or a written notice (including by e-mail) stating its objection to the motion and the grounds for such objection no later than 5:00 p.m. (Toronto time) on the date that is four (4) days prior to the date such motion is returnable (the "**Objection Deadline**"). The Monitor shall have the ability to extend the Objection Deadline after consulting with the Applicant and the DIP Agent.

54. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that following the expiry of the Objection Deadline, counsel to the Monitor or counsel to the Applicant shall inform the Court, including by way of a 9:30 a.m. appointment, of the absence or the status of any objections to the motion and the judge having carriage of the motion may determine whether the motion should proceed at a 9:30 a.m. chambers appointment or otherwise on consent, or whether a hearing will be held in the ordinary course on the date specified in the notice of motion.

GENERAL

55. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant or the Monitor may from time to time apply to this Court to amend, vary or supplement this Order or for advice and directions concerning the discharge of their respective powers and duties under this Order or the interpretation or application of this Order.

56. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that nothing in this Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as an interim receiver, a receiver, a receiver and manager, or a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicant, the Business or the Property.

57. **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada, the United States, or in any other foreign jurisdiction, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicant, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicant and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding or to assist the Applicant and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

58. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the Applicant and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order.

59. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any interested party (other than the Applicant and the Monitor) that wishes to amend or vary this Order shall bring a motion before this Court on a date to be set by this Court upon the granting of this Order (the "**Comeback Date**"), and any such interested party shall give seven (7) days' notice to the Service List and any other party or parties likely to be affected by the relief sought by such party in advance of the Comeback Date, provided that the DIP Agent and the DIP Secured Parties shall be entitled to rely on this Order as issued and entered and on the DIP Charge, up and to the date this Order may be varied or stayed.

60. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. (Toronto time) on the date of this Order.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT A TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO:

SEP 19 2017

PER / PAR:

SCHEDULE "A"

FORM OF CROSS-BORDER PROTOCOL

[ATTACHED]

CROSS-BORDER RESTRUCTURING PROTOCOL

Between the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Case No. 17-34665 (KLP)) and the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) (Court File No. CV-17-00582960-00CL)

This cross-border insolvency protocol (the "**Protocol**") shall govern the conduct of all parties in interest in the Restructuring Proceedings (as such term is defined herein).

The Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases (the "**Guidelines**") attached hereto as Schedule "A" are hereby incorporated by reference and form part of this Protocol. Where there is any discrepancy between the Protocol and the Guidelines, this Protocol shall govern.

A. Background

1. Toys "R" Us, Inc. ("**Toys U.S.**"), a company incorporated in the State of Delaware, is the ultimate parent company of an international enterprise that is the leading global speciality retailer of toys and baby products in the United States (the "**U.S.**"), Canada and other countries. On September 18, 2017 (the "**Filing Date**"), Toys U.S. and its direct and indirect subsidiaries listed on Schedule "B" hereto (collectively, the "**U.S. Debtors**") as well as Toys "R" Us (Canada) Ltd. Toys "R" Us (Canada) Ltee ("**Toys Canada**" and with the U.S. Debtors, the "**Debtors**") commenced cases (the "**Chapter 11 Cases**") under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "**Bankruptcy Code**") in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (the "**U.S. Court**") and Toys Canada also commenced a reorganization proceeding in Canada (the "**CCAA Proceeding**" and together with the Chapter 11 Cases, the "**Restructuring Proceedings**") by filing an application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**") with the Ontario Superior Court of Justice

(Commercial List) (the "**Canadian Court**" and together with the U.S. Court, the "**Courts**" and each individually, a "**Court**").

2. On the Filing Date, the Canadian Court issued an Initial Order (as may be amended from time to time, the "**Initial Order**") which, *inter alia*: (a) granted Toys Canada relief under the CCAA; (b) appointed Grant Thornton Limited as monitor of Toys Canada (in that capacity, the "**Monitor**"), with the rights powers, duties and limitations upon liabilities set forth in the CCAA and the Initial Order; and (c) granted a stay of proceedings in respect of Toys Canada.

3. The Debtors continue to operate their businesses and manage their properties as debtors-in-possession under the supervision of the Courts pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code, the CCAA and the Initial Order, as applicable.

4. The Office of the United States Trustee (the "**U.S. Trustee**") has not yet appointed an official committee of unsecured creditors (the "**Creditors' Committee**") in the Chapter 11 Cases.

B. Purpose and Goals

5. While the Chapter 11 Cases and the CCAA Proceeding are full and separate proceedings pending in the U.S. and Canada, the implementation of administrative procedures and cross-border guidelines is both necessary and desirable to coordinate certain activities in the Restructuring Proceedings, protect the rights of parties thereto, ensure the maintenance of each Court's respective independent jurisdiction and give effect to any applicable doctrines, including, comity. Accordingly, this Protocol has been developed to promote the following mutually desirable goals and objectives in the Restructuring Proceedings:

(a) harmonize and coordinate activities in the Restructuring Proceedings before the Courts;

(b) promote the orderly and efficient administration of the Restructuring Proceedings to, among other things, maximize the efficiency of the Restructuring Proceedings, reduce the costs associated therewith and avoid duplication of effort;

(c) honor the independence and integrity of the Courts and other courts and tribunals of the U.S. and Canada, respectively;

(d) promote international cooperation and respect for comity among the Courts, the Debtors, any Creditors' Committee, the U.S. Representatives (defined below), the Canadian Representatives (defined below) (together with the U.S. Representatives, the "**Estate Representatives**"), the U.S. Trustee and other creditors and interested parties in the Restructuring Proceedings;

(e) facilitate the fair, open and efficient administration of the Restructuring Proceedings for the benefit of all of the Debtors' creditors and other interested parties, wherever located; and

(f) implement a framework of general principles to address basic administrative issues arising out of the cross-border nature of the Restructuring Proceedings.

As the Restructuring Proceedings progress, the Courts may also jointly determine that other cross-border matters that may arise in the Restructuring Proceedings should be dealt with under and in accordance with the principles of this Protocol. Subject to the provisions of this Protocol, where an issue is to be addressed only to one Court, in rendering a determination in any

cross-border matter, such Court may: (a) to the extent practical or advisable, consult with the other Court; and (b) in its sole discretion while considering principles of comity, either (i) render a binding decision after such consultation; (ii) defer to the determination of the other Court by transferring the matter, in whole or part, to the other Court; or (iii) seek a Joint Hearing of both Courts.

C. Comity and Independence of the Courts

6. The approval and implementation of this Protocol shall not divest nor diminish the U.S. Court's and the Canadian Court's respective independent jurisdiction of the subject matter of the Chapter 11 Cases and the CCAA Proceeding, respectively. By approving and implementing this Protocol, neither the U.S. Court, the Canadian Court, the Debtors, the Estate Representatives nor any creditors or interested parties shall be deemed to have approved or engaged in any infringement on the sovereignty of the U.S. or Canada.

7. The U.S. Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction and power over the conduct of the Chapter 11 Cases and the hearing and determination of matters arising in the Chapter 11 Cases. The Canadian Court shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction and power over the conduct of the CCAA Proceeding and the hearing and determination of matters arising in the CCAA Proceeding.

8. In accordance with the principles of comity and independence recognized herein, nothing contained herein shall be construed to:

(a) increase, decrease or otherwise modify the independence, sovereignty or jurisdiction of the U.S. Court, the Canadian Court or any other court or tribunal in

the U.S. or Canada, including the ability of any such court or tribunal to provide appropriate relief under applicable law on an *ex parte* or "limited notice" basis;

(b) require the U.S. Court to take any action that is inconsistent with its obligations under the laws of the U.S.;

(c) require the Canadian Court to take any action that is inconsistent with its obligations under the laws of Canada or the laws of the applicable Province therein;

(d) require the Debtors, the Monitor, the Creditors' Committee, the Estate Representatives or the U.S. Trustee to take any action or refrain from taking any action that would result in a breach of any duty imposed on them by any applicable law;

(e) authorize any action that requires the specific approval of one or both of the Courts under the Bankruptcy Code or the CCAA after appropriate notice and a hearing (except to the extent that such action is specifically described in this Protocol); or

(f) preclude the Debtors, the Monitor, the Creditors' Committee, the Estate Representatives, the U.S. Trustee, or any creditor or other interested party from asserting such party's substantive rights under the applicable laws of the U.S., Canada or any other relevant jurisdiction including, without limitation, the rights of parties in interest to appeal from the decisions taken by one or both of the Courts.

9. Subject to the terms hereof, the Debtors, the Creditors' Committee, the Estate Representatives and their respective employees, members, agents and professionals shall respect and comply with the independent, non-delegable duties imposed upon them by the Bankruptcy Code, the CCAA, the Initial Order, other applicable laws and orders of the Courts, as applicable.

D. Cooperation

10. To assist in the efficient administration of the Restructuring Proceedings and in recognizing that a Debtor may be a creditor of another Debtor's estate, each of the Debtors and its respective Estate Representatives shall, where appropriate: (a) cooperate with the others in connection with actions taken in both the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court; and (b) take any other appropriate steps to coordinate the administration of the Restructuring Proceedings for the benefit of the Debtors' respective estates and stakeholders.

11. To harmonize and coordinate the administration of the Restructuring Proceedings, the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court each may coordinate activities and consider whether it is appropriate to defer to the judgment of the other Court. In furtherance of the foregoing:

(a) The U.S. Court and the Canadian Court may communicate with one another, with or without counsel present, with respect to any procedural matter relating to the Restructuring Proceedings.

(b) If the issue of the proper jurisdiction of either Court to determine an issue is raised by an interested party in either of the Restructuring Proceedings or a written request for a Joint Hearing (as defined below) is made with respect to any relief sought in either Court, the Courts may consult with one another to determine an appropriate process by which the issue of jurisdiction will be

determined. Such process shall be subject to submissions by the Debtors, the U.S. Trustee, the Creditors' Committee, the Estate Representatives, the Monitor and any interested party prior to any determination on the issue of jurisdiction or Joint Hearing request being made by either Court, and such issue of jurisdiction or Joint Hearing request shall be decided prior to the adjudication of the matter in the Court such matter was originally brought.

(c) The Courts may, but are not obligated to, coordinate activities in the Restructuring Proceedings such that the subject matter of any particular action, suit, request, application, contested matter or other proceeding is determined in a single Court.

(d) The U.S. Court and the Canadian Court may conduct joint hearings (each, a "**Joint Hearing**") with respect to any matter relating to the conduct, administration, determination, or disposition of any aspect of the Chapter 11 Cases or the CCAA Proceeding, including, the interpretation or implementation of this Protocol, where both Courts consider such a Joint Hearing to be necessary or advisable. With respect to any Joint Hearing, unless otherwise ordered or agreed to by the Courts, the following procedures will be followed:

(i) A telephone or video link shall be established so that both the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court shall be able to simultaneously hear the proceedings in the other Court.

(ii) Notices, submissions, motions or applications by any party (collectively, the "**Pleadings**") that are or become the subject of a Joint Hearing shall be made or filed initially only to the Court in which such party is appearing

and seeking relief. Promptly after the scheduling of any Joint Hearing, the party submitting such Pleadings to one Court shall file courtesy copies with the other Court. In any event, Pleadings in respect of relief sought from both Courts shall be filed with both Courts.

(iii) Any party intending to rely on any written evidentiary materials in support of a submission to the U.S. Court or the Canadian Court in connection with any Joint Hearing or application (collectively, the "**Evidentiary Materials**") shall file or otherwise submit such materials to both Courts in advance of the Joint Hearing. To the fullest extent possible, the Evidentiary Materials filed in each Court shall be identical and shall be consistent with the procedural and evidentiary rules and requirements of each Court.

(iv) If a party has not previously appeared in or attorned or does not wish to attorn to the jurisdiction of a Court, it shall be entitled to file Pleadings or Evidentiary Materials in connection with the Joint Hearing without, by the mere act of such filings or appearance, being deemed to have attorned to the jurisdiction of the Court in which such material is filed, so long as it does not request in its materials or submissions any affirmative relief from such Court.

(v) The Judge of the U.S. Court and the Justice of the Canadian Court who will preside over the Joint Hearings shall be entitled to communicate with each other in advance of any Joint Hearing, with or without counsel being

present, to: (a) establish guidelines for the orderly submission of Pleadings, Evidentiary Materials, and other papers and for the rendering of decisions by the Courts; and (b) to address any related procedural, administrative or preliminary matters.

(vi) The Judge of the U.S. Court and the Justice of the Canadian Court who preside over any Joint Hearing, shall be entitled to communicate with each other during or after any Joint Hearing, with or without counsel present, for the purposes of (a) determining whether consistent rulings can be made by both Courts; (b) coordinating the terms upon the Courts' respective rulings; and (c) addressing any other procedural or administrative matters.

12. Notwithstanding the terms of paragraph 11 above, this Protocol recognizes that the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court are independent courts. Accordingly, although the Courts will seek to cooperate and coordinate with each other in good faith, each Court shall be entitled at all times to exercise its independent jurisdiction and authority with respect to: (a) matters presented to and properly before such Court; and (b) the conduct of the parties appearing in such matters.

13. Notwithstanding the foregoing, or anything to the contrary herein, in the interest of cooperation and coordination of these proceedings, each Court shall recognize and consider all privileges applicable to communications between counsel and parties, including those contemplated by the common interest doctrine or like privileges, which would be applicable in each respective Court. Such privileges in connection with communications shall be applicable in both Courts with respect to all parties to these proceedings having any requisite common interest.

14. Where one Court has jurisdiction over a matter which requires the application of the law of the jurisdiction of the other Court in order to determine an issue before it, the Court with jurisdiction over such matter may, among other things, hear expert evidence or seek the advice and direction of the other Court in respect of the foreign law to be applied, subject to paragraph 30 herein.

E. Recognition of Stay of Proceedings

15. The Canadian Court hereby recognizes the validity of the stay of proceedings and actions against or respecting the Debtors and their property under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code (the "**U.S. Stay**"). In implementing the terms of this paragraph, the Canadian Court may consult with the U.S. Court regarding the interpretation, extent, scope and applicability of the U.S. Stay and any orders of the U.S. Court modifying or granting relief from the U.S. Stay.

16. The U.S. Court hereby recognizes the validity of the stay of proceedings and actions against or respecting Toys Canada, its property and the current and former directors and officers of Toys Canada under the CCAA and the Initial Order (the "**Canadian Stay**"). In implementing the terms of this paragraph, the U.S. Court may consult with the Canadian Court regarding the interpretation, extent, scope and applicability of the Canadian Stay and any orders of the Canadian Court modifying or granting relief from the Canadian Stay.

17. Nothing contained herein shall affect or limit the Debtors' or other parties' rights to assert the applicability or non-applicability of the U.S. Stay or the Canadian Stay to any particular proceeding, property, asset, activity or other matter, wherever pending or located. Subject to the terms hereof: (a) any motion with respect to the application of the stay of proceedings issued by the Canadian Court in the CCAA Proceeding shall be heard and determined by the Canadian

Court and (b) any motion with respect to the application of the stay under section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code shall be heard and determined by the U.S. Court.

F. Retention and Compensation of Representatives and Professionals

18. The Monitor, its officers, directors, employees, counsel, agents, and any other professionals retained therefor, wherever located (collectively, the "**Monitor Parties**") and any other estate representatives in the CCAA Proceeding (collectively, the "**Canadian Representatives**") shall be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Court with respect to all matters, including: (a) the Canadian Representatives' appointment and tenure in office; (b) the retention and compensation of the Canadian Representatives; (c) the Canadian Representatives' liability, if any, to any person or entity, including the Debtors and any third parties, in connection with the Restructuring Proceedings; and (d) the hearing and determination of any other matters related to the Canadian Representatives arising in the CCAA Proceeding under the CCAA or other applicable Canadian law. Additionally, the Canadian Representatives: (x) shall not be required to seek approval of their retention in the U.S. Court for services rendered in the CCAA Proceedings; (y) shall be compensated for their services solely in accordance with the CCAA, the Initial Order and other applicable laws of Canada or orders of the Canadian Court; and (z) shall not be required to seek approval of their compensation in the U.S. Court.

19. The Monitor Parties shall be entitled to the protections of section 306 of the Bankruptcy Code and the same protections and immunities in the U.S. as those granted to them under the CCAA and the Initial Order. In particular, except as otherwise provided in any subsequent order entered in the CCAA Proceeding, the Monitor Parties shall incur no liability or obligations as a

result of the appointment of the Monitor, the carrying out of its duties or the provisions of the CCAA and the Initial Order by the Monitor Parties, except any such liability arising from actions of the Monitor Parties constituting gross negligence or willful misconduct.

20. Any estate representative appointed in the Chapter 11 Cases, including without limitation, any restructuring officer appointed under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code and any examiners or trustees appointed in accordance with section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code (collectively, the "**U.S. Representatives**") shall be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Court with respect to all matters, including: (a) the U.S. Representatives' appointment and tenure in office; (b) the retention and compensation of the U.S. Representatives; (c) the U.S. Representatives' liability, if any, to any person or entity, including the Debtors and any third parties, in connection with the Restructuring Proceedings; and (d) the hearing and determination of any other matters related to the U.S. Representatives arising in the Chapter 11 Cases under the Bankruptcy Code or other applicable laws of the U.S. Additionally, the U.S. Representatives and their counsel and other professionals retained therefor (in all cases, whether in Canada or U.S.): (x) shall not be required to seek approval of their retention in the Canadian Court; (y) shall be compensated for their services to the Debtors solely in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code and other applicable laws of the U.S. or orders of the U.S. Court; and (z) shall not be required to seek approval of their compensation in the Canadian Court.

21. Any professionals retained by or with the approval of Toys Canada for activities performed in Canada or in connection with the CCAA Proceeding, including, in each case, counsel, financial advisors, accountants, consultants and experts (collectively, the "**Canadian Professionals**") shall be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Canadian Court. Accordingly, the Canadian Professionals: (a) shall be subject to the procedures and standards for

retention and compensation applicable in the Canadian Court under the CCAA, the Initial Order any other applicable Canadian law or orders of the Canadian Court; and (b) shall not be required to seek approval of their retention or compensation in the U.S. Court. The Debtors will include the identity and the amount of payments with respect to the CCAA Professionals in the monthly operating reports.

22. Any professionals retained by or with approval of the Debtors for activities performed in the U.S. or in connection with the Chapter 11 Cases, including, in each case, counsel, financial advisors, accountants, consultants and experts (collectively, the "**U.S. Professionals**") shall be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Court. Accordingly, the U.S. Professionals: (a) shall be subject to the procedures and standards for retention and compensation applicable in the U.S. Court under the Bankruptcy Code and any other applicable laws of the U.S. or orders of the U.S. Court; and (b) shall not be required to seek approval of their retention of compensation in the Canadian Court.

23. Any professionals retained by the Creditors' Committee, including, in each case, counsel and financial advisors (collectively, the "**Committee Professionals**") shall be subject to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S. Court. Accordingly, the Committee Professionals: (a) shall be subject to the procedures and standards for retention and compensation applicable in the U.S. Court under the Bankruptcy Code and any other applicable laws of the U.S. or orders of the U.S. Court; and (b) shall not be required to seek approval of their retention of compensation in the Canadian Court.

G. Appearances

24. Upon any appearance or filing, as may be permitted or provided for by the rules of the applicable Court, the Debtors, their creditors and other interested parties in the Restructuring Proceedings, including the Creditors' Committee, the Estate Representatives and the U.S. Trustee, shall be subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Canadian Court or the U.S. Court, as applicable, with respect to the particular matters as to which they appear before that Court.

H. Notices

25. Notice of any Pleading or paper filed in one or both of the Restructuring Proceedings involving or relating to matters addressed by this Protocol and notice of any related hearings or other proceedings shall be given by appropriate means (including, where circumstances warrant, by courier, facsimile, email or other electronic forms of communication) to the following: (a) creditors and interested parties, in accordance with the practice of the jurisdiction where the papers are filed or the proceedings are to occur and orders of the applicable Court; and (b) to the extent not otherwise entitled to receive notice under clause (a) of this paragraph, to counsel to the (i) the Debtors (including Canadian counsel to Toys Canada); (ii) the Monitor; (iii) the U.S. Trustee; (vi) DIP ABL Agent and the advisors and counsel thereto; (v) DIP Taj Term Loan Agent and the advisors and counsel thereto; (vi) DIP Delaware Term Loan Agent and the advisors and counsel thereto; (vii) the indenture trustee for the TRU Taj 12.00% Senior Notes and the advisors and counsel thereto; (viii) the administrative agent for the prepetition Secured Revolving Credit Facility and the advisors and counsel thereto; (ix) the administrative agent for the prepetition Secured Term Loan B Facility and the advisors and counsel thereto; (x) the prepetition administrative agent for the Propco I Unsecured Term Loan Facility and the advisors and counsel thereto; (xi) the agent for the Propco II Mortgage Loan and the advisors and counsel

thereto; (xii) the agent for the Giraffe Junior Mezzanine Loan and the advisors and counsel thereto; (xiii) the administrative agent for the prepetition European and Australian Asset-Based Revolving Credit Facility and the advisors and counsel thereto; (xiv) the administrative agent for the Senior Unsecured Term Loan Facility and the advisors and counsel thereto; (xv) the indenture trustee for the Debtors' 7.375% Senior Notes and the advisors and counsel thereto; (xvi) the indenture trustee for the Debtors' 8.75% Unsecured Notes and the advisors and counsel thereto; (xvii) counsel to the ad hoc group of the Term B 4 Holders; and (xviii) counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee of Taj Noteholders. Notice in accordance with this paragraph shall be given by the party otherwise responsible for effecting notice in the jurisdiction where the underlying papers are filed or the proceedings are to occur. In addition to the foregoing, upon request by either Court, the Debtors shall provide the U.S. Court or the Canadian Court, as the case may be, with copies of any orders, decisions, opinions, or similar papers issued by the other Court in the Restructuring Proceedings.

26. When any cross-border issues or matters addressed by this Protocol are to be addressed before a Court, notices shall be provided in the manner and to the parties referred to in paragraph 25 above.

I. Effectiveness; Modification

27. This Protocol shall become effective only upon its approval by both the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court.

28. This Protocol may not be supplemented, modified, terminated, or replaced in any manner except upon the approval of both the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court after notice and a

hearing. Notice of any legal proceedings to supplement, modify, terminate, or replace this Protocol shall be given in accordance with the notice provisions set forth in paragraph 25 above.

J. Procedure for Resolving Disputes Under This Protocol

29. Disputes relating to the terms, intent, or application of this Protocol may be addressed by interested parties to the U.S. Court, the Canadian Court, or both Courts upon notice in accordance with the notice provisions outlined in paragraph 25 above. In rendering a determination in any such dispute, the Court to which the issue is addressed: (a) shall consult with the other Court; and (b) may, in its sole and exclusive discretion, either: (i) render a binding decision after such consultation; (ii) defer to the determination of the other Court by transferring the matter, in whole or in part, to such other Court; or (iii) seek a Joint Hearing of both Courts in accordance with paragraph 11 above. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in making a determination under this paragraph, each Court shall give due consideration to the independence, comity, and inherent jurisdiction of the other Court established under existing law.

30. In implementing the terms of this Protocol, the U.S. Court and the Canadian Court may, in their sole discretion, provide advice or guidance to the other Court with respect to legal issues in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) the U.S. Court or the Canadian Court, as applicable, may determine that such advice or guidance is appropriate under the circumstances;

(b) the Court issuing such advice or guidance shall provide it to the other Court in writing;

(c) copies of such written advice or guidance shall be served by the applicable Court in accordance with paragraph 25 hereof; and

(d) the Courts may jointly decide to invite the Debtors, the Estate Representatives, the U.S. Trustee, the Monitor, the Creditors' Committee and any other affected or interested party to make submissions to the appropriate Court in response to or in connection with any written advice or guidance received from the other Court.

31. For clarity, the provisions of paragraph 31 hereof shall not be construed so as to restrict the ability of either Court to confer as provided in paragraph 11, above, whenever such Court deems it appropriate to do so.

K. Preservation of Rights

32. Except as specifically provided herein, neither the terms of this Protocol nor any actions taken under the terms of this Protocol shall: (a) prejudice or affect the powers, rights, claims, and defenses of the Debtors and their respective estates, the Creditors' Committee, the Estate Representatives, the U.S. Trustee, or any of the Debtors' creditors under applicable law, including the Bankruptcy Code and the CCAA, and the orders of the Courts; or (b) preclude or prejudice the rights of any person to assert or pursue such person's substantive rights against any other person under the applicable laws of Canada or the U.S.

SCHEDULE "A"

GUIDELINES APPLICABLE TO COURT-TO-COURT COMMUNICATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER CASES

[ATTACHED]

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE

TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY:
COOPERATION AMONG
THE NAFTA COUNTRIES

PRINCIPLES OF COOPERATION AMONG THE NAFTA COUNTRIES

Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications in Cross-Border Cases

As Adopted and Promulgated
BY
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

May 16, 2000

The Executive Office
The American Law Institute
4025 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104-3099
Telephone: (215) 243-1600 • Telecopier: (215) 243-1636
E-mail: ali@ali.org • Website: http://www.ali.org

© The American Law Institute – www.ali.org

© The American Law Institute – www.ali.org

Guidelines
Applicable to Court-to-Court Communications
in Cross-Border Cases

Introduction:

One of the most essential elements of cooperation in cross-border cases is communication among the administrating authorities of the countries involved. Because of the importance of the courts in insolvency and reorganization proceedings, it is even more essential that the supervising courts be able to coordinate their activities to assure the maximum available benefit for the stakeholders of financially troubled enterprises.

These Guidelines are intended to enhance coordination and harmonization of insolvency proceedings that involve more than one country through communications among the jurisdictions involved. Communications by judges directly with judges or administrators in a foreign country, however, raise issues of credibility and proper procedures. The context alone is likely to create concern in litigants unless the process is transparent and clearly fair. Thus, communication among courts in cross-border cases is both more important and more sensitive than in domestic cases. These Guidelines encourage such communications while channeling them through transparent procedures. The Guidelines are meant to permit rapid cooperation in a developing insolvency case while ensuring due process to all concerned.

The Guidelines at this time contemplate application only between Canada and the United States because of the very different rules governing communications with and among courts in Mexico. Nonetheless, a Mexican Court might choose to adopt some or all of these Guidelines for communications by a sindico with foreign administrators or courts.

A Court intending to employ the Guidelines — in whole or part, with or without modifications — should adopt them formally before applying them. A Court may wish to make its adoption of the Guidelines contingent upon, or temporary until, their adoption by other courts concerned in the matter. The adopting Court may want to make adoption or continuance conditional upon adoption of the Guidelines by the other Court in a substantially similar form, to ensure that judges, counsel, and parties are not subject to different standards of conduct.

The Guidelines should be adopted following such notice to the parties and counsel as would be given under local procedures with regard to any important procedural decision under similar circumstances. If communication with other courts is urgently needed, the local procedures, including notice requirements, that are used in urgent or emergency situations should be employed, including, if appropriate, an initial period of effectiveness, followed by further consideration of the Guidelines at a later time. Questions about the parties entitled to such notice (for example, all parties or representative parties or representative counsel) and the nature of the court's

© The American Law Institute – www.ali.org

consideration of any objections (for example, with or without a hearing) are governed by the Rules of Procedure in each jurisdiction and are not addressed in the Guidelines.

The Guidelines are not meant to be static, but are meant to be adapted and modified to fit the circumstances of individual cases and to change and evolve as the international insolvency community gains experience from working with them. They are to apply only in a manner that is consistent with local procedures and local ethical requirements. They do not address the details of notice and procedure that depend upon the law and practice in each jurisdiction. However, the Guidelines represent approaches that are likely to be highly useful in achieving efficient and just resolutions of cross-border insolvency issues. Their use, with such modifications and under such circumstances as may be appropriate in a particular case, is therefore recommended.

Guideline 1

Except in circumstances of urgency, prior to a communication with another Court, the Court should be satisfied that such a communication is consistent with all applicable Rules of Procedure in its country. Where a Court intends to apply these Guidelines (in whole or in part and with or without modifications), the Guidelines to be employed should, wherever possible, be formally adopted before they are applied. Coordination of Guidelines between courts is desirable and officials of both courts may communicate in accordance with Guideline 8(d) with regard to the application and implementation of the Guidelines.

Guideline 2

A Court may communicate with another Court in connection with matters relating to proceedings before it for the purposes of coordinating and harmonizing proceedings before it with those in the other jurisdiction.

Guideline 3

A Court may communicate with an Insolvency Administrator in another jurisdiction or an authorized Representative of the Court in that jurisdiction in connection with the coordination and harmonization of the proceedings before it with the proceedings in the other jurisdiction.

Guideline 4

A Court may permit a duly authorized Insolvency Administrator to communicate with a foreign Court directly, subject to the approval of the foreign Court, or through an Insolvency Administrator in the other jurisdiction or through an authorized Representative of the foreign Court on such terms as the Court considers appropriate.

Guideline 5

A Court may receive communications from a foreign Court or from an authorized Representative of the foreign Court or from a foreign Insolvency Administrator and

© The American Law Institute – www.ali.org

should respond directly if the communication is from a foreign Court (subject to Guideline 7 in the case of two-way communications) and may respond directly or through an authorized Representative of the Court or through a duly authorized Insolvency Administrator if the communication is from a foreign Insolvency Administrator, subject to local rules concerning ex parte communications.

Guideline 6

Communications from a Court to another Court may take place by or through the Court:

(a) Sending or transmitting copies of formal orders, judgments, opinions, reasons for decision, endorsements, transcripts of proceedings, or other documents directly to the other Court and providing advance notice to counsel for affected parties in such manner as the Court considers appropriate;

(b) Directing counsel or a foreign or domestic Insolvency Administrator to transmit or deliver copies of documents, pleadings, affidavits, factums, briefs, or other documents that are filed or to be filed with the Court to the other Court in such fashion as may be appropriate and providing advance notice to counsel for affected parties in such manner as the Court considers appropriate;

(c) Participating in two-way communications with the other Court by telephone or video conference call or other electronic means, in which case Guideline 7 should apply.

Guideline 7

In the event of communications between the Courts in accordance with Guidelines 2 and 5 by means of telephone or video conference call or other electronic means, unless otherwise directed by either of the two Courts:

(a) Counsel for all affected parties should be entitled to participate in person during the communication and advance notice of the communication should be given to all parties in accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable in each Court;

(b) The communication between the Courts should be recorded and may be transcribed. A written transcript may be prepared from a recording of the communication which, with the approval of both Courts, should be treated as an official transcript of the communication;

(c) Copies of any recording of the communication, of any transcript of the communication prepared pursuant to any Direction of either Court, and of any official transcript prepared from a recording should be filed as part of the record in the proceedings and made available to counsel for all parties

© The American Law Institute – www.ali.org

in both Courts subject to such Directions as to confidentiality as the Courts may consider appropriate; and

(d) The time and place for communications between the Courts should be to the satisfaction of both Courts. Personnel other than Judges in each Court may communicate fully with each other to establish appropriate arrangements for the communication without the necessity for participation by counsel unless otherwise ordered by either of the Courts.

Guideline 8

In the event of communications between the Court and an authorized Representative of the foreign Court or a foreign Insolvency Administrator in accordance with Guidelines 3 and 5 by means of telephone or video conference call or other electronic means, unless otherwise directed by the Court:

(a) Counsel for all affected parties should be entitled to participate in person during the communication and advance notice of the communication should be given to all parties in accordance with the Rules of Procedure applicable in each Court;

(b) The communication should be recorded and may be transcribed. A written transcript may be prepared from a recording of the communication which, with the approval of the Court, can be treated as an official transcript of the communication;

(c) Copies of any recording of the communication, of any transcript of the communication prepared pursuant to any Direction of the Court, and of any official transcript prepared from a recording should be filed as part of the record in the proceedings and made available to the other Court and to counsel for all parties in both Courts subject to such Directions as to confidentiality as the Court may consider appropriate; and

(d) The time and place for the communication should be to the satisfaction of the Court. Personnel of the Court other than Judges may communicate fully with the authorized Representative of the foreign Court or the foreign Insolvency Administrator to establish appropriate arrangements for the communication without the necessity for participation by counsel unless otherwise ordered by the Court.

Guideline 9

A Court may conduct a joint hearing with another Court. In connection with any such joint hearing, the following should apply, unless otherwise ordered or unless otherwise provided in any previously approved Protocol applicable to such joint hearing:

(a) Each Court should be able to simultaneously hear the proceedings in the other Court.

© The American Law Institute – www.ali.org

(b) Evidentiary or written materials filed or to be filed in one Court should, in accordance with the Directions of that Court, be transmitted to the other Court or made available electronically in a publicly accessible system in advance of the hearing. Transmittal of such material to the other Court or its public availability in an electronic system should not subject the party filing the material in one Court to the jurisdiction of the other Court.

(c) Submissions or applications by the representative of any party should be made only to the Court in which the representative making the submissions is appearing unless the representative is specifically given permission by the other Court to make submissions to it.

(d) Subject to Guideline 7(b), the Court should be entitled to communicate with the other Court in advance of a joint hearing, with or without counsel being present, to establish Guidelines for the orderly making of submissions and rendering of decisions by the Courts, and to coordinate and resolve any procedural, administrative, or preliminary matters relating to the joint hearing.

(e) Subject to Guideline 7(b), the Court, subsequent to the joint hearing, should be entitled to communicate with the other Court, with or without counsel present, for the purpose of determining whether coordinated orders could be made by both Courts and to coordinate and resolve any procedural or nonsubstantive matters relating to the joint hearing.

Guideline 10

The Court should, except upon proper objection on valid grounds and then only to the extent of such objection, recognize and accept as authentic the provisions of statutes, statutory or administrative regulations, and rules of court of general application applicable to the proceedings in the other jurisdiction without the need for further proof or exemplification thereof.

Guideline 11

The Court should, except upon proper objection on valid grounds and then only to the extent of such objection, accept that Orders made in the proceedings in the other jurisdiction were duly and properly made or entered on or about their respective dates and accept that such Orders require no further proof or exemplification for purposes of the proceedings before it, subject to all such proper reservations as in the opinion of the Court are appropriate regarding proceedings by way of appeal or review that are actually pending in respect of any such Orders.

Guideline 12

The Court may coordinate proceedings before it with proceedings in another jurisdiction by establishing a Service List that may include parties that are entitled to receive notice of proceedings before the Court in the other jurisdiction ("Non-Resident

© The American Law Institute – www.ali.org

Parties"). All notices, applications, motions, and other materials served for purposes of the proceedings before the Court may be ordered to also be provided to or served on the Non-Resident Parties by making such materials available electronically in a publicly accessible system or by facsimile transmission, certified or registered mail or delivery by courier, or in such other manner as may be directed by the Court in accordance with the procedures applicable in the Court.

Guideline 13

The Court may issue an Order or issue Directions permitting the foreign Insolvency Administrator or a representative of creditors in the proceedings in the other jurisdiction or an authorized Representative of the Court in the other jurisdiction to appear and be heard by the Court without thereby becoming subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.

Guideline 14

The Court may direct that any stay of proceedings affecting the parties before it shall, subject to further order of the Court, not apply to applications or motions brought by such parties before the other Court or that relief be granted to permit such parties to bring such applications or motions before the other Court on such terms and conditions as it considers appropriate. Court-to-Court communications in accordance with Guidelines 6 and 7 hereof may take place if an application or motion brought before the Court affects or might affect issues or proceedings in the Court in the other jurisdiction.

Guideline 15

A Court may communicate with a Court in another jurisdiction or with an authorized Representative of such Court in the manner prescribed by these Guidelines for purposes of coordinating and harmonizing proceedings before it with proceedings in the other jurisdiction regardless of the form of the proceedings before it or before the other Court wherever there is commonality among the issues and/or the parties in the proceedings. The Court should, absent compelling reasons to the contrary, so communicate with the Court in the other jurisdiction where the interests of justice so require.

Guideline 16

Directions issued by the Court under these Guidelines are subject to such amendments, modifications, and extensions as may be considered appropriate by the Court for the purposes described above and to reflect the changes and developments from time to time in the proceedings before it and before the other Court. Any Directions may be supplemented, modified, and restated from time to time and such modifications, amendments, and restatements should become effective upon being accepted by both Courts. If either Court intends to supplement, change, or abrogate Directions issued under these Guidelines in the absence of joint approval by both Courts, the Court should give the other Courts involved reasonable notice of its intention to do so.

© The American Law Institute – www.ali.org

Guideline 17

Arrangements contemplated under these Guidelines do not constitute a compromise or waiver by the Court of any powers, responsibilities, or authority and do not constitute a substantive determination of any matter in controversy before the Court or before the other Court nor a waiver by any of the parties of any of their substantive rights and claims or a diminution of the effect of any of the Orders made by the Court or the other Court.

© The American Law Institute – www.ali.org

SCHEDULE "B"

LIST OF DEBTOR SUBSIDIARIES

1 Toys "R" Us, Inc.

2 Geoffrey Holdings, LLC

3 Geoffrey International, LLC

4 Geoffrey, LLC

5 Giraffe Holdings, LLC

6 Giraffe Junior Holdings, LLC

7 MAP 2005 Real Estate, LLC

8 Toys "R" Us - Value, Inc.

9 Toys "R" Us (Canada) Ltd.

10 Toys "R" Us Delaware Inc.

11 Toys "R" Us Europe, LLC

12 Toys "R" Us Property Company II, LLC

13 Toys Acquisition, LLC

14 TRU Asia, LLC

15 TRU Guam, LLC

16 TRU Mobility, LLC

17 TRU of Puerto Rico, Inc.

18 TRU Taj (Europe) Holdings, LLC

19 TRU Taj Finance, Inc.

20 TRU Taj Holdings 1, LLC

21 TRU Taj Holdings 2 Limited

22 TRU Taj Holdings 3, LLC

23 TRU Taj, LLC

24 TRU-SVC, Inc.

25 Wayne Real Estate Parent Company, LLC

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF TOYS "R" US (CANADA) LTD. TOYS "R" US (CANADA) LTEE

Applicant

Court File No. CV-17-00582960-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)
Proceeding commenced at Toronto

INITIAL ORDER

GOODMANS LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
333 Bay Street, Suite 3400
Toronto, Canada M5H 2S7

Brian F. Empey LSUC#30640G
bempey@goodmans.ca

Melaney Wagner LSUC#: 44063B
mwagner@goodmans.ca

Christopher Armstrong LSUC#: 55148B
carmstrong@goodmans.ca

Tel: (416) 979-2211
Fax: (416) 979-1234

Lawyers for the Applicant

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OR COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF ROBERTS COMPANY CANADA LIMITED

Court File No.: CV-20-00643158-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

Proceedings commenced in Toronto

BOOK OF AUTHORITIES OF THE APPLICANT
(Amended and Restated Initial Order)

BENNETT JONES LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
3400 One First Canadian Place
P.O. Box 130
Toronto, ON M5X 1A4

Raj Sahni (LSO#: 42942U)
Tel: (416) 777-4804
Email: sahnir@bennettjones.com

Danish Afroz (LSO#: 65786B)
Tel: (416) 777-6124
Email: afrozd@bennettjones.com

Lawyers for the Applicant